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Abstract 
This dissertation is a defence of agent-regret and an exploration of its role in our lives. I argue 
that agent-regret shows that an agent takes seriously her status as an agent who impacts the world, 
but who only has fallible control over it. To accept responsibility for any outcomes, she must 
accept responsibility for unintended outcomes, too: agent-regret is part of being a human agent. 
In doing this, I try to defend and develop Williams’s own conception of agent-regret. 
In the first part, I explore the nature of agent-regret. Agent-regret is distinct from guilt because 
we can feel agent-regret without being at fault. I argue that several challenges that seek to reduce 
agent-regret to a form of guilt fail. I further argue that agent-regret takes as its object not only 
something one has done, but the fact that one did it; I discuss this in terms of what Bernard 
Williams called taking an “external” view on one’s own action.  
I suggest that we can best understand the object of agent-regret as one’s responsibility for an 
outcome. I argue that this form of “responsibility” is conceptually separate from liability or 
answerability; it concerns whether the outcome can be ascribed to an agent. This is a restricted 
form of causal responsibility but retains its agential character. I suggest that we can be responsible 
for outcomes even when we did not intend to bring them about. 
In the second part, I vindicate the propriety of agent-regret against the ideas that we are not 
responsible for unintended outcomes or that such responsibility is not important. I set out 
several challenges to this effect. I argue that we are responsible for unintended outcomes 
because in order to be responsible as agents at all, we must use fallible abilities. When we 
exercise these abilities but fail, we are responsible as agents for those unintended outcomes that 
arise. I then consider the importance of being responsible for particular unintended outcomes 
and analyse the idea that this affects our identities. I argue that responsibility for an outcome 
affects a form of identity, but that it does not involve essential features of a person. Instead, our 
responsibility for outcomes is a contingent feature that nonetheless plays an important role in 
our interpersonal interactions and self-conceptions. I argue that these reactions are appropriate, 
because our responsibility for particular outcomes is independently significant—but these 
reactions also lend this responsibility added significance as part of inescapable human practices.  
Thus our responsibility for outcomes is important. Its importance means that it can serve as an 
appropriate object of agent-regret that vindicates the propriety of agent-regret. I end by 
considering several interesting features of agent-regret, including its expression and “pure” cases, 
which are cases where an agent feels agent-regret despite not regretting the result of her action. 
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“[T]he evil which is done without design should be regarded as a misfortune to the doer as 
well as to the sufferer.” 
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 
 
 
 
In June, 2012, a forty-two-year-old paralegal living in Illinois, whom I’ll call Patricia, was 
driving home in the early evening when the sun suddenly hit her eyes. “I felt an impact, but a 
very strange impact. I thought maybe it was a deer,” she told me. Her air bags deployed, 
knocking her glasses off and burning her forearms. She pulled over, and ran into the road. 
There was blood everywhere. Then she saw a man, crumpled; his motorcycle lay beside him. 
Patricia tried to stanch his head wounds with her clothing. She whispered to him and called 
911. A truck driver came upon the scene and pulled Patricia away from the body. “I couldn’t 
understand what was happening,” she recalled. “He started praying, but he was praying for me. 
I heard him say, ‘God, protect her. God, look out for her. God, give her strength.’ At that 
point, I just completely broke down.” 
Alice Gregory, The Sorrow and the Shame of the Accidental Killer 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Agent-regret plays an important role in both the philosophical literature and in our lives. 
One thing that I have found in writing this thesis is that agent-regret is everywhere; or, 
rather, the sort of incidents that arouse agent-regret are everywhere, even if the emotion 
itself is often present only in a nebulous or obfuscated form. From a golfer blinding a 
spectator with an errant shot,1 to a boxer killing his opponent,2 to the folks whose lives 
have been made wretched by accidentally killing someone, and which have recently 
been the subject of discussion in venues like Radio 4, The Guardian, The New Yorker, 
and This American Life.3  
My aim in this thesis is to offer an analysis of what exactly agent-regret is and to defend 
our propensity to feel it. I have a few reasons for doing this. One is that agent-regret is 
an oft-used and oft-ill-treated concept in philosophy. Philosophers regularly employ the 
concept in passing, using it to help them along to some conclusion, or attacking it on the 
basis of a brief sketch and the strength of their own position. But agent-regret has rarely 
been the subject of a sustained exploration—even, or especially, Williams’s own 
contributions are brief and elusive. Although my account will not be comprehensive, 
since I will have to omit or skim quickly over several features of agent-regret, I hope to 
provide a robust picture of agent-regret so that we can clearly see whether others are 
understanding it properly, and those who wish to attack the idea of agent-regret at least 
have a clear target. 
                                               
 
 
1
 Bryant, “Brooks Koepka.” 
2
 “Mike Towell.” 
3
 “Life After Death”; Clifford, “An Ex-Cop’s Remorse”; Gregory, “The Sorrow and the Shame of the 
Accidental Killer”; Bartley, “Killing a Man...”; Izard, “‘I Had Become a Killer’”; “Meeting the Man I 
Killed - BBC Radio 4,” 4. 
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Secondly, understanding Williams’s own account is important because he is one of the 
most significant figures of Twentieth Century philosophy. Although there are a few 
points at which I diverge from the letter of Williams’s account, I offer an analysis not 
just of agent-regret but of Williams’s notion. Thus we will be able to better see how it 
fits with other elements of his work—I make this explicit at several points—and will be 
better able to understand Williams more broadly. My focus on Williams also explains 
the approach I take. My aim is to argue that Williams’s own account of agent-regret and 
his account of why it is important are correct. It is important to stress two aspects of this. 
Firstly, there is a meta-philosophical point: Williams thought that our emotional 
reactions were central to understanding ourselves.4 Understanding agent-regret is 
important because it is an emotion that illuminates our view of ourselves. Secondly, 
there is what Williams thinks agent-regret reveals. It reveals something about our agency, 
and how we need to take account of the role of luck in working out what it means to be 
an agent. If Williams is right, we see another reason to try to properly understand agent-
regret: understanding it lets us better understand ourselves and the ways in which we 
interact with the world. 
Finally, as I will discuss at 1.3, people often characterise their feelings not as agent-regret 
but as guilt, despite not being at fault. The ordinary folks who have their lives ruined by 
their accidental involvement in horrific events deserve to have to hand a better 
understanding of how they can, and should, react to these events, and how they can 
honour the severity of what they have done without descending into a blaming self-
flagellation. Little hope of my achieving that in a dry academic thesis, but it is a start. 
My hope is that the significance of agent-regret, and of understanding it properly, 
permeates this thesis. In the rest of this introduction, I will lay out some groundwork for 
the rest of this thesis, beginning with an account of the very basics of agent-regret. 
                                               
 
 
4
 See Williams, “Morality and the Emotions”; Williams, “The Point of View of the Universe: Sidgwick 
and the Ambitions of Ethics.” Compare Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.” For a discussion of 
Williams’s method see MacIntyre, Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity - An Essay on Desire, Practical 
Reasoning, and Narrative, 152–58. 
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The Basic Cases 
Before starting anything like an analysis of agent-regret, we should have a few examples 
in mind. The first is Williams’s classic example, the second is often found in the 
literature. 
The Lorry Driver, whilst driving perfectly carefully, hits and kills a child.5 
The lorry driver is not to be confused with the negligent drivers who both are equally 
negligent but one hits a road sign and the other kills a child.6 Our main focus is on the 
lorry driver, and the clear difference between him and the negligent drivers is that he 
was driving perfectly carefully. He was not at fault, and we will discuss this in chapters 1 
and 2.  
I take the lorry driver to be a central case of agent-regret, and we will return to this case 
throughout. But it is a case packed with complicating factors—not least the child’s agency, 
and the fact it is a child involved—that cloud a proper understanding of what is going on. 
So, it is useful to have a more mundane case with a good deal less tragedy: 
Maddie accidentally, and through no fault of her own, smashes Zack’s 
Moorcroft vase.7 
How can she smash a vase without being at fault? I have in mind cases where she 
accidentally brushes against it in a corridor, or, whilst carrying it, it slips out of her hands. 
The basic idea behind agent-regret was that these agents do not just feel regret (because 
they were involved) nor do they feel guilt (because they were not at fault), rather they 
feel a particular emotion that attends to their involvement in the event: agent-regret. 
My focus on the smashing of a vase, as well as the presence of everyday cases in the 
literature, captures something I want to highlight: that agent-regret is everywhere. 
Sometimes one can get the impression that agent-regret is a recherché emotion felt only 
                                               
 
 
5
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 28. 
6
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 29. 
7
 The vase features in MacKenzie, “Agent-Regret and the Social Practice of Moral Luck,” 95; Raz, FNTR, 
244; Wolf, “The Moral of Moral Luck,” 13–14. 
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in the grand and distant cases of Williams’s literary examples, or in truly awful events 
like in the case of the lorry driver or other accidental killers. Yet it is with us in a variety 
of mundane situations, much like when Maddie smashes the vase: from spilling another 
person’s pint, accidentally breaking a girl’s leg by swinging a tennis racquet in the 
corridor, dropping red wine on a white couch, or bumping someone to the floor as we 
both round the corner.8 Agent-regret can be deep, such as when it occurs over some 
very important event like a death, and is widespread, such as in these minor but 
commonplace cases. Insofar as it is both widespread and sometimes deep, it is a 
significant emotional reaction, so to vindicate our propensity to feel it requires some 
heft. 
Foreseen and Unforeseen 
In the above cases, an agent is going about their business and, out of nowhere, a stroke 
of bad luck blindsides them: Maddie smashes the vase, the lorry driver runs over the 
child, and so on. This is the realm of unforeseen outcomes. They involve outcome luck: 
there is luck involved in the outcome arising.9 This will be the form of agent-regret that 
I will focus on throughout this thesis. It raises the question that we discuss in Part II: 
namely, how can we be responsible for outcomes that we did not intend, and why does 
this responsibility matter?  
But there are cases of agent-regret that do not involve outcome luck (even if one might 
be unlucky in being in such a situation).10 This sort of case involves foreseen outcomes. 
In “Moral Luck” Williams says that sometimes “either course of action, even if it is 
judged to be for the best, leaves regrets—which are, in our present terms, agent-regrets 
about something voluntarily done.”11 Williams allows for this to apply to dilemmas, 
                                               
 
 
8
 Sussman, “Is Agent-Regret Rational?,” 788. 
9
 This can also be called “consequential,” “outcome,” or “resultant” luck, see Dan-Cohen, “Luck and 
Identity,” 6n14. It is contrasted with luck in one’s circumstances or constitution, see Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 
28. 
10
 For the distinction see Baron, “Remorse and Agent-Regret,” sec. 3.2. Stephen de Wijze thinks this, 
“tragic remorse”, is different to agent-regret because it involves a “willing endorsement of a moral 
violation” whereas agent-regret involves luck de Wijze, “Tragic-Remorse –The Anguish of Dirty Hands,” 
464. I will stick to Williams’s characterisation of these as cases of agent-regret.  
11
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 31. 
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“tragic cases,” where no option is best;12 and it can also apply for cases where is forced 
into the lesser of two evils. The classic example is Agamemnon.13 Agamemnon must 
choose between sacrificing his daughter Iphigenia and abandoning his war.14 He chooses 
to sacrifice Iphigenia. Williams is clear that Agamemnon does not regret what he has 
done due to “a persistent doubt that he may not have chosen the better thing”.15 He feels 
regret “not because of a doubt, but because of a certainty” and that certainty is simply 
that he has done something awful—whether it was a dilemma or the lesser of two evils—
he has killed his daughter.  
Now, we need not just apply this to tragic cases or cases in which there is great damage 
caused. Sometimes there will be no way of resolving a conflict between two values.16 And 
if we notice that sometimes two values can conflict in rather mundane scenarios, we see 
that there are many cases in which this sort of regret might arise.17 Should I keep my 
promise to meet my friend, or should I tend to the injured bird? I might regret doing 
either because of how it harms the bird or my friend. Should I buy the PlayStation, or 
should I give my money to charity? Both courses might leave me with regrets: not 
because either option is awful or the choice is tragic but because I clearly lose out on 
something,18 or they cause some sort of harm to someone, or there is something 
“distressing or appalling”19—or even just a little off—about what I have done, or it is not 
the sort of thing done by “honourable and scrupulous people”.20 
The basic idea behind agent-regret in cases of foreseen outcomes is that one can feel 
agent-regret over making a choice where one knows what will happen, but one regrets 
                                               
 
 
12
 Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 173.  The rest of “Ethical Consistency” explores dilemmas and the 
underlying picture of obligation in more depth. See also Williams, “Conflicts of Values.” 
13
 Williams, “Ethical Consistency.” Cited at Williams, “Moral Luck,” 31n3. See also Williams, S&N, 132–
35. And see Williams, “Practical Necessity.” For a different interpretation, according to which 
Agamemnon should be blamed for his attitude, see Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 33–38. 
Williams calls this a “moralistic distortion” Williams, S&N, 134. 
14
 He is fighting a just war, “that he could not desert without the most serious impiety”, and men are 
starving because the expedition has stalled Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, 34. 
15
 Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 173. 
16
 Williams, “Conflicts of Values.” 
17
 E.g. the mundane yet off-putting tasks that one might have to perform in order to achieve a worthwhile 
political project, at Williams, “Politics and Moral Character,” 60. 
18
 Carla Bagnoli offers an analysis of agent-regret in terms of the loss of a valuable alternative: Bagnoli, 
“Value in the Guise of Regret.” I discuss this below in 3.3. 
19
 Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” 174. Williams notes this wouldn’t be “moral” or give us a conflict of 
obligations. 
20
 Williams, “Politics and Moral Character,” 57. 
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that action because it had some noxious elements, but this does not arouse guilt because 
one was not at fault and did as well as one could have done in a bad situation.21 We will 
mostly focus on cases of unforeseen outcomes because it is there that some interesting 
issues concerning agency arise. Still, I hope that my analysis of agent-regret does extend 
to these foreseen cases, and I leave them in the background primarily to keep the 
discussion streamlined and uncomplicated. I will briefly return to foreseen cases at 3.2. 
Moral Luck 
Many discussions of agent-regret come amidst discussions of moral luck. Williams saw 
himself as reacting against a particular idea of morality that he located in Kant: that moral 
value is both supremely important and is immune to luck.22 Kant’s view is paradigmatic 
of “the morality system”.23 Such a system focusses on the voluntary and judges us by what 
we control, assuming that our intentions are fully in our own control and thus immune 
to luck.24 By showing us the importance of agent-regret, which seems to tell us something 
about our agency outside the voluntary, Williams hoped to cast doubt on the morality 
system.25  
But we must be careful not to pigeon-hole agent-regret as a parochial reaction to an 
even-more-parochial system. Williams himself thinks that the emotions of certain Greek 
figures are understood by us and them as akin to agent-regret.26 Adam Smith, writing 
before Kant, offered an account of a similar reaction.27 Smith uses remarkably similar 
examples to Williams: he cites a man who rides a horse and loses control, and a man 
who “without the smallest degree of blameable negligence” kills another.28   
It is action, and our assessment of it, that will lie at the heart of this thesis, not morality. 
Still, many of the discussions we will encounter overlap with questions concerning 
                                               
 
 
21
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 31. 
22
 Williams, 20–22. 
23
 See especially Williams, ELP, chap. 10. 
24
 Williams, 177–78, 193–94. 
25
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 22. 
26
 Williams, S&N, 93. See also Williams, chap. 3. 
27
 For Smith’s discussion of moral luck see Smith, TMS, II.iii. For discussion see Crisp, “Moral Luck and 
Equality of Moral Opportunity”; Hankins, “Adam Smith’s Intriguing Solution to the Problem of Moral 
Luck.” 
28
 The first example is at Smith, TMS, II.iii.2.10. The second at Smith, II.iii.3.4. 
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morality or the law. This means that many of the discussions I engage with have a 
different focus and arise from different interests. I will not attempt to make explicit 
“translations” between those projects and mine, yet hope to accurately convey the spirit 
of any of the interlocutors encountered below to shed light on human agency.  
The Structure 
This thesis is in two interlinked parts. The first part sets out the nature of agent-regret. 
In chapter 1, I distinguish agent-regret from ordinary regret and guilt. I distinguish it 
from ordinary regret by exploring how the object of agent-regret is the fact that I have 
done something, not just something that I have done; this is because I can take an 
external view on my action. When one takes an external view on one’s own action, one 
recognises it as one’s action but regards it as if someone else had acted, and this 
precludes agent-regret. I then distinguish agent-regret from guilt by exploring what the 
distinction between agent-regret and guilt is supposed to be, arguing that there is a form 
of guilt that is distinct from agent-regret insofar as this form of guilt presupposes fault 
and that one intended the outcome.  
In chapter 2, I develop this. I suggest that the object of agent-regret is one’s responsibility 
for an outcome. Our responsibility for an outcome concerns whether an outcome can 
be ascribed to us as agents, and I distinguish this from several other understandings of 
responsibility. Yet why would we regret our responsibility for an outcome if we were not 
at fault in bringing it about? I sketch the idea that being responsible for some outcomes 
is worse than being responsible for others.  
In chapter 3, I argue that we sometimes regret our responsibility for an outcome despite 
not regretting the outcome itself. This is because our responsibility for outcomes matters 
independently of the outcomes it creates. I call this the “pure” analysis of agent-regret. I 
explain how this also applies to cases of foreseen outcomes. I end chapter 3, and Part I, 
by summarising my account of the nature of agent-regret, and by contrasting it with 
several broad accounts of the nature of agent-regret. 
In Part II, I defend our propensity for agent-regret by exploring whether our 
responsibility for outcomes is significant enough to provoke a reaction like agent-regret. 
As I have said, agent-regret is widespread and can be deep. This sets us a challenge: to 
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show that responsibility for an outcome is significant enough to engender a reaction like 
agent-regret. 
In chapter 4, I make clear that our responsibility for outcomes is important, both to our 
status as persons and our self-respect. But my account of outcome responsibility holds 
that we are responsible also for outcomes we did not intend; after all, agent-regret is 
supposed to arise in cases like the driver’s, where he clearly did not intend to kill the 
child. Are we responsible for outcomes that we did not intend? I sketch several 
challenges that claim we are not. Some claim that although we might be responsible in 
some sense, this is not due to any features of our agency (I noted above that I want to 
follow Williams’s approach and to show that our responsibility for outcomes tells us 
something about agency); others claim that we only think we are responsible due to a 
mistake.  
In chapter 5, I argue that our status as agents depends upon being responsible for 
unintended outcomes. I argue that this is based on a realistic understanding of agency 
and is not based on a mistake: to make an impact on the world as agents we must use 
fallible abilities. The basic idea is that we are also responsible for outcomes when we 
use these abilities and they misfire. What’s more, a mature agent understands that she 
is fallible and cannot guarantee bringing about the outcomes she intends; the mature 
agent accepts that she is responsible for unintended outcomes. This is a realistic picture 
of human agency according to which we can make an impact on the world—we can make 
an impact, but imperfectly—and this grounds our responsibility for unintended 
outcomes 
Chapter 5 establishes that we are (at least sometimes) responsible for outcomes that we 
did not intend. But this doesn’t tell us much about how we should respond to our 
responsibility for particular outcomes, like the driver’s responsibility for the child’s 
death. In chapter 6, I turn from the picture of agency to the importance that individual 
instances of responsibility have for an agent. I take up a suggestion found in both 
Williams and Tony Honoré: that our responsibility for outcomes affects our identities. 
I consider Meir Dan-Cohen’s claim that were we not responsible for certain outcomes 
we would not be the individuals that we are. I argue that this fails to make sense of our 
emotional reactions. Instead, I suggest that the way in which outcome responsibility 
affects our identities is in being a feature to which we and others respond in a way that 
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affects our self-conceptions and interpersonal reactions. I suggest that these reactions 
are inescapable, and argue that they are rightly inescapable by exploring the relation 
between these reactions, our features, and what it means to be a potent-but-fallible 
human agent. Thus our responsibility for outcomes is significant and is an appropriate 
object of agent-regret. 
In chapter 7, I explore how this picture of identity explains: why there can be divergence 
over whether we think someone should feel agent-regret; taking an external view on 
one’s own action; how we can understand agent-regret on a pure analysis; how we move 
on from agent-regret; and how agent-regret urges the agent to act. 
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Chapter 1 
Agency and Regret 
 
 
 
In 1.1, I locate agent-regret in a broader family of retrospective emotions, including guilt 
and regret. In 1.2, I distinguish agent-regret from ordinary regret by considering the role 
that agency plays in agent-regret. I draw the familiar contrast between agent-regret and 
regret; further, I discuss Williams’s “external” view and show this affects our conception 
of agent-regret: agent-regret involves not only regretting one’s own action but regretting 
that an action was one’s own. In 1.3, I turn to guilt. I consider the contrast between 
agent-regret and guilt in light of survivor guilt. I argue that agent-regret need not attach 
to faulty actions and this establishes a contrast with at least one conception of guilt. I 
suggest that a reasonable conception of fault leaves characters like the lorry driver and 
Maddie free from fault. 
I leave one further issue concerning guilt until chapter 2, where we take up the question 
of why we might regret our actions if we were not at fault. Through chapters 2 and 3, we 
will come to a rough grip on why we might regret our own actions without being at fault 
and will further develop this in Part II. 
1.1 Agent-regret, regret, and guilt 
There are clear affinities between agent-regret, guilt (or remorse), and ordinary regret; 
when Williams introduced the idea of agent-regret in “Moral Luck”, he contrasted it 
with these emotions.1 All three of these emotions are, in R. Jay Wallace’s terms, 
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“retrospective.”2 They are retrospective because they are directed at a past occurrence 
(unlike fear or hope).3 We will focus only on the negative retrospective emotions (unlike 
nostalgia), which involve feeling pain or distress about that past occurrence; this pain is 
occasioned via the thought that the object of the emotion was somehow “unfortunate or 
lamentable” (unlike the twinge in my hamstring caused by an old injury).4 I will assume 
this cognitivist picture, whereby the painful feeling is aroused by a thought, throughout 
this thesis.5 
Retrospective negative emotions have as their object (mediated via a thought) some 
past occurrence; this is regarded as lamentable and lends the emotion a painful 
feeling. 
This understanding of these emotions is explanatory in several ways. Firstly, the fact that 
we regard something as lamentable explains why the emotion will be painful; as Wallace 
puts it, “It makes sense to be pained about an event or situation that you evaluate in 
negative terms.”6 It also explains another important feature of these emotions. When we 
have a retrospective negative emotion, we wish that the lamentable thing had never 
happened.7 This is because, at least in ordinary cases, to regard something as lamentable 
is to prefer that it had never happened. So, seeing it as lamentable makes sense of 
wishing it had not happened.8 This shows the basis behind Williams’s claim that in any 
case of agent-regret, there will be “a wish on the agent's part that he had not done it.”9 
Maddie wishes that she had not broken the vase, and this is because she sees her 
breaking the vase as lamentable. The lorry driver wishes he had not hit the child because 
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 Wallace, The View from Here, 16–19. Wallace is a sceptic about agent-regret Wallace, 40–45. See 
below 4.4.2. 
3
 We might regret something that will happen, but this is past insofar as we regret not its future happening, 
but the (already existent) fact that it will happen. 
4
 Wallace, The View from Here, 19. Carla Bagnoli appeals to a similar thought, from the other angle: for 
Bagnoli, one feels agent-regret, and the associated pain, in virtue of seeing the value of the option one did 
not choose Bagnoli, “Value in the Guise of Regret,” 177–78. For a focus on the object of regret and our 
attitude towards that object, see Rorty, “Agent Regret.”  
5
 See also Scarre, “The ‘Constitutive Thought’ of Regret,” 572–73. For scepticism around cognitivism, see 
Bagnoli, “Value in the Guise of Regret”; Jacobson, “Regret, Agency, and Error.”  
6
 Wallace, The View from Here, 19. 
7
 At least, we wish it had never happened under at least one description: for instance, I might regret that I 
broke my foot, but not regret that I broke my foot in saving my wife’s life.  
8
 Wallace, The View from Here, 49–50. 
9
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 30. 
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he sees his hitting the child as lamentable. (Thinking about wishes is useful in 
understanding agent-regret, but I will only briefly discuss wishes, at 7.2.) 
How do we set agent-regret apart from other retrospective emotions? Although I will 
nuance and expand it, the following offers us a basic understanding of agent-regret: 
Agent-regret has what I have done as its object; what I have done is regarded as 
lamentable—even if I was not at fault in doing it—and this gives agent-regret a 
painful feeling. 
Ordinary regret need not involve what I have done, and guilt seems to involve fault. This 
characterisation clearly needs sharpening and we need a deeper grasp of the ways in 
which agent-regret is distinct from guilt and ordinary regret. I will focus, in the rest of 
Part I, on how agent-regret involves our agency and how it can be free from fault.10  
1.2 Agency 
In this section, I will explore the way in which agent-regret involves regretting one’s 
action. We will further develop how agent-regret attaches to one’s own action in chapter 
2, where I will argue that the object of agent-regret is one’s responsibility for an outcome.  
1.2.1 The first person 
Let’s start by establishing a distinction between regret and agent-regret. Most famously, 
a spectator to the lorry driver’s accident might regret what happened.11 She might regret 
the actions of the child who ran into the road, or of the child’s parents in letting him 
play so close.12 Keaton might regret that Maddie smashed Zack’s vase. In none of these 
cases does the person who feels regret have to be involved in the regrettable occurrence. 
Anyone who thinks such a thing was lamentable might regret it, and this is because regret 
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 For a similar focus on fault and agency, see Sussman, “Is Agent-Regret Rational?,” 790–95.  
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 28. 
12
 Scarre considers a case where the lorry driver regrets not his own action but the child’s: See Scarre, 
“The ‘Constitutive Thought’ of Regret,” 577. See Williams’s discussion of the javelin thrower: Williams, 
S&N, 61–62. 
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can take as its object states of affairs, things that have happened, or other people’s 
actions.13 This is regret in the “general sense”;14  or what I will call “ordinary regret”. 
Regret has some past occurrence as its object; this object is regarded as 
lamentable and this gives regret a painful feeling.  
This is a broad characterisation of regret. Some philosophers characterise regret more 
narrowly, suggesting that regret involves human agency.15 Others note that if we just 
define regret in my way, it might be too general to be an illuminating characterisation of 
any emotion.16 But my use of regret fits with Williams’s own use.17 What matters for our 
purposes is not so much whether regret is broadly understood or narrowly understood, 
whether it is a class or species of emotion, nor whether agent-regret is an entirely distinct 
emotion from regret or just a species of it. What matters for our purposes is that we can 
see that there is a standard sort of regret that does not presuppose involvement, and that 
agent-regret is clearly distinct from (or within) this. 
But agent-regret requires more than mere involvement: Zack does not feel agent-regret 
that Maddie smashed his vase.18 Rather, it concerns one’s agential involvement, it 
concerns an agent’s “own past actions”.19 Now, it isn’t just that one’s agential involvement 
allows one to feel agent-regret; rather, the object of one’s agent-regret is one’s agential 
involvement. The thing we think is lamentable is not just any state of affairs, nor is it just 
any occurrence or action; rather, the object of agent-regret is, at least for this current 
broad characterisation, one’s own exercise of agency. Thus agent-regret arouses a 
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 Williams says that one regrets states of affairs  Williams, “Moral Luck,” 27. I don’t think much hangs 
on this; it is clear that I can regret that the lorry driver killed the child, rather than just regretting the child’s 
death. 
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 Williams, 27.  
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 Bittner, “Is It Reasonable to Regret Things One Did?,” 262. In some of the psychological literature, 
regret turns around our own deliberative errors: see Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, chap. 32. 
Kahneman references Zeelenberg et al., “On Bad Decisions and Disconfirmed Expectancies.” John 
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 Jacobson, “Regret, Agency, and Error,” 97. But even if we define regret broadly, we can define 
subspecies such as ordinary regret, which cannot attach to one’s own action. 
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 See also Sussman, “Is Agent-Regret Rational?,” 793. 
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 We discuss “personal regret” at 4.3.2; this is a form of regret that presupposes some sort of involvement 
but not necessarily agential involvement—Zack may feel personal regret. I agree that this is a useful 
category and deepens our understanding of the varieties of regret. 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 27. 
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different wish that things could have been otherwise, a wish not just about how things 
turned out, but about how “one might have acted otherwise.”20  
The point is that Maddie can think “what I did was lamentable… I wish I hadn’t done 
it.” Agent-regret takes what I have done as its object. So, what we regret when we feel 
agent-regret is specific: 
Agent-regret laments that I did such a thing. 
Proviso: Agent-regret is agent regret rather than action regret. It can attach to 
actions of my team or group.21 Or, the lorry driver’s cab-mate can feel agent-
regret if he thinks he “might have prevented [the child’s death], an agent’s 
thought.”22 Other sorts of omissions might also arouse agent-regret. I will only 
discuss agent-regret that arises over actions, but I hope that what I say is 
amenable to adaptation. For instance, in 2.3.1 I say that one must intend to do 
something and be causally related to it in order to be responsible for it. To 
broaden, we might think that the cab-mate could have reached over and pulled 
the brake; because he could have done that, we might extend to him an agent’s 
thought.  
Most pictures of agent-regret leave it at this. But agent-regret is not just the same as 
regretting one’s own action. Agent-regret has a thicker object than merely one’s own 
action. This is because one might regret something that one has done in just the same 
way as one regrets anyone else’s actions and thus feel ordinary regret, not agent-regret.23 
We saw above that Keaton might regret that Maddie smashed the vase—Maddie might 
also feel ordinary regret about her smashing of the vase. Williams calls this regarding 
one’s action (that one recognises as one’s own action) “purely externally, as one might 
regard anyone else's action”.24 I have discussed this in more depth elsewhere, but it is 
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 One must be a “participant” Williams, 27. See Baron, “Remorse and Agent-Regret,” 274–78; Dan-
Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self,” 986–89. 
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important to have a rough grip on the external view since it makes clear exactly what the 
object of agent-regret is.25 
1.2.2 The external view 
Understanding what it means to take an external view on our own actions is important. 
But most accounts of agent-regret go by without a mention of taking an external view on 
one’s own action. So, does it really matter? Well, we will later (in 7.4) see that the 
external view illuminates an important feature of agent-regret: its particular expression. 
In short, when one takes an external view, one might be willing to pay compensation but 
is satisfied with an insurance pay-out to the victim of one’s actions, whereas when one 
feels agent-regret one is not left satisfied by a pay-out.26 Appreciating the external view 
helps us understand this. But more importantly than explaining this feature of agent-
regret, understanding the external view will also allow us to see what exactly the object 
of agent-regret is. What does it mean to take an external view on one’s own action and 
feel ordinary regret rather than agent-regret? 
Keaton feels a certain regret over Maddie smashing the vase. Let’s suppose that he 
doesn’t just regret that the vase smashed but regrets that someone smashed the vase.27 
The idea behind the external view is that we can imagine Maddie (let’s call her MaddieExt 
when she takes an external view) knowing she smashed the vase but feeling regret in just 
the same way that Keaton feels regret. For instance, we can imagine Maddie
Ext
 saying to 
Zack something like “It’s a shame someone smashed your vase” rather than “I’m so 
sorry I smashed your vase”. Here is another example: perhaps one might take an 
external view on an action one performed long ago. Arnold might regret that his 
grandson carved graffiti into a tree, and then he remembers that he did such a thing 
himself as a kid. We can imagine Arnold thinking that carving graffiti into a tree is a 
regrettable thing for a child to do, but he might think back on his own action and regret 
it in just the same way as he regrets his grandson carving into a tree. Both Maddie and 
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 See Wojtowicz, “Bernard Williams on Regarding One’s Own Action Purely Externally.” 
26
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 28. 
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 The discussion closely follows Wojtowicz, “Bernard Williams on Regarding One’s Own Action Purely 
Externally,” 53–54. 
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Arnold might regret these actions, but they regret them in the same way that they might 
regret anyone else’s actions. 
How does a thought like “I regret the vase was smashed (and I recognise I smashed it)” 
differ from the thought involved in agent-regret? Above I characterised agent-regret as 
lamenting that I did such a thing. An external view is different. It still involves regret. 
But Maddie
Ext’s regret is not directed at MaddieExt doing a certain thing. Rather, when she 
takes an external view she regrets that something was done (the vase was smashed) and 
recognises that she did it. She regrets something that is her doing, but she regrets the 
doing not the fact that it was her doing. When she feels agent-regret she regrets her 
doing. So, agent-regret and an external view have different objects. Maddie
Ext 
regrets an 
action, which was her action; Maddie regrets it as her action.28 
When someone regrets their own action but takes an external view, they regret 
that action, they recognise that they performed that action, but they do not regret 
the fact that they performed that action so do not feel agent-regret. 
This shows that agent-regret requires more than a “first-personal subject-matter”, it 
requires more than just regretting one’s own action.29 Instead, as Marcia Baron puts it, 
“That he was the agent…is ineliminably a part of what he feels.”30 And Raimond Gaita 
says that agent-regret is “directed not only to what we did or to its effects, but also at the 
fact that we did it.”31 The point here is that someone who feels agent-regret has the self-
referential thought “I regret that I did it”.32 When I take an external view, that I was the 
agent is not ineliminably part of what I feel; nor is my regret directed at the fact that I 
did it.  
Further, an agent can take an external view on an action that might also have aroused, 
in that agent, agent-regret. It isn’t the type of action that precludes agent-regret; rather, it 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 27.  
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 Baron, “Remorse and Agent-Regret,” 261.  
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 Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 53. David Sussman also brings out the importance of 
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is taking a particular kind of attitude.33 We can also imagine Maddie
Ext
 feeling agent-regret 
(as she does in the standard case), and we might imagine Arnold feeling agent-regret, 
too. What seems to happen in taking an external view is that an agent recognises that 
she did it, and it was regrettable, but something steps in to prevent her from regretting 
her doing it and leaves her only regretting that it was done. How do we explain why one 
might take an external view or feel agent-regret? I do not want to offer a full analysis of 
this here but do wish to close off some possible misunderstandings. For instance, Joseph 
Raz attempts to distinguish taking an external view from feeling agent-regret by way of 
JR who forgets that he performed such an action, and when he realises that he was the 
agent he again feels agent-regret.34 But such an understanding of the external view doesn’t 
explain why someone who takes an external view would be willing to pay compensation, 
because if I have forgotten I did it, why would I think I should compensate as opposed 
to anyone else compensating?  
Further, philosophers who are interested in Williams are often tempted (at least, as I 
have found in conversation) to explain the external view in terms of Nagel’s external 
view or Williams’s extrinsic luck. I discuss the failure of such accounts elsewhere but let 
me briefly recap. Take, first, extrinsic luck. Williams thinks that luck can affect a project 
in one of two ways.35 On the one hand, there is luck intrinsic to a project, such as Gauguin 
failing because he doesn’t get a lucky stroke of creativity; on the other, there is luck 
seemingly unrelated to the project, such as Gauguin crashing on the way to Tahiti.36  If 
he fails due to intrinsic luck he feels agent-regret;37 if he fails due to extrinsic luck he 
regrets what has happened, but does not think that he has failed.38 But this shows why 
we cannot understand the external view in terms of extrinsic luck: when one suffers 
extrinsic luck and feels regret, one tends to regret what happened, not one’s action. 
Gauguin regrets that he never became a painter or that he was injured, he does not regret 
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his action, say, setting off to become a painter. Likewise, Nagel’s external view doesn’t 
allow for us to regret an action.39 Nagel’s “external view” involves taking a mechanistic 
view on the world such that an action becomes very much like an event—so we lose our 
grip on the idea that something is an action and can be regretted as an action.40 
My own approach was to suggest two promising analyses of the external view: either one 
might accept an action as one’s own yet not identify with it or one does not care about 
the fact that one performed that action.41 Maddie might take an external view because 
she does not care about what she has done, or does not identify with her action. We will 
return to this in chapter 7. For now, we must see that agent-regret involves regretting that 
I did such a thing. It is not ordinary regret since it involves one’s own agency. And it is 
thicker than just regretting an action and recognising that the action was my own since 
one can regret something that in fact is one’s own doing yet not regret the fact that it was 
own doing. Agent-regret involves regretting that I did it.  
1.3 Guilt and fault 
I will return to this in more depth in chapter 2, but we should have a good enough grip 
on the object of agent-regret to now be wondering: if agent-regret involves regretting what 
I have done, how is it any different to guilt? After all, guilt also seems to involve one’s 
own actions, and when one feels guilt one does not take an external view.  
Guilt has some past faulty behaviour (or wrongdoing) of mine as its object; this 
object is regarded as lamentable and this gives guilt a painful feeling. 
In “Moral Luck”, as well as contrasting agent-regret with ordinary regret, Williams 
contrasted agent-regret with two related concepts: fault and remorse.42 Fault is a 
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normative judgment, remorse is an emotion that responds to this. Williams claims we 
need to move away from a “dichotomy” between “regret and remorse”.43 And that is 
because agent-regret is distinct from them both: 
Agent-regret is distinct from some notion of guilt. 
I use “guilt” interchangeably with “remorse”.44 
Williams pinpoints two features of guilt: fault, and the voluntary.45 Williams wrote, 
famously, that the lorry driver runs over the child “through no fault of his own” and that 
we can admit that it “was not his fault.”46 So, Agent-regret can arise in cases in which the 
agent is not at fault.47  
Agent-regret can arise in cases where the agent is not at fault. 
In Ethics and the Limits, Williams links guilt to blame, and he further links blame to 
doing what one ought not.48 An agent who feels guilt feels this emotion because he can 
blame himself, and he can blame himself because he was at fault (he did what he ought 
not do). But the lorry driver needn’t blame himself, because he did as well as he could 
in the circumstances. The difference here between guilt and agent-regret comes out if 
we think that there is a difference between the emotion felt by our lorry driver and a 
reckless or drunk driver. 
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Secondly, we can only feel guilt over what we have voluntarily done, but we can feel 
agent-regret about the voluntary or the involuntary.49 The point is just that one’s action 
does not have to be voluntary in order to arouse agent-regret.50 Or, more precisely, the 
regrettable action need not be voluntary—driving was a voluntary act of the driver’s, 
killing the child was not, and it is killing that he regrets. This relates to the intended. 
What I mean by these terms is illustrated by the lorry driver’s case: an action is voluntary 
(driving) or involuntary (killing), an outcome is intended (getting to one’s destination) or 
unintended (the child dying).51 The driver intended to get to the depot and voluntarily 
drove; he did not intend to kill the child and the killing was not voluntary. I will tend to 
use “voluntarily” and “intentionally” on the one hand, and “non-
voluntary”/“involuntary” and “unintentionally” on the other, interchangeably. (See 2.2 
and 2.3.1.) 
Agent-regret can arise over non-voluntary actions. 
Although guilt is restricted to the voluntary, agent-regret can arise over both the voluntary 
and the involuntary.  
So, agent-regret can arise when the agent is not at fault, can arise when the agent’s action 
was not voluntary, and is distinct from guilt at least insofar as guilt is restricted to the 
voluntary and the faulty. This brings us to a family of challenges to agent-regret. So far, 
I have just been trying to sketch the object of agent-regret, without much resistance; now 
we must turn to genuine worries for whether there is indeed a distinct emotion with such 
an object. A broad and wide-spread line of argument holds that there is no such thing 
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as agent-regret, and instead agent-regret is not (importantly) distinct from some other 
emotion; often the claim is that agent-regret is actually guilt.  
Challenges from guilt: agent-regret is just a form of guilt.52 
Sometimes this is not so much an argument as characters describing themselves as 
feeling guilty because guilt is more fitting than ordinary regret.53 Take the following 
exchange between Jonathan Izard and MaryAnn Gray, both of whom killed someone 
in a car accident: 
JI: “Was the right word guilt for your feeling in those first few weeks 
and months?”  
MG: “Absolutely. The accident, my accident, was not my fault. Really 
nobody, including the boy’s family, blamed me. But I blamed myself. 
I was the one driving the car that hit and killed an 8-year-old boy.” 54 
Yet Jonathan Bartley, another accidental killer, questions whether what he feels is 
actually guilt.55  
Given that Williams is so insistent that agent-regret is distinct from guilt, for Williams to 
be right we need to find a form of guilt that clearly contrasts with agent-regret, such that 
there may still be cases of agent-regret that are not just swallowed up by guilt and that 
are applicable to these real-world cases. In the following, I explore some philosophical 
challenges to the idea that agent-regret is a distinct emotion. In doing so I want to show 
how there is conceptual space for agent-regret. In 1.3.1, I consider the first challenge, a 
threat to agent-regret’s distinctness that arises by considering what it means to feel guilt. 
The survivor guilt challenge claims that guilt needn’t involve fault and can arise over the 
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involuntary, so agent-regret is just a form of guilt. I admit that when guilt is understood 
in this capacious sense, agent-regret can be a form of guilt—but this is no challenge to us 
since the contrast with agent-regret is really with “narrow guilt”. I further explore the 
guilt of the morality system, which is the form of narrow guilt that Williams contrasted 
with agent-regret in “Moral Luck”, and which involves both fault and voluntariness.   
In 1.3.2 we come to the second and third challenges. We find the second challenge 
expressed, albeit tentatively, by Adam Smith. This is the fault challenge, which claims 
that our characters are actually at fault and so feel guilty. I argue that the fault challenge 
is misguided: a plausible notion of fault leaves the driver and Maddie free of fault, this 
is because fault must involve a failing in one’s conduct and they exhibit no such failings. 
The third challenge arises in several discussions of agent-regret. This is the doubts about 
fault challenge, which claims that our characters think they are (or might be) at fault, so 
either they actually feel guilt, or agent-regret involves the mistaken perception of fault. I 
argue that it is implausible to hold that agents must think they are (or might be) at fault. 
By the end of 1.3, we will have seen several ways in which agent-regret is distinct from 
guilt and fault and will have established the contrast Williams had in mind between 
agent-regret and guilt.  
But we will not yet address a final challenge, the object challenge. This holds that to 
regret one’s own action one must have been at fault. It questions how we can even think 
our actions are regrettable if we were not at fault. We turn to this challenge in chapter 
2. 
1.3.1 The contrast with guilt 
The first challenge from guilt alleges that agent-regret is just the same as guilt because 
there are other forms of guilt that do not involve fault and can arise over the involuntary; 
thus the characterisation of guilt is flawed. The classic example is survivor guilt. 
The survivor guilt challenge: the concept “guilt” covers cases in which the agent 
is not at fault, and it is not restricted to the voluntary (e.g. survivor guilt). So, 
agent-regret is just a form of guilt. 
The reply to this challenge is simply that it misses the point: agent-regret is not supposed 
to contrast with just any stipulated form of guilt. We will see that there is a capacious 
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sense of guilt which might overlap with agent-regret. But it is also vital that we find some 
variety of guilt that stands in contrast to agent-regret, given Williams’s insistence that 
there is some contrast between guilt and agent-regret.  
In Shame and Necessity, Williams briefly explores guilt.56 He suggests that guilt is 
aroused by an action (or omission) that “typically elicits from other people anger, 
resentment, or indignation” and calls for, and can be abated by, “reparation”.57  
Capacious guilt is aroused by an act that typically arouses the anger or 
resentment of others, and often calls for reparations.  
This is a very broad understanding of guilt: it makes no reference to fault or wrongdoing, 
nor does it presuppose that one’s action was voluntary.58 Others offer similar analyses of 
guilt, analyses that do not implicate an agent’s fault or which do not attach only to the 
voluntary. For instance, David Velleman thinks we can feel guilty for surviving a plane 
crash (survivor guilt)59 or for eating ice cream.60 On Velleman’s picture, we can feel guilty 
when we are “defenceless” against negative responses like “blame [or] resentment” and 
we are defenceless “because they are warranted”, but we need not be at fault for these 
responses to be warranted.61 So, there might be some notion that we rightly call “guilt” 
that does not involve fault but counts as guilt because it involves defencelessness or the 
warranted anger of others. One might think that if a capacious understanding of guilt is 
the correct understanding of the concept of guilt, this collapses the distinction between 
agent-regret and guilt.62 
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But Williams grants that agent-regret may be a form of capacious guilt.63 Others may 
direct their anger or resentment at me, and may feel they have a claim to compensation, 
even in cases of agent-regret.64 But those tempted by the claim that agent-regret is just a 
form of guilt because survivor guilt is a form of guilt, a form of guilt that does not involve 
fault or voluntariness, miss the mark. The existence of survivor guilt as a form of guilt is 
a threat to the distinctness of agent-regret only if we think the important contrast is 
between capacious guilt and agent-regret.  
In Shame and Necessity, Williams suggests that there might be another form of guilt 
that involves certain “kinds of failing or inadequacy”.65 As we might construe this: when 
one’s action proceeds from such a failing or instantiates some inadequacy, one is at fault.  
Narrow guilt is aroused by an act that involves fault on the agent’s part that 
typically arouses the anger or resentment of others, and often calls for 
reparations.  
Further, Williams thinks that for this form of guilt to be a viable, rational emotion that 
people should feel, we need to understand “what those failings mean in the context of 
our own and other people’s lives.”66  
The paradigm form of narrow guilt for Williams is the guilt of “the conceptions of 
modern morality” that insist on restricting guilt to the voluntary.67 Such a restriction arises 
because, on this picture of morality, religious insight or reason gives us knowledge of the 
moral law and we “need only the will to obey it.”68 Any failure is thus based on the agent’s 
own will and is thus located in “the agent’s own contribution”.69 On this picture, a failure 
of reason or insight is the special kind of inadequacy which gives guilt its importance. 
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This is the guilt of “the morality system”—which we encountered in the introduction—
that Williams rallied against.70 
The guilt of the morality system is aroused by an act that involves fault at the 
level of the voluntary that typically arouses the anger and resentment of others, 
and often calls for reparations.  
The role of the voluntary, and the connection with guilt, comes out when we attach fault 
to one’s failure to do what one voluntarily can do: conform one’s will to reason.  
This is the guilt that Williams thought contrasted with agent-regret. Firstly, it is restricted 
to the voluntary whereas agent-regret can also apply to the involuntary; secondly, insofar 
as it is a narrow form of guilt, it requires fault—where fault is located in the voluntary—
whereas agent-regret does not.  Thus we see why agent-regret contrasts with the guilt of 
the morality system both in terms of voluntariness and fault.  
Agent-regret is distinct from the guilt of the morality system that presupposes 
fault at the level of the voluntary. 
The existence of a capacious notion of guilt does not really matter to us in trying to 
understand agent-regret. What matters is that there is this narrower version of guilt that 
does indeed contrast with agent-regret.  
Williams thinks the guilt of the morality system is a castle built on sand because it does 
not—perhaps cannot—properly justify the importance of a failure to conform one’s will 
to reason.71 This is an important point in understanding moral luck and the importance 
of morality overall. But this takes us too far from our project; the point for us is that it 
provides a contrast with agent-regret. It should be clear that common cases of agent-
regret do not involve any fault at the level of voluntariness: the lorry driver drives 
carefully yet we still seem to grant that he should feel agent-regret.  
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1.3.2 Fault  
Sometimes Williams makes it seem that the important difference between agent-regret 
and guilt is the restriction of fault to the voluntary.72 But really, there are two differences: 
agent-regret need not involve fault, and it need not be restricted to the voluntary, it’s just 
that the guilt of the morality system runs together fault and voluntariness. What we have 
seen so far is that agent-regret as an emotion is conceptually separate from the guilt of 
the morality system. This is useful: it helps us see what picture Williams was trying to 
draw when he claimed that remorse and regret could not make up the entirety of this 
set of emotions.  
But it does not show that there is indeed an emotion like agent-regret that applies to the 
non-voluntary and is free from fault. Even though agent-regret is conceptually distinct, a 
new challenge could claim that there are other sorts of fault, other than those 
presupposed by the morality system, according to which an agent who feels agent-regret 
is actually at fault. Perhaps the fault can exist at the level of the involuntary, or we might 
justify attaching fault to the voluntary in some other way.73  Associated with this we might 
find a different notion of guilt.74 Yet I take it that a plausible conception of narrow guilt 
will involve fault in a way that agent-regret need not.  
In the rest of this chapter, I will argue that we need not be at fault to feel agent-regret, 
and in chapter 2 will develop how we can feel agent-regret without being at fault. (We 
will turn to the voluntary in more depth in chapters 4-6.) Let’s start with another 
challenge: 
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The fault challenge: characters who allegedly feel agent-regret are actually at fault 
and should feel guilty. 
I want to deal with this briefly: I do not think that there is a plausible way of alleging fault 
in Maddie or the lorry driver that respects the fact that there is a useful distinction 
between cases like the ones we have so far explored, and cases where one’s conduct is 
clearly substandard.  
It’s important to note that if all we mean by “fault” is that one’s action ended up 
somehow regrettable, that one’s action somehow has something bad about it, we haven’t 
so much shown that agent-regret involves fault as shown that sometimes our actions can 
be lamentable regardless of our conduct. Someone who wants to employ such a notion 
of “fault” and wants to explain why we should care about doing something regrettable is 
pursuing the same project as me.75 For this challenge to be interesting, we need to say 
something a bit more than just that fault involves doing a bad thing. It strikes me that we 
would need to instead impugn the lorry driver’s conduct, and presumably Williams, 
when he said the lorry driver was not at fault, meant that the lorry driver’s conduct was 
unimpeachable—harking back to what we have seen above, he did as he ought, or he 
was not to blame. We do not think that there’s something he should have done 
differently.76  
Our characters may well have been at fault had they been drunk or reckless or even had 
they not paid proper attention—surely any plausible picture of fault and narrow guilt will 
make sense of this. But we must distinguish our driver from a drunk driver. If we make 
the notion of fault too broad, we lose this; yet clearly it is an important ethical feature. 
On a reasonable understanding of fault, our characters will be free of fault, and thus will 
not appropriately feel guilt. Agent-regret is distinct from such a notion of guilt insofar as 
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agent-regret need not involve fault, thus construed. This is, of course, nothing like a 
complete analysis of what it means to be at fault, but I hope it makes plausible the idea 
that there is a robust notion of fault and agent-regret need not involve it.77   
Yet still a further challenge comes from considering not just whether our agents were at 
fault, but whether they might think they were. Several philosophers hold that sufferers 
of agent-regret are confused: they don’t believe that they were innocent, and instead feel 
some form of narrow guilt. The lorry driver might think that he was at fault, or he might 
entertain reasonable doubts as to whether he was at fault, and thus feel guilty.78 On such 
an account, perceived fault, or the perception of possibly being at fault, is central to 
agent-regret. 
The doubts about fault challenge: characters who allegedly feel agent-regret 
actually think they were at fault, or wonder whether they were at fault, so feel 
something closer to guilt. 
A development of this (see also 4.4.1) suggests that agent-regret is a response to our 
epistemic limitations: we can’t be sure whether we were at fault, so it’s good to act as if 
we were.79 Agent-regret is just guilt where the agent wasn’t actually at fault, but he thinks 
that he was, or might have been, at fault. 
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The reply to this challenge is that it is unpersuasive, and the fact we might doubt 
ourselves does not tell us much about agent-regret. Take Maddie’s case. She might think 
she was careless. If she was careless, she might feel something like guilt, since being 
careless was a fault. But often we break things or damage things and do not think that 
we are careless. Maddie may stop to think about whether she was careless. More 
seriously, the lorry driver, we hope, will evaluate whether he was at fault and whether 
there was any other way in which he should have conducted himself to avoid this tragedy. 
And sometimes these agents may mistakenly believe they were at fault, or dwell on the 
potential that they were. But let’s not overegg the point. The driver may quickly stop 
wondering whether he did anything wrong, since he realises he did not; and in our more 
mundane cases, like Maddie’s case, this is even more plausible. Doubting thoughts don’t 
tell us much about agent-regret: rather, they tell us something about basic humility. We 
all know that we are imperfect and can engage in self-deception. We should reflect on 
our possible failings. But this demand for reflection applies in many cases, and we need 
not think we are at fault just because we might reflect. (Sometimes we reflect on our 
actions even when we are successful, since we might wonder whether we could have 
done something differently or whether we might have been complacent.) Yes, it is 
especially appropriate to reflect when we do something bad. Often enough drivers who 
kill are reckless, so the driver should consider whether he was reckless. But his self-
reflection does not show us that he thinks he was or might a have been at fault; rather, 
he is just checking.80 More likely, then, Maddie just thinks she broke the vase, and the 
driver just that he killed the child—without any associated faults.  
1.4 Agent-regret’s domain  
This chapter had two aims. Firstly, I hope to have highlighted some basic features of 
agent-regret, and the ways in which it concerns our own agency. I did this by offering the 
traditional distinction between agent-regret and bystander regret, before introducing the 
idea that the external view shows that one regrets not just one’s own action but that one 
so acted. 
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The rest of the chapter was defensive, arguing against the idea that agent-regret is just 
guilt. I have not begun to explain why we might regret our actions. Instead, I considered 
several elements of agent-regret concerning fault, voluntariness, and guilt, and tried to 
defend Williams’s basic account of agent-regret. I showed that there may be a capacious 
notion of guilt that does not exclude agent-regret, but that this fits with Williams’s 
conception of agent-regret, thus disarming the challenge from survivor guilt. I suggested 
that the conception of guilt Williams had in mind was the guilt of the morality system, 
which holds that fault lies at the level of voluntary behaviour, namely at the level of one’s 
volitions. I then argued that it is implausible to allege that Maddie or the lorry driver 
must have been at fault or must think that they were at fault.  
What remains to be seen is why we might regret our actions if we were not at fault. Yes, 
it seems that killing someone is worse than just going for a drive; but how can my action 
be regrettable when I was not at fault? We now turn to this.
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Chapter 2 
Outcomes, Action, and 
Responsibility 
 
…regret cannot always be held at that distance, and then it moves back 
to the moments of deliberation and action, and you regret acting as 
you did. This still need not imply that you deliberated carelessly; you 
may have deliberated as well as you could, but you still deeply regret 
that that was how the deliberation went, and that this was what you 
did. This is not just regret about what happened, such as a spectator 
might have. It is an agent’s regret… 
Bernard Williams
1
  
 
In 2.1 I consider a challenge that argues that to regret what we have done, we must regret 
our decisions, but to regret our decisions we must see those decisions as faulty. My aim 
in this chapter is to provide another understanding of the object of regret and to show 
that our decisions need not just be regretted in terms of fault. In 2.2 I introduce 
outcomes, results, and consequences. I consider the way in which outcomes figure in 
the constitution and assessment of actions. In 2.3, I provide a detailed analysis of the 
concept of outcome responsibility, aiming to clarify the basic concept that Tony Honoré 
introduced, which has found an important place in much theorising about civil law. In 
2.4, I return to the idea that we cannot feel agent-regret without being at fault and dismiss 
it because we do not just regret outcomes or decisions, rather, we regret our 
responsibility for outcomes.  
2.1 The object challenge: Jacobson 
Given that we have granted that agent-regret is conceptually distinct from guilt, we need 
to understand why we might regret our own actions without being at fault. The challenge 
we now discuss alleges that one’s action can only be made lamentable in one of two 
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ways: either one’s decision was faulty, in which case guilt is appropriate, or one just 
regrets the outcome, in which case ordinary regret is appropriate and one does not feel 
agent-regret.
2
 The concept of agent-regret carves out no space at all. 
The object challenge: agent-regret cannot be a viable emotional category since 
fault is what makes one’s own action regrettable; if one is not at fault one just 
feels ordinary regret. 
Daniel Jacobson offers a particularly clear version of this challenge.3 Jacobson rightly 
points out that because ordinary regret focusses on outcomes, agent-regret cannot just 
be the thought that it would be better if the outcomes were different—my thoughts must 
involve my agency. So, Jacobson thinks that we must focus on the agent’s decision.4 He 
thinks that we must locate the regrettable element in the decision itself. If the regrettable 
element lays in the decision, to feel agent-regret is to regret one’s decision and to wish 
that decision had been different. But how can a decision itself be regrettable, and what 
does it mean to wish that one’s decision had been different? Presumably, a regrettable 
decision is a bad decision, and one wishes that one’s decision had been different because 
one recognises that one made that decision through faulty procedures or that the 
decision was an error. Thus, one’s action can only be regrettable because of some fault.5  
For Jacobson, the thought behind agent-regret is some form of narrow guilt that 
presupposes one was at fault alongside the acknowledgement that “While I regret doing 
what I did, I endorse doing it again in similar circumstances.”6 This latter 
acknowledgement denies fault.7 So to feel agent-regret is to feel something like guilt and 
admit we were at fault, whilst simultaneously denying we were at fault. On Jacobson’s 
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position, to regret what we have done we must think—at some level—that we were at fault 
(or, in his terms, in error), otherwise we feel mere ordinary regret.8 
This challenge picks up on the fact that agent-regret can’t just be regret about an 
outcome—that would be ordinary regret. But it asks, “What does it mean to regret what 
you have done?” and suggests that the answer must include regret about your decisions, 
and that this must impute fault. To combat Jacobson’s challenge, we need to see why 
this is wrong. Jacobson’s focus on decisions makes sense; after all, decisions are a central 
part of normative assessment and are a central component of action. But—and here’s 
the problem with this challenge—Jacobson doesn’t just focus on the decision, he 
insulates it from what follows. Rather than just ensuring that agent-regret doesn’t take 
the outcome as its object, Jacobson presupposes that the outcome can play no role in 
any assessment of, or constitution of, a decision or an action. To see why this is wrong, 
we need to understand the role that outcomes, and our responsibility for those 
outcomes, play in our actions. 
2.2 Outcomes and actions 
To see how we might come to regret our actions without just regretting the intrinsic 
quality of our decisions, we need to understand the role of outcomes, and our 
responsibility for those outcomes, in action. What do I mean by an outcome? 
Outcomes are the states of affairs produced by an event or action. 
Many things are outcomes, including a broken vase, a dead child, a goal scored, or a 
financial crisis (but not the fact that red is a colour). These are all things over which we 
might feel ordinary regret. The bystander might regret that the vase is broken or that the 
child died. 
We have seen that agent-regret involves more than just regretting an outcome. It involves 
regretting that I did such a thing. (As noted at 1.2.1, I only discuss action and not 
omissions.) Outcomes figure in the constitution of actions, they figure in delineating 
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 One can see this as a version of the doubts challenge from 1.3.2, or as distinct. 
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exactly what I have done. To see this, we should note that we can divide outcomes into 
two categories:
9
 
The result of an action is an outcome that constitutes it as that action. 
The consequences of an action are outcomes that arise because of that action 
but do not constitute it as that action. 
The result of the driver killing the child is the dead child, a consequence of it is the 
driver’s mental anguish, the damage to his lorry, and so on. The result of smashing the 
vase is the smashed vase, a consequence is the shard of china stuck in your foot.  
Results are especially important in getting a grip on the ways in which outcomes can 
arouse agent-regret. That is because the result partly constitutes the action I have 
performed. This is a central part of how we talk about agency. In order for Niles to score 
a half-court shot, the ball must go through the hoop; in order for A to stab B, A must 
poke something pointy through B’s skin; in order for A to kill B, B must die. Without 
the broken skin or the death, A just tries to stab or kill B. And we clearly have a way of 
talking about this: we distinguish, quite sharply, between murder and attempted murder.  
Our actions are partly constituted by their results. 
“Partly” because actions are also constituted by intentions: you can kill without mens 
rea, but you can’t murder. The crucial point is that actions are not just constituted by 
what we intend or decide to do, but also by their results. So, the action we have 
performed is affected by what happens. Performing a specific action is almost always 
outside of our absolute control because the outcomes themselves are to an extent 
outside of our control (we discuss this in much more depth in chapters 4-5). As Nagel 
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 For this distinction see Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law, 58–59. And see von Wright, “III: 
Act and Ability from Norm and Action.” Duff puts this in terms of our description of actions at Duff, 
Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, 42. 
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puts it: “how things turn out determines what he has done.”10 This is where moral luck 
rears its head.  
But our concern is the constitution of actions, not moral assessment. We can see that, 
in the terms I introduced in 1.3, an action is voluntary, one brings about an outcome 
intentionally, insofar as one’s action brings about an intended outcome; and an action is 
involuntary, or one does something unintentionally, insofar one’s action brings about an 
unintended outcome. The lorry driver voluntarily drove but involuntarily killed. Results 
alter the characterization of the driver’s action (and thus its voluntary nature): he 
involuntarily killed by bringing about the child’s death, which was not intended. 
Often, we can redescribe our responsibility for an outcome as a specific action: he killed 
the child, she smashed the vase, you knocked over the other person.
11
 But we cannot 
always find an illuminating redescription.
12
 For instance, because I laid the trap you 
broke your leg, even though we might not want to say that I broke your leg, because 
“broke your leg” implies some sort of immediacy like in a football tackle or a car crash. 
Still, it seems that your broken leg will affect how we think about my laying the trap: 
laying the trap now calls to mind thoughts of your broken leg. Or take the case of 
Palsgraf.
13
 As a guard tried to push a salesman onto the train he was struggling to board 
the salesman dropped his package of fireworks which exploded, a scale on the platform 
fell and Palsgraf was injured. It seems a stretch to say that the guard performed an action 
like “injuring” Palsgraf as he pushed the salesman on the train. The relevant action is 
pushing. But we might say the guard is responsible for Palsgraf’s injury, and we might 
say that pushing the salesman made the guard responsible for her injury.
14
   
                                               
 
 
10
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 29–30. And see: “The terrible thing that happened to him, through no fault of 
his own, was  that he did those things.” Williams, S&N, 70. See also Rosati, “Mortality, Agency, and 
Regret,” 237. 
11
 See Tadros, Criminal Responsibility, 22. 
12
 “…an outcome for which it could well seem appropriate to hold a person responsible might simply be 
too remote from the originating action to count, under any plausible description, as part of the action.” 
Perry, “Honoré on Responsibility for Outcomes,” 73. 
13
 Palsgraf v Long Island R. R. Co. 
14
 Of course, the legal case was mostly about liability, and they were found not responsible. I discuss 
liability below.  
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We regard our actions not just in light of our intentions, nor just in terms of 
results, but also in terms of the consequences that arise from them.
15
 
What’s more, evaluations we make of different actions vary depending on their 
outcomes. We can clearly see that some events are worse than others: “the earthquake 
in Turkey was much worse than the earthquake in San Francisco because many more 
people have died in it.”16 Likewise, some actions are worse than other actions because 
of their outcomes. For instance, murder is worse than attempted murder. Of course, 
the sense of “worse” in play, and the impact it should have on agents’ lives, is partly the 
issue. I do not claim that this is morally worse, but hope to explain some ways these 
actions may be bad in other respects in chapter 6.
17
 The point here is just to get a grip 
on the idea that murder is to some extent worse than attempted murder. And, as the 
lorry driver knows full well, killing someone is worse than going for a drive; pushing 
someone is worse when it leads to Palsgraf’s injuries. 
Some actions are worse than other actions in virtue of the outcomes they lead 
to. 
In 3.1, we will come to see that the way in which outcomes affect our assessments of 
actions is complicated. I have suggested here that the outcome, which we recognise as 
bad, makes us assess our action negatively. This is often true, but I will argue that it does 
not encompass all cases of agent-regret. For this chapter, we just need to see that 
outcomes affect what we have done, how we assess what we have done, and can make 
us negatively evaluate what we have done.  
Before complicating this picture, we should try to get a better grip on what we have seen 
here: that sometimes our actions lead to various results or consequences that affect how 
we assess those actions. We need to understand the relationship between the agent, their 
action, and the outcome: this brings us to the topic of outcome responsibility. 
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 Perry also sees outcome responsibility as ascribing either a result or a consequence: Perry, 
“Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” 73. 
16
 Enoch and Marmor, “The Case Against Moral Luck,” 410. 
17
 What might be controversial is whether we should be judged depending on the badness of our actions 
(as opposed to, say, on the badness of our decisions). See Enoch and Marmor, 410.   
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2.3 Outcome Responsibility 
The above has allowed us to see that outcomes are important in understanding the 
constitution of our actions; I now want to offer us a way of understanding this that brings 
in a new set of concepts concerning responsibility. In particular, we will focus on a 
concept introduced by Tony Honoré: outcome responsibility. I will develop the idea 
that the object of agent-regret is one’s responsibility for an outcome. By drawing 
connections between agent-regret and outcome responsibility, we will be able to tap into 
a variety of rich discussions concerning the importance of outcome responsibility. A 
proper defence of agent-regret requires a good understanding of the relation between it, 
its object, and the importance of its object. By the end of chapter 3, we will have a 
complete picture of the emotion of agent-regret, and the underlying structures. We can 
then turn, in Part II, to why it is an appropriate emotion to feel. But what is outcome 
responsibility? 
To start with, there are various senses of “responsible”, and various aspects of 
responsibility, and discussions of outcome responsibility implicate only a few.
18
 I will 
restrict our focus to responsibility for external outcomes; by this I mean outcomes in 
the external world (including in other people, and their mental states). But responsibility 
for one’s own mental states introduces complications.19 Although it is possible that there 
are some forms of agent-regret that attach to the fact one has formed a certain mental 
state, such cases will be rare; and because much of the discussion of outcome 
responsibility concerns tort law, the literature won’t shed much light on our own mental 
states. Relatedly, we will we not be concerned with the ways in which we might be 
responsible for mere attempts.
20
 We will also focus only on responsibility for outcomes 
that arise due to one’s agency.21 Although I may be vicariously responsible in various 
ways, many of these will not involve my agency—such as when I am held responsible for 
                                               
 
 
18 Hart also puts this in terms of “senses”, acknowledging that although “connexions exist between these 
different ideas, they are often very indirect” Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, 211. For an overview 
of a various aspects of responsibility see Fischer and Tognazzini, “The Physiognomy of Responsibility.”  
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 Angela Smith admits this responsibility for attitudes is more “controversial”: Smith, “Responsibility as 
Answerability,” 103–4. 
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 On attempts, see Duff, “Criminal Attempts.” 
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 Honoré is clear that vicarious liability is not a form of outcome responsibility Honoré, “Appreciations 
and Responses,” 228–29.  
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what my child has done, or when an insurer must pay out—and thus will not be relevant 
to agent-regret. We will nuance this further below.  
Our agents in the cases of Maddie and the lorry driver are concerned precisely with 
their responsibility for bringing something about in the world. Given the breadth of 
discussions of various sorts of responsibility, it’s important to keep our focus fairly 
narrow. The best way of shedding light on agent-regret is by focussing tightly on our 
responsibility for changes in the world. What does it mean to be responsible for some 
outcome in the world?  
2.3.1 Ascribability 
Outcome responsibility is the form of responsibility that connects an agent to an 
outcome via their agency. According to Honoré: 
“Outcome responsibility, as I conceive it, is the idea that certain 
outcomes of our conduct, settled according to causal criteria, are ours, 
even when unforeseen or unintended. We identify with them and 
others attribute them to us.”22 
Stephen Perry offers similar lines of thought. He says that outcome responsibility 
concerns “ascribing, or attributing, outcomes to human beings, who accordingly count 
as authors of both the outcome and the originating action.”23 The outcome isn’t just 
attributed to me; rather, it is ascribed to me as an agent, or even as an author (see 5.1.4). 
The outcome is ascribed to my agency.24 (I use “ascribed” and “attributed” 
interchangeably.) 
This gives us the core of the idea 
Ascribability: This outcome can be attributed/ascribed to my agency. 
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 Honoré, 223.  
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 Perry, “Honoré on Responsibility for Outcomes,” 72. 
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 Honoré also offers some considerations that suggest outcome responsibility concerns agency; for 
instance, he thinks that people who are not generally capable of controlling their actions are not 
responsible for outcomes Honoré, “Introduction,” 9–10. He also puts this in terms of a “minimum 
capacity for choosing and acting”, and in terms of successful trying Honoré, “Responsibility and Luck,” 
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Honoré, “The Morality of Tort Law,” 76–77. 
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In short, ascribability is one form of connection between me and an outcome, and I am 
connected to that outcome by way of my agency. For instance, we might say that the 
lorry driver is responsible for the death of the child because his actions resulted in the 
death of the child; the guard is responsible for Palsgraf’s injury because his actions led 
to Palsgraf’s injuries. I now will offer a sharper characterisation of outcome 
responsibility, focussing firstly on how it is a form of causation, then on how it is a form 
of agential causation; then I explore how it relates to other forms of responsibility. (We 
will come on to the idea that outcomes are ours and we identify with them in chapter 
6.) 
Causation 
What sort of connection is involved in ascribing an outcome to an agent? I will take it 
that it is at least a form of causal responsibility: to say that outcome can be ascribed to 
my agency is to say that my agency (at least in part) caused that outcome.
25
 I will not offer 
an analysis of causation, but will take the following idea, which we find in Hart and 
Honoré’s Causation in the Law and which Honoré says his account of outcome 
responsibility builds on, as central to causation:
26
 “to cause something is to intervene in 
the existing or expected state of the world.”27 Given this understanding of causation, to 
be outcome responsible, to have an outcome ascribed to you, you must intervene in the 
world. (As I noted, we can be responsible in virtue of omissions. I take it that we can 
expand this to say that an agent could have intervened or could have prevented someone 
else from intervening.) 
I also want to draw on Hart and Honoré to delineate when we can be said to have caused 
something. In Causation in the Law, Hart and Honoré held that common sense 
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 Honoré uses causal language, seeing his inquiry into outcome responsibility as exploring “why should 
people be held responsible, and so under certain conditions be legally liable, for the harm they cause?” 
Honoré, “Introduction,” 1. See also Honoré, “The Morality of Tort Law,” 77n28; Honoré, “Being 
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 Honoré, “Introduction,” 2.  
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principles should underpin much of our causal theorising.28 Although much of this 
concerns the concept of causation, they held that “because causal judgements are so 
pervasive a feature of everyday life, ordinary people learn to apply the concept of cause 
with reasonable accuracy.”29 That is to say that an ordinary judgment, unencumbered by 
a philosophical account of what it means to be a cause, is likely to be a good judgment 
on whether or not something is a cause. Because of this, Honoré insisted that we should 
be content, when determining whether or not we hold someone outcome responsible, 
to rely upon “ordinary ideas of attribution.”30  
What sort of ordinary attributions did they have in mind? Hart and Honoré held that, 
generally, later acts by other agents tend to mean the first agent is not responsible for 
what follows.31 So, if James only goes to university because his parents fund him, his 
parents might be (partly) responsible for James going to university, but they are not 
responsible for his taking lots of drugs rather than reading lots of Hume.32 This seems 
to align with a fairly ordinary idea of who caused James to drop out of university.   
Further, as Honoré puts it, again drawing on Causation in the Law, “how far back one 
should go in a causal inquiry depends on the purpose of the inquiry.”33 When we ask 
what caused the death in a road accident, our answer will depend on whether we are 
concerned with a medical or a legal question—whether he was killed by internal bleeding 
or the other driver’s negligence.34 A medical student examining a cadaver will focus on 
why the driver died, but probably won’t be concerned with the driver’s identity. Our 
causal, and our responsibility-based, judgments are pragmatic. Because our inquiries are 
pragmatic, we often hold certain conditions fixed, or treat them as background 
conditions.  What we hold fixed, and the purposes of our inquiries, will depend to some 
degree on what we care about and are interested in. To return to the lorry driver’s case, 
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“Appreciations and Responses,” 226. 
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the child’s father is likely interested in who killed his child not in the scientific facts. So, 
although there may be ordinary ideas of causal attributions, the causal judgments we 
make may differ depending on our interests (I expand this in chapter 7). 
I will proceed as if these ordinary attributions are a good guide as to whether someone 
was a cause. This makes sense: after all, our concern is with agent-regret, which will 
depend on whether an agent (usually an ordinary person not a philosopher) thinks she 
is responsible for that outcome. And it might also matter (as we see in chapters 6 and 7) 
whether other people think she is responsible. But we are dealing with the causal 
attributions of ordinary agents, so it is plausible to offer an understanding of causation 
based on the attributions made by ordinary agents.  
Whether one has caused an outcome, and thus whether one is outcome 
responsible, is settled by appeal to everyday attributions. 
Notably, this sets my account apart from accounts that hold someone to be causally 
responsible if their action was necessary for a certain outcome to arise. Francis 
Hutcheson held that “the consequences which affect the morality of actions are…all 
those events which otherwise would not have happened.”35 Hutcheson’s point is about 
morality, but we can see it more broadly as a point about responsibility: you are 
responsible for all those events which otherwise would not have happened.36 Let’s call 
this metaphysical causal responsibility.  
Metaphysical causal responsibility: whether one has caused an action is settled 
by whether that outcome would have arisen but for one’s action. 
This may have some scientific or historical uses, but it does not seem to be an ethically 
useful understanding of causation. To have caused something in this way is ethically 
unimportant—for instance, metaphysical causal responsibility does not affect one’s 
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identity in the ways discussed in chapter 6—and we certainly do not think it should arouse 
something like agent-regret. 
In this metaphysical sense, the lorry driver’s mother is (at least partly) causally 
responsible for the child’s death. But we do not think she caused the child’s death, nor 
that she should ascribe the child’s death to herself, despite the fact that she was causally 
necessary (because she gave birth to the driver). Why? Well, one reason we do not 
ascribe the outcome to her agency is that her actions aren’t relevant to our concerns like 
“who killed the child?” or “why did the child die?” When we are considering this case, 
we hold the lorry driver’s existence fixed, so do not inquire into his origins, which are 
background conditions. My point is that she is not outcome responsible because the 
causation involved in outcome responsibility concerns common-sense attributions. We 
will return to this in chapters 5 and 6. 
I hope that our ordinary ideas about whether an outcome can be attributed to an agent 
will mostly be clear enough throughout this thesis and will help us to develop a plausible 
account of outcome responsibility and why this responsibility matters.  
Agency 
My account restricts outcome responsibility to one’s responsibility as an agent. This is 
in contrast to other ways one might have an outcome ascribed to oneself as a person. In 
Gone with the Wind, Scarlett is devastated because Ashley does not love her.37 We 
might say that Ashley is responsible for her sadness, but this is hardly down to what he 
has done.38 Likewise, if the officer is thrown into a button by a wave and thus fires a 
torpedo that sinks the Bismarck, we do not ascribe this outcome to his agency.39 Nor am 
I responsible as an agent if a scientist controls my body through electric pulses, nor if I 
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am hypnotised,40 nor if I have a fit.41 There are many ways we might say that a person is 
responsible, in some sense, for an outcome arising without this being a claim that they 
are responsible as an agent.42 (I leave open if the people in these examples are actually 
responsible in any sense. The point is to show some conceptual space.)
 
Although there may be a broader form of outcome responsibility that concerns ascribing 
outcomes to a person for the outcomes they (bodily, agential, or otherwise) bring about, 
we will focus only on ascriptions to agents. Narrowing our focus in this way is well 
motivated. Firstly, there will be many differences between, say, being responsible due to 
my body taking up space or moving itself in a certain way, and being responsible due to 
how I exercise my agency; we will be better placed to understand outcome responsibility 
if we have a narrower focus. Secondly, as explained above, I take it that the standard 
understanding of outcome responsibility concerns agency. Thirdly, as we saw in the 
introduction, Williams is clear that agent-regret tells us something about agency, 
focussing on agency will better illuminate this connection.
43
  
When is it the case that an outcome is ascribed to my agency? In chapter 5, I will offer 
a deeper defence of the following; for now, I just want to set out my position concerning 
the role of intentions, which we will develop in Part II. In order for something to count 
as agential—given our focus, for an event to count as an action—it must involve something 
like an intention or a decision, and this is plausible because these seem to be clearly 
agential features. Otherwise, it could be merely bodily responsibility. I will assume that 
we get the agential element if an intention is involved.  
The real issue for our purposes comes when we consider at what level the intention 
needs to feature. Both Honoré and Williams think that if we are to describe something 
as an action, one must have some intention in play; but they do not think that one needs 
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to intend that outcome.44 For instance, the driver involuntarily kills someone, and we 
can employ the language of action because he was trying to do something else 
voluntarily: he intended to get to his destination. Likewise, Donald Davidson thinks “a 
man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes 
it intentional.”45 This gives us a good grip on matters. For instance, Davidson says that if 
an officer mistakenly presses a button that fires a torpedo, “then the officer sank the 
Bismarck”, but if he is thrown against it by a wave “we will not count him as the agent.”46 
In the first case we might say he mistakenly sank the Bismarck, we can redescribe his 
pushing a button as sinking the Bismarck. In the second case, there is no intention 
involved in the sinking of the Bismarck. His intentions do not figure in explanations of 
why the Bismarck sank; what is relevant is that the wave threw his body against the 
button. This is why we do not say he acted, and do not think he did anything. He might 
be involved as a body, or as a person, but he is not involved as an agent.47 To employ a 
metaphor here, his agency was not in play. 
Some Intended Outcome (SIO): For an outcome to be ascribed to my agency, 
I must have intended to bring about some outcome (I must have been doing 
something voluntarily), and I must be appropriately causally related to that 
outcome, but I need not have intended that outcome 
If my agency is in play (I’m not asleep, I’m not hypnotised), and the change in the world 
can be explained by my agency being in play (the officer writing a letter isn’t relevant to 
his getting thrown onto the button), then the outcome can be ascribed to my agency. I 
take it that there is some plausibility to SIO and to the idea that there is a difference 
between the officer who makes a mistake and the officer who is moved by the waves, 
and this somehow relates to agency. I will explore this in much more depth, and defend 
SIO, in Part II. 
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But what justifies saying that an outcome can be ascribed to my agency just because I 
was acting voluntarily, and intended to bring about some outcome? Why not say that I, 
as an agent, am responsible for that outcome so long as I intended to bring about that 
outcome? I now want to introduce a broad sort of account that denies SIO, and which 
denies the propriety of agent-regret (I nuance this in chapter 4). Instead of saying that 
an intention must feature, this account says that I must actually intend the outcome that 
arises. (Such an account might also count certain foreseen outcomes as intended.
48
) 
That Intended Outcome (TIO): For an outcome to be ascribed to my agency, I 
must have intended to bring about that outcome, and I must be appropriately 
causally related to that outcome. 
On such an account, the connection between my agency and the outcome is both more 
obvious and more robust given that I intend to bring about the outcome; in such cases, 
the action and outcome can be seen as “expressing what the agent has in mind”.49 This 
is still an account of outcome responsibility; it would say that an agent (for example, the 
lorry driver) is responsible for the voluntary actions he performs (driving), and for the 
intended results (getting to his destination), but not for his involuntary actions (killing), 
nor the unintended results (the dead child). There is one important nuance to add to 
this account, and we also need to see a few ways in which we might understand it.  
Firstly, the nuance. Such an account will require more than just that I intend to bring 
about an outcome and it arises; for instance, I am not responsible for an outcome if I 
intend it and it just so happens to arise.
50
 Instead, to be responsible for an outcome we 
need to successfully guide the world to that outcome via our intentions.
51
 What is central 
on this view is that one can be responsible for an outcome so long as one intends that 
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outcome, that outcome is manifested in the world, and it is manifested due to one’s 
intention bringing it about.
52
  (See chapter 5.) 
Secondly, there are varieties of TIO. Instead of (or as well as) intending an outcome, 
the agent might think the outcome is a good thing, desire it, or express her deepest self 
in bringing it about. Both “attributability” and “ascribability” have their own uses in the 
literature concerning aretaic evaluation and whether something can be ascribed to one’s 
deep or real self.
53
 On such views, an outcome is ascribable or attributable to an agent 
when the outcome is properly related to the agent’s self, when it manifests or reflects the 
agent’s (perhaps “deep”) self.54 (In 5.1.4 I call this “authorship”.) 
Much of this literature concerns moral responsibility, or responsibility that is 
normatively couched, and it often focusses on whether we are responsible for our 
attitudes and actions rather than outcomes themselves; but the point translates across. 
We might think that the outcome is related to the agent’s character, or to “deliberative, 
reason-tracking aspects of the agent.”55 Attributability or ascribability in this sense forges 
a connection between the agent’s character (either broadly construed, or as a reason-
tracker) and the outcome, action, or attitude for which the agent is responsible. The 
important point to note here is that although this is a form of outcome responsibility, it 
is not the form I defend. On my account, whether this outcome is ascribable to—and 
reflects or manifests—my deep self, or my intentions, does not exhaust the ways in which 
outcomes can be ascribed to me and my agency.
56
  
Agent-regret tends to the accidental or unintended or undesired. SIO lines up nicely 
with our picture of agent-regret. If we aim to vindicate agent-regret (likewise, if we want 
to vindicate certain understandings of strict liability) then we need to be able to say that 
agents are responsible for outcomes that they did not intend, because there is no way 
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that the lorry driver intended to kill the child. Agent-regret does not arise when one acts 
in a way that expresses one’s deeper values, or one’s character, or (for unforeseen 
outcomes) even when one expresses what one has in mind. If we want to keep hold of 
the idea that agent-regret tells us something about our agency, then we need to establish 
a link between an agent and an outcome that does not just arise over the outcomes that 
the agent intended. I offer an account of responsibility that makes sense of why an agent 
is responsible for an outcome even if it does not reflect his intentions or his character; I 
offer an account of responsibility that makes sense of agent-regret. Defending this 
account of responsibility, which sees whether one is responsible for that outcome as 
detached from one’s evaluation of that outcome, is one of the central problems when it 
comes to agent-regret (and moral luck), and I will try to defend this picture in some 
depth in Part II. 
2.3.2 Ascribability, answerability, liability 
I now want to contrast ascribability with two other notions of responsibility: liability and 
answerability. My aim is to demonstrate how these notions are distinct, and to suggest 
that ascribability is, in certain respects, more fundamental than any of them. In doing 
this, we will come to a fuller understanding of what it means to be responsible for an 
outcome and can proceed to a discussion of its relationship with agent-regret whilst 
hopefully avoiding any pitfalls that might arise if we do not have these concepts properly 
lined up. 
Liability 
One centrally important aspect of many discussions of responsibility—especially in the 
literature on tort law that carries many of the discussions of outcome responsibility—is 
liability, and the question of when one should have to bear the burden of the costs 
imposed by one’s actions.  
Liability: One rightly faces a burden. 
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The rough idea is just that it would not be wrong for another to force one to bear this 
burden;
57
 or perhaps one has forfeited one’s right not to face that burden.58 We can keep 
our understanding of this ecumenical. 
Now, one can be liable without having brought about any outcome oneself. For instance, 
we can be liable to pay tax.59 We also find this in the vicarious liability of employer 
liability,60 or when parents are liable to pay for the stuff their children smashed in the 
shop.61 Yet we can also offer a more restricted form of liability: the liability for having 
done something. On such an account, we have to bear burdens in virtue of bringing 
about some outcome.62 And we might have to bear these burdens despite not being at 
fault—this underpins much of strict liability.63 Consider this in terms of fault as discussed 
so far: I may have broken the window and performed a bad action, but I was not at fault 
in playing cricket on that pitch or hitting the ball as I did. My conduct was 
unimpeachable. But fault can be absent and one can still face liability in virtue of 
bringing about some outcome: I must fix the window.  
This is clearly distinct from ascribability. For one, we do not impose liability for 
everything we do.64 I walked to the corner; that brings no benefits nor costs. Still, we can 
ascribe the fact that I am at the corner to my walking there. Nor do we impose liability 
for everything we do that affects other people: when I get the job and you lose out, I am 
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(partly) responsible for your sadness but, barring special circumstances, I incur no 
liability towards you. That is because some domains of action justify the imposition of 
harms on others.65 Even outside of these domains, I am clearly not liable for everything 
I have caused because sometimes, even if blame or burdens might be lurking, I can offer 
a defence.66 As Honoré puts it, “People are never legally liable merely because they have 
caused someone harm.”67 Still, we can say that they did indeed cause this harm: that is 
the work that ascribability does. So, ascribability is distinct from liability.  
Answerability 
Another form of responsibility also raises its head. Prior to any burdens being imposed, 
except in cases of strict liability, we usually have a chance to answer for bringing about 
that outcome. We are given a chance to offer an excuse or a justification, and only if we 
fail here are we held liable.  
Answerability: One can rightly be made to explain why some outcome arose.68 
When one is answerable it is incumbent upon one to give an intelligible account of some 
particular action, decision, or (what we are concerned with) outcome.69 What’s more, we 
expect that the agent will not just (say, scientifically) explain what she has done.70 Rather, 
she will either show she has not violated any norm, or she will justify or excuse her 
action, or apologise. If she fails to give an adequate explanation, she will likely face 
associated burdens.71 But sometimes we are liable without being answerable, such as 
when we are strictly liable and any answer we can offer is irrelevant to our liability. Other 
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times we are answerable yet not liable, such as when we give an acceptable justification 
or excuse.72  
How does answerability relate to ascribability? We might think that as rational agents 
we are, in principle, answerable for everything we do, and for all the outcomes we bring 
about; or we might hold that we are answerable only if there is some specific person who 
can demand an answer.73 It is clear that sometimes we are not actually answerable to 
certain people. In the criminal law, for instance, there are blocks, like diplomatic 
immunity or a statute of limitations, on being held answerable.74 We certainly are not 
always answerable to our peers, either; for instance, no one may have the standing to 
confront me. If we are answerable only if there is someone who can hold us answerable, 
then ascribability is clearly distinct from answerability: I can be said to have done 
something, even if there is no one who can ask me why I did it and thus even if I am 
not answerable.  
What if we are answerable for every outcome we bring about because we are answerable 
if we are in principle answerable? Even if this is the case, answerability is conceptually 
distinct from ascribability. Answerability concerns a demand for explanation and the 
purpose of such demands will be central to how and why we hold someone answerable, 
and our responses to this. Ascribability is different. It establishes the connection between 
the agent and the outcome that underpins the demand for explanation—to be answerable 
for bringing about an outcome, I must have brought about that outcome—it does not 
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itself imply that any explanation is required. I can be judged to have done something 
without questions of holding me to account arising.75  
This is important. Ascribability lets us answer the fundamental question of whether the 
agent “even performed the action in question.”76 More broadly, ascribability lets us say 
the agent is “appropriately related” to the outcome.77 If the outcome cannot be in some 
way ascribed to me (or a plausible case for this made), then it cannot be incumbent upon 
me to explain why I brought it about; in such a situation my response would be closer 
to a denial of an offence than a defence: I can rightly refuse to say any more with “It’s 
not up to me to explain, because I didn’t do it.” Likewise in the law, as Antony Duff 
points out, “the defendant has nothing for which she must formally answer unless and 
until the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that she committed the offence 
charged.”78 As Duff notes, not only must they prove that I acted with mens rea, but also 
they need to prove that I did it, that the outcome can actually be ascribed to my agency.79 
If you can’t show that I did it, then you may still hold me answerable or liable in virtue 
of my being connected to the outcome in some other way—such as the fact it was my 
child who broke the vase—but you can’t hold me responsible for performing that action 
or bringing about that outcome unless you can say that I brought about that outcome.80 
Thus ascribability plays a fundamental role in holding others and ourselves answerable 
and responsible. As Victor Tadros puts it, in a slightly different context: 
“Despite the intimacy of the relationship between responsibility and 
our social and emotional practices, however, those practices invite us 
to provide a further account of something more basic: what it is that 
we are responsible for. For they invite us to ask what it is that we can 
properly be called to account for, or that we react to in the significant 
sense.”81 
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Ascribability does not directly concern whether one must offer an explanation or bear 
burdens; rather, it seeks to answer the question of whether one can properly be said to 
have brought about that outcome in the first place. Outcome responsibility as 
ascribability underpins answerability and liability for what we have done, by providing 
the connection between an agent and an outcome.82 He is liable for the disaster “because 
he caused the disaster”.83 To say that he caused the disaster is to connect him to the 
disaster, and we do this in this case by ascribing the outcome (the disaster) to his agency. 
That is the important role that outcome responsibility fulfils.  
In this sense, ascribability is prior to both liability and answerability. Duff, discussing 
criminal and moral responsibility, says that “liability presupposes responsibility,” where 
this responsibility is answerability.84 That’s true (at least in the criminal and moral worlds, 
where liability is for voluntary actions); I add that answerability (at least in the criminal 
and moral words) itself presupposes ascribability. Yet we can be answerable or liable for 
things we haven’t done, when we look outside of the criminal and the moral.85 So, we 
shouldn’t think, as Honoré sometimes suggests, that outcome responsibility is simply 
more fundamental than answerability or liability.86 Rather, outcome responsibility (as 
ascribability) is prior to certain forms of answerability or liability.87 To be answerable or 
liable for bringing about certain outcomes, we need to first have those outcomes ascribed 
to us. 
I hope that by now we can see that ascribability is distinct from answerability and liability; 
ascribability underpins important species of liability and answerability that concern our 
actions and the outcomes we have brought about; insofar as it performs this role, 
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ascribability is important. It’s especially important because if we want to blame people, 
or demand that they explain themselves, not just for intending to kill someone, but for 
actually killing them—if we want to establish a distinction between murder and attempted 
murder88—then we need to be able to say that we can blame someone not just for their 
intentions (since the intentions of the person who fires and misses are the same as the 
person who fires) but for being responsible for outcomes. So, outcome responsibility as 
ascribability clearly plays an important role in much ethical thinking; but this hasn’t got 
much to do with agent-regret. In Part II, I will argue that it plays far more important 
roles than just allowing us to blame people for outcomes: it underpins our status as 
persons and affects our identities.  
2.4 Outcome responsibility and agent-regret 
The discussion so far helps us to see that outcome responsibility concerns ascribability. 
To be outcome responsible is to be connected to an outcome as a causal agent of that 
outcome. I have not offered a full account of when we can ascribe such outcomes but 
did suggest SIO was plausible. We turn to this in more depth in Part II. In the rest of 
this chapter, I want to briefly explore the relationship between outcome responsibility 
and agent-regret and will suggest that outcome responsibility is the object of agent-regret. 
We will return to Jacobson’s challenge and see how this picture helps us defuse it, and 
then in chapter 3 we will complete this picture of the nature of agent-regret.  
In 2.2 we saw that outcomes affect how we assess our actions. When they are results, 
outcomes can affect what action one has performed; when they are consequences, 
outcomes can also affect the light in which an action is assessed. In 2.3 I offered a way 
of understanding this: our actions leave us responsible for certain outcomes; outcomes 
can be ascribed to us, specifically they can be ascribed to our agency. In such cases, we 
are responsible due to what we have done.  
Outcome responsibility is not primarily about the costs we face or the demands for 
answers we might face, although it links us to outcomes in a way that might underpin 
such questions or such burdens. And, as we saw in 2.3.1, this account of when we are 
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responsible is not restricted to ascribing outcomes to our deep selves or our intentional 
impacts on the world. Rather it is about the fundamental question of whether an 
outcome can be ascribed to an agent at all. What matters when it comes to outcome 
responsibility is whether my agency can be connected to an outcome. And this is what 
drives the thoughts we experience in agent-regret. Maddie and the lorry driver are both 
concerned by the fact that they have done something lamentable; and although in both 
of these cases answerability and liability are close by, these are based on the fact that 
such an outcome can be ascribed to these agents. Although both might think “How can 
I make sense of this? How can I explain it to others? How can I make up for it?”—with 
these being harder questions for the driver—their thoughts turn more tightly around the 
fact that they, and their actions, are why such an outcome arose.  
We can assess our agency not just in light of the intrinsic features of our decisions—the 
intentions that mean our agency is in play—but in light of the outcomes for which we are 
left responsible by exercising our agency.
89
 The driver regrets that fact that this death can 
be ascribed to him, he regrets killing the child, and he regrets going on a drive. However 
we put it, the point is that the driver regrets his responsibility for that outcome.
90
 
Likewise, the guard in Palsgraf might regret pushing the salesman, and he regrets this 
because it makes him responsible for Palsgraf’s injury. What is consistent across these 
cases, whether they involve results or consequences, is that our responsibility for an 
outcome explains our regret; it explains why pushing, which can otherwise be innocuous, 
is regrettable, because the pushing led to the injury. Further, this responsibility arises 
due to more than just the intrinsic features of our decisions and need not just attach to 
faulty behaviour. 
My suggestion is thus that the object of one’s regret is not one’s decision or intention, 
nor is it merely the outcome that arose; rather, it is one’s responsibility for that outcome. 
We can model the object of agent-regret in terms of outcome responsibility: 
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Agent-regret laments my responsibility for an outcome. 
Contrast this with  
Agent-regret laments that I did such a thing. 
Both of these are distinct from taking an external view (compare regretting an instance 
of responsibility that happens to be my responsibility, with regretting my responsibility 
for an outcome). Focussing on outcome responsibility has a few benefits. One benefit is 
that one’s responsibility for an outcome is broader than what actions one has performed. 
Although I will not discuss omissions and other cases that might not be described as 
actions, an account of agent-regret should be able to expand to account for them, and 
construing agent-regret in terms of outcome responsibility better allows for that. Another 
benefit is that lamenting that I did such a thing, or lamenting my action, does not make 
clear what about my action it is that I regret; for instance, it could be that the decision 
was intrinsically bad. By focussing on our responsibility for an outcome, we can still say 
that we regret an action or an exercise of our agency, it’s just that the element that drives 
that regret is made clear: we regret these actions or exercises of agency because they 
make us responsible for such outcomes (regardless of whether we find fault in our 
decisions). Further, we make outcome responsibility central, and much of the discussion 
of Part II, which I hope will vindicate agent-regret, relies upon discussions of outcome 
responsibility and its importance. Finally, this helps us draw more clearly the links 
between Bernard Williams’s work and Tony Honoré’s, which should hopefully 
illuminate Honoré’s work in terms of our emotions, and place Williams’s more firmly 
within the philosophy of law. 
Let’s return to Jacobson and the object challenge. Jacobson holds that the thought 
behind agent-regret is some form of guilt (that involves fault) alongside the 
(contradictory) acknowledgement that “While I regret doing what I did, I endorse doing 
it again in similar circumstances.”91 But what Jacobson has in mind only concerns one’s 
decision, considered by itself. On my picture, we can put things differently without any 
such clash. Instead we say: “While I regret doing what I did, I endorse deciding that way 
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in similar circumstances.” I can still regret doing what I did—I can regret performing that 
action—without holding my decision to have been in error or at fault. The assessment of 
a decision in itself turns around its intrinsic qualities (I am sympathetic to the view that 
moral judgment is based on the quality of our intentions, but I will not explore that). 
But an action is made of more than just a decision, it can be made of a result, too; and 
our actions can also be significant in terms of their consequences. It is the fact I am 
responsible for your broken leg that I regret, but this does not mean I have made any 
sort of error in my decision that needs to be renounced, and I can fully endorse deciding 
that way. Jacobson goes wrong in concluding that agent-regret, if it is to apply to one’s 
own actions, must take as its object one’s decision assessed only in terms of its intrinsic 
features, and that this is the only way we can assess our actions. Instead, we should 
recognise that our actions can be made good or bad in light of what follows.  
Still, we can make sense of the quote with which I opened this chapter. The deliberation 
is bad insofar as it led to that outcome; it is bad insofar as it was part of that action. It is 
not bad in and of itself—you need not have been careless, you could have deliberated as 
well as you could—it is not bad in a fault-involving way. Regretting one’s own action, even 
regretting one’s own decision, does not mean that one was at fault. It just means that one 
recognises the place that this decision had in something lamentable.  
By introducing the concept of outcome responsibility, we introduce the possibility that 
we can regret an action without assuming that there is some fault at the level of the 
decision. It is my responsibility for the outcome, not something bad in me or my 
decisions, that I regret. Yet I do not just regret the outcome itself; rather, I regret the 
exercise of agency that left me responsible, as an agent, for that outcome. The driver 
only meant to go for a drive but driving turned into killing. The decision turned out 
badly, and the action was regrettable, only because it left the driver responsible for the 
death of the child. 
Now that we have seen why an agent might regret their action without being at fault—
because it leaves them responsible for some outcome—we are well placed to offer a fuller 
understanding of the nature of agent-regret. We turn to this in chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3 
Outcome Responsibility and Agent-
Regret 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I further explore how outcome responsibility relates to, and illuminates, 
agent-regret. In chapter 2, I suggested that the lorry driver was responsible for the child’s 
death (I defend this in greater depth in Part II), and this responsibility is worse than, say, 
responsibility for the child’s broken leg. In such a case, it seems like this responsibility 
is worse because the outcome is worse. In 3.1, I develop the idea that we can feel agent-
regret despite not regretting an outcome itself. Although in many cases we do regret our 
responsibility for an outcome because we regret the outcome itself, there is no necessary 
relationship between our assessment of an outcome and our assessment of our 
responsibility. In 3.2, I apply our picture of outcome responsibility to agent-regret 
aroused by foreseen outcomes. In 3.3, I conclude this part by setting out my account of 
agent-regret and distinguishing it from accounts offered by several other philosophers. 
By the end of Part I, we should have a proper grasp on the nature of agent-regret and 
how it differs from guilt and ordinary regret; we should also have a good understanding 
of the object of agent-regret: that one was responsible for an outcome. In Part II, I turn 
to defending our propensity for agent-regret. 
3.1 Outcomes and evaluations: pure agent-regret 
I have suggested that we can understand the object of agent-regret in terms of outcome 
responsibility: someone who feels agent-regret regrets their responsibility for an 
outcome. This was based on a point—about how we conceive of actions and our 
responsibility for outcomes—that is independent of any claims about how we evaluate 
our responsibility; we could think that the constitution of actions changed depending on 
results without those actions being better or worse for it. Given that I have put forward 
66 
 
our responsibility for an outcome as the object of agent-regret, it is clear that we need to 
be able to evaluate this responsibility negatively if it can indeed be the object of agent-
regret. So, we need to understand the evaluation of our responsibility. It was easy to see, 
following the analogy of the earthquake case, that certain results plausibly make our 
actions better or worse. 
One way of incorporating the role of outcomes into an analysis of agent-regret is to note 
that agent-regret often involves regretting the outcome of one’s action. The agent sees 
the outcome as a bad thing independently of her involvement. Were the lorry driver 
just a bystander then we imagine he would feel ordinary regret. The lorry driver doesn’t 
just regret that he killed the child, he also regrets that the child died. Much as the 
earthquake is made bad, or made worse, by the death-toll, the driver’s action is made 
bad by the death of the child. On this approach, the lorry driver sees the child’s death 
as a bad thing, and thus he comes to regret that he killed the child, or thus he comes to 
regret his responsibility for the child’s death. John Gardner thinks that agent-regret is a 
compound of ordinary regret about a state of affairs and the thought that I am 
responsible for the regretted state of affairs:  
“[W]hat Williams regards as the distinct emotion of agent-regret is 
instead a combination of two separate, but interacting, experiences. 
One is ordinary, vanilla regret. The other is the thought of one’s own 
responsibility for what is regretted. I regret the injury to the child who 
ran out in front of my lorry, and on top of that I hold myself to have 
been responsible for it. Then, naturally enough, I also regret the fact 
of my responsibility. My pained thoughts include not just ‘if only the 
lad hadn’t run out’ but also ‘if only I had gone for a different route 
this morning’ (or a smaller truck, earlier start, etc.).”1  
On Gardner’s picture, we regret the outcome, realise we are responsible for it, and that 
regret transmits from the outcome to become regret about one’s responsibility for that 
action.   
Gardner’s picture is a paradigmatic version of what we might call the standard picture 
of agent-regret. 
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 Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law, 139. 
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The Standard Picture: The agent assesses the outcome as bad, recognises her 
responsibility for the outcome, and thus sees her responsibility as bad.2 
This is not a point about how we conceive of actions but about how we assess them. Not 
only does the outcome affect the ways in which we conceive of and understand an action, 
it gives the action, and our responsibility for that action, its evaluative character—when it 
comes to agent-regret, the outcome renders one’s responsibility lamentable.  
The standard picture says that I lament that I did such a thing (or that I was responsible 
for this or that) because I lament the results or consequences of that action (see further 
7.2). I make no dispute that “naturally enough” we often jump from the badness of an 
outcome to the badness of our responsibility for it. The standard picture offers a 
plausible evaluative explanation of many cases of agent-regret. It offers a plausible 
explanation of what makes the agent evaluate their action as a bad thing, as something 
that is regrettable. Yet the standard picture builds this evaluative explanation into the 
nature of agent-regret. It says that to feel agent-regret is to see one’s action as bad because 
one sees the outcome as bad.  
But the evaluation offered on the standard approach does not apply to all cases of agent-
regret, so the standard picture—according to which the nature of agent-regret is such that 
it necessarily involves regretting the outcome of one’s action—fails as an account of agent-
regret. A proper account of agent-regret allows room for other explanations of why we 
assess our actions, or our responsibility for outcomes, as bad things. This is because one 
can feel agent-regret without feeling any regret over what has happened.3 I don’t just 
mean that one can think that what has happened is the best outcome one could have 
                                               
 
 
2
 This view seems to be presupposed in much of the literature. Take the following example, from Susan 
Wolf: “The emotional response to beliefs about the badness of the effects of one's actions is what Bernard 
Williams labeled 'agent-regret.'” Wolf, “The Moral of Moral Luck,” 16. Connie Rosati cashes out agent-
regret in terms of “a person’s regret about her contribution to an undesirable event or state of affairs” 
Rosati, “Mortality, Agency, and Regret,” 232. See also Wallace, “Replies,” 434. Or take the following, 
couched in Carla Bagnoli’s own way but where the outcome (albeit the outcome that did not arise) drives 
the assessment of our responsibility: “agent-regret concerns what for the agent is a valuable alternative, 
even though she did not or could not choose it.” Bagnoli, “Value in the Guise of Regret,” 177.  
3
 As far as I can tell, only Amélie Rorty notes this: “Characteristically, the agent regrets his action because 
he regrets the state of affairs to which it has contributed. But it is possible for a person to regret his having 
brought about E, without regretting E. (He may, for instance, think it is important for someone else to 
enjoy the satisfaction of having brought about E.)” Rorty, “Agent Regret,” 490. See also 494-495 This 
quote nicely captures what I will now expound. 
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hoped for, as in cases of foreseen outcomes; rather, one can feel agent-regret over doing 
something that, in terms of its effects, isn’t just better than some other awful outcome, 
but is good, and one evaluates that outcome as good. This is what I will call the pure 
picture of agent-regret. 
I take it that the pure picture of agent-regret is novel. The standard picture does indeed 
seem to be the standard picture. But it is important to note that my primary concern in 
this thesis is to explore how agent-regret tells us something about our agency, and what 
it means to be an agent. Most of Part II will involve trying to defend the idea that agents 
are responsible for outcomes that are outside of their control, and that this matters. And 
most of this will be discussed in light of the standard examples of agent-regret that I 
introduced in the introduction, all of which are amenable to the explanation offered by 
the standard picture. Still, I take it that the pure picture is the right picture, and by the 
end of this thesis, I hope that my analysis of agent-regret as pure agent-regret is plausible, 
and that we will be able to better recognise the holes in the standard picture: sometimes 
one’s regret cannot be explained by looking at the badness of the outcomes of one’s 
action, rather there are other features that explain why one might think one’s action was 
bad. Even though I will not go into depth on the pure picture, I clearly need to say a 
little more in sketching the pure picture if it is to be plausible. What sort of evaluative 
explanations—explanations of why one might regret one’s responsibility for an outcome 
without regretting the outcome itself—do I have in mind? 
Firstly, who performs an action can be important. As Williams made vividly clear in his 
Critique of Utilitarianism, there’s something important—not least to Jim—about whether 
it is Pedro or Jim who kills the villager(s).4 In this situation Jim does regret the outcome, 
and he surely does see his killing the villager as a bad thing because he, whom we assume 
to be a reasonably compassionate pacifist, respects the life of the villagers. Yet surely 
Williams point was not just that it can matter who does a bad thing; rather, it can matter 
who does anything. (Relatedly, as I will discuss at 6.3.2, it might matter to the 
meaningfulness of my life that I complete a certain task, regardless of the good that arises 
if you complete it.)  
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 See Williams’s discussion of Jim, and George, in Williams, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” secs. 3–6. 
69 
 
For a further example, take a case that Amélie Oksenberg Rorty offers. A mother is 
building a table with her young daughter to encourage her daughter’s confidence in her 
manual abilities; the mother, absentmindedly, hammers in the final nail and 
immediately regrets doing so because she realises that by finishing the table she stopped 
her daughter from completing the project herself.5 Rorty thinks the mother will feel 
agent-regret. I might not agree: I think the mother might have been careless and guilt 
might be more appropriate. But the point of this example doesn’t concern agent-regret: 
rather, the lesson I want to draw from this case is that it can matter not just what things 
are done, not just what outcomes arise, but that a particular person does them or is 
responsible for them: in this case, it matters because only by hammering in the final nail 
will her daughter achieve finishing the table. We don’t need to appeal to Williams’s Jim-
in-the-jungle cases to see the fairly obvious truth that who does something matters.  
Finally, take a different sort of case: revenge. Shylock might be wryly amused were 
Antonio to lose a pound of flesh; he might even be satisfied to some extent were 
someone else to cut it from Antonio; but for full satisfaction Shylock must cut the flesh 
himself.6 Or take the example of Inigo Montoya in The Princess Bride.7 For half his life 
he has been waiting to say to his father’s killer: “Hello. My name is Inigo Montoya. You 
killed my father. Prepare to die.” Montoya would not be content to learn that his father’s 
killer has died or been killed. Montoya doesn’t want him dead, he wants to kill him. 
Revenge seems to be achieved—at least in many cases—only if I do it. It’s not just that an 
outcome is realised, nor that someone acts to realise that outcome, it matters that I 
realise it. Montoya might regret his father’s killer’s death at someone else’s hands, but 
relishes killing him himself. What we do, and that we do it, can matter to us 
independently of the outcome.  
We will discuss the relationship between outcome responsibility and evaluative 
explanations in far more depth when we discuss the ways in which outcome 
responsibility affects our identities in chapter 6. For now, let’s see how the possibility of 
this sort of evaluative explanation affects agent-regret. One might regret being involved 
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 Rorty, “Agent Regret,” 489. 
6
 See the discussion in Miller, Eye for an Eye, chap. 6. 
7
 Reiner, The Princess Bride. 
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in bringing about some outcome without regretting the outcome or whilst positively 
welcoming it. That is to say, I might regret my responsibility for an outcome without 
regretting the outcome itself. I will illustrate this with two cases, both of which involve 
deaths, and both of which bring out that it is not always the outcome that one regrets. It 
is important to bear in mind that in both of these cases what matters is the agent’s own 
perspective, because what matters in agent-regret is the agent’s own assessment. So, we 
should not impute moralistic attitudes towards deaths and executions and should grant 
that some people think the deaths of certain people are thoroughly good things that 
might arouse in them no semblance of regret in and of themselves.  
Here is the first case: 
The rifleman in a firing squad welcomes the convict’s execution, but he regrets 
that he fired a fatal bullet—he regrets that he killed the convict. 
The rifleman does not regret that the convict was killed by a firing squad; he believes 
this convict deserves to die at the hands of the state. He does not see either the outcome 
itself, nor the actions that led to it, as regrettable. Rather, what he regrets is that he killed 
the convict.8  
One might think this case is psychologically implausible. But it helps to make sense of 
a real-world practice: the dummy bullet.9 Firing squads often have one bullet loaded with 
a blank, and the members of the squad know this. Thus, riflemen can either know or 
deceive themselves into thinking that they did not fire a fatal bullet. They can absolve 
themselves of responsibility (which is itself already partly achieved by the diffusion of 
responsibility achieved by there being several members of the squad). The practice of 
providing a dummy bullet doesn’t make sense if what the members of the firing squad 
might regret is either the death or the execution of the convict. Including a blank makes 
sense only if they might regret their own responsibility: they regret having so acted, they 
regret killing the convict. Now you might think that the rifleman is suffering some 
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 To get around any issues about why he was in the squad, we can imagine that he was chosen to be in it 
by a lottery, and thinks the lottery is a fair method. 
9
 “Firing Squad”; Westcott, “How and Why Gardner Was Shot.” 
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recalcitrant form of guilt. Perhaps.
10
 But it also strikes me that the rifleman might regret 
his killing of the convict.  
The following case is even clearer. It takes the basic structure of the lorry driver’s case 
and makes the outcome something that, plausibly, our agent would not regret. If you 
accept the basic cases of agent-regret, and are an advocate of the standard picture, this 
should persuade you that the evaluative story is more complicated than as presented on 
the standard picture. As a starting point, think about the celebrations amongst some 
people following Margaret Thatcher’s death.11 Or take Bob Dylan’s attitude towards 
warmongers in his “Masters of War”: “And I hope that you die/And your death’ll come 
soon/ I will follow your casket/ In the pale afternoon/And I’ll watch while you’re 
lowered/Down to your deathbed/And I’ll stand o’er your grave/’Til I’m sure that you’re 
dead”12 It should be clear that sometimes we do not regret, we actively welcome, the 
deaths of certain people. Nor do we have any reason to suppose that these contented 
folks would be any less glad they to discover that, say, Thatcher or a warmonger was 
killed by some accident; perhaps they were hit by a lorry. They might even take a 
laudatory attitude towards the driver, seeing him as some sort of inadvertent hero. They 
need not feel regret just because an action brings about the death. 
Yet we might imagine that were Bob Dylan our lorry driver and were he to run over not 
a child but that very warmonger whom he detests, Dylan would (or at least could) be 
wracked with agent-regret. The fact his own action brings about the death quite plausibly 
changes how he feels, because it introduces his own responsibility for that outcome. 
The hateful driver detests a particular individual. He has regularly, and 
ingenuously, wished death upon this person. He then, accidentally, runs this 
person over. The lorry driver regrets killing the victim. 
This combines two recognisable phenomena: that sometimes we (at least some of us) 
are glad that certain hateful people are dead, and that we (at least some of us) are averse 
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 The case does not turn around his involvement in the death revealing to him that he (actually) opposes 
capital punishment and so regrets the result or even feels guilt. Still, sometimes agent-regret is revelatory 
and tells us about our values: see White, “Revelatory Regret and the Standpoint of the Agent.” 
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to killing people. What the rifleman and the hateful driver show us is that we can feel 
agent-regret despite not regretting the outcome itself. Were we, say, to drug either 
character so that he forgot his role, and then tell him that, respectively, the convict had 
been executed or the warmonger killed, he would feel no regret; were they bystanders, 
neither would feel ordinary regret; were either character able to express his judgments 
of value, he could still honestly say he does not regard the death itself as a bad thing. 
The outcome does play a role insofar as we often take account of outcomes when we 
assess actions, and when it is a result it constitutes the action as this action, but the 
outcome need not be evaluatively linked to one’s evaluation of one’s action. To these 
characters, the outcome itself does not matter; what matters is what they have done.  
These cases might seem to be extreme, but we can also imagine more mundane 
examples: I might not regret that your vase smashed (it’s a really ugly vase, and you 
always keep your flowers in it far too long till they start to smell) but I regret that I 
smashed it; I might not regret that you broke your nose (I don’t much like you and find 
your vanity annoying) but I regret that it’s because I ran into you. These are the purest 
cases of agent-regret:   
In pure agent-regret, one regrets one’s action but does not regret the outcome 
itself. 
This emphasises the difference between agent-regret and taking an external view. When 
I take an external view on my own action, I think that it was lamentable that someone 
was responsible for some outcome, but I do not regret that I was that person. In a pure 
case, I might not regret it were anyone else responsible for that outcome—what matters 
is that I was responsible.  
The possibility of pure agent-regret shows a fundamental flaw in the standard picture. 
Let’s look at this in terms of Gardner’s account. What is evaluatively central to agent-
regret is that I regret the fact of my responsibility not that I regret the outcome and thus 
regret my responsibility for that outcome. I might not regret the outcome. So, it can’t 
just be that agent-regret is regret about some outcome that transmits to my own 
responsibility for it because I can feel agent-regret without feeling regret about that 
outcome. No doubt the standard picture often succeeds, in particular cases, as an 
explanation of why we negatively assess our responsibility and thus feel agent-regret; it is 
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right that sometimes we regard our actions as bad because we regard the outcomes as 
bad. But it fails as an analysis because agent-regret does not always involve such 
evaluations.  
Too often are philosophers led astray by a misguided account of agent-regret: they 
recognise that there’s something more than just regretting outcomes, they see that 
Williams is on to something, but they focus on the bad outcome of ordinary regret. But 
agent-regret is not just ordinary regret that spreads its tendrils into my responsibility. A 
proper analysis of agent-regret must explain why we might regret our responsibility for 
an outcome, and we cannot always explain this regret by way of our evaluation of the 
outcome itself. A proper analysis of agent-regret has to make room for a robust 
understanding of the various ways in which we might evaluate our responsibility for an 
outcome. We explore why our responsibility for outcomes might be significant, aside 
from the fact it leads to certain outcomes, in more depth in chapters 6 and 7. What 
matters here is just that we can see that the badness of my action is not always explained 
by the badness of this sort of outcome: the result that is, say, the death of the warmonger, 
does not always explain why I regret killing that person. Instead, we sometimes must 
appeal to other explanations of why someone might regret performing some action. To 
put it another way: sometimes we assess an action negatively because of what it leads to; 
other times we assess what we have done negatively, and it is negative only because that 
action did lead to that outcome, but it is the leading to that outcome, and not always the 
outcome itself, that we see in a negative light.   
3.2 Foreseen and unforeseen 
I noted in the introduction that we seem to find agent-regret in two sorts of case. In the 
one sort of case, we feel agent-regret because we are afflicted by something unforeseen. 
Perhaps we were ignorant of something and had no reason to know it might happen; 
but we are often just afflicted by bad luck. The outcome that arises, the outcome that 
we are responsible for, is in some respects unlucky. The driver is unlucky to be 
responsible for the child’s death, the outcome arising because of his agency is unlucky 
for him. In the other sort of case, our agents know what they are doing. They are unlucky 
in that they have to make a choice, but they know what will arise in virtue of their choice. 
Or, in the language of outcome responsibility, they know what outcome will be ascribed 
to them—they know what they will be responsible for.  
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As I said in the introduction, I will mostly focus on such cases of unforeseen outcomes; 
yet I claimed that my analysis of agent-regret should extend also to cases of foreseen 
outcomes. Although I do not need to examine this in depth, it would be useful to sketch 
a brief account of how my account as offered so far applies to foreseen cases, rather 
than just making you take my word for it. To do this, I want to see how outcome 
responsibility is also the object of agent-regret when it comes to foreseen outcomes, and 
to note that they are also amenable to cases of pure agent-regret. 
Recall Agamemnon’s case. We can at least make a case that Agamemnon’s conduct is 
unimpeachable. Even though there are versions of the story where Agamemnon must 
make his choice because he, an ancestor, or some crewmember has behaved badly, we 
do not have to suppose that in every case where one faces a dilemma or must choose 
between two evils one must do so because of some prior fault.13 For a case that is even 
more clearly free of fault, imagine someone in a boating accident who will inevitably face 
agent-regret because he can only save one of his wife or his son; it would be implausible 
to say that he faces this choice because of some prior fault. 
Just as in cases of unforeseen outcomes, someone who feels agent-regret over making 
such a choice doesn’t just regret the outcome itself. Nor do they just regret facing this 
choice, although they do regret that, too. Rather, the fact that Agamemnon must kill his 
daughter, the fact that the boatman must (in saving his wife) abandon his child, is what 
these agents regret. Were some friendly God to swoop down and pre-emptively kill 
Iphigenia before Agamemnon had to make his choice, Agamemnon might feel a deep 
sadness, but he will not have room for agent-regret. Were the boatman to see another 
ship in the distance that could easily reach his son, he would have no need for agent-
regret. (What if our agents have already made their choice, only to then get a stroke of 
good luck? Still, it is outcome responsibility that carries the load. If the boatman 
abandons his son but his son is then saved, he cannot regret being responsible for his 
son’s death. Although he abandoned his son and he is responsible for the outcome that 
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 Honoré makes the same point that prior faults can’t explain all such cases: Honoré, “Responsibility and 
Luck,” 21. 
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is literally turning his back on his son.14) So, cases of agent-regret that arise when an agent 
foresees what she will be responsible for also involve regretting one’s responsibility for 
some outcome.  
Pure cases can also arise when it comes to foreseen outcomes—in fact, they might be 
more prevalent here. If one faces not a dilemma, but the lesser of two evils, there is a 
sense in which one does not regret the outcome, and Williams is astute to this: we might 
regret doing as we do despite recognising that what we did was “for the best”.15 
Presumably, this means that the outcome was the best possible outcome. For instance, 
if one must give up one’s career to look after one’s ailing partner, one might regret this 
despite recognising that looking after one’s partner is more important and not something 
itself to regret. Now, one might think that in the lesser of two evils there will be some 
bad-making feature of the outcome that explains such a case away (it meant you had to 
give up your career). But I also think that we can see this in cases where the outcome is 
not the lesser of two evils, rather it is something that one positively welcomes. It is such 
cases that show the inadequacy of the standard account even when applied to foreseen 
outcomes. Here is an example of what I have in mind.16  
The boss does not want to fire the worker, but she knows that someone must 
fire him—and she is the boss.  
The result of firing him is that he is out of a job. But she wants him to be out of a job: 
he’s boorish and a bad worker. There’s nothing about the outcome that she regrets. She 
just doesn’t want to be responsible for it. How do we explain this, if she sees the outcome 
as a good thing? In this case we might think that the boss doesn’t want to be the sort of 
person who fires someone (see chapter 7).  
So, I have suggested that we can also understand agent-regret over foreseen outcomes 
as taking as its object our responsibility for such outcomes (rather than the outcomes or 
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 Perhaps he can feel agent-regret over deciding to abandon his son. As I said at the start of 2.3, I will 
focus only on responsibility for outcomes in the world; it is possible that some cases of agent-regret arise 
because, say, we formed an intention.  
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 31. 
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 Rorty uses a similar case at Rorty, “Agent Regret,” 495. Rorty’s employee is a bumbler, but is a sweet 
man with a family to support, and will be out of work. The boss in my example is not concerned for the 
employee. 
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the decision involved). Further, it seems that pure cases can arise also with regards to 
cases where one feels agent-regret over becoming responsible for some outcome even 
when one knows one will become responsible by acting in such a way. 
3.3 What is agent-regret? Summary 
I hope that we now have a robust and clear picture of the nature of agent-regret and its 
object. My aim in chapters 1 and 2 was to get a clearer picture of the object of agent-
regret. In chapter 1, I set out to distinguish agent-regret from ordinary regret and from 
guilt. I made clear that agent-regret does not just involve regretting an outcome, nor does 
it just involve regretting one’s own action. After all, we can take an external view on our 
own actions: I can recognise my responsibility for an outcome and regret that someone 
was responsible for that outcome without regretting that I was responsible for it.  
Just as important as distinguishing agent-regret from ordinary regret was distinguishing 
agent-regret from guilt and seeing how agent-regret could exist without involving fault. I 
suggested that although agent-regret might be a form of guilt when guilt is broadly 
understood, the distinction Williams was after was more specific. Agent-regret is distinct 
from guilt when guilt involves fault (a “narrow” notion of guilt, as is manifested in the 
guilt of the morality system that Williams had in mind).  I argued that if we use a notion 
of fault that concerns how an agent conducts themselves, we can see that our characters 
who feel agent-regret are not at fault, and nor need they think that they were at fault.  
In chapter 2, I took up a challenge that we find offered by Daniel Jacobson: how can an 
agent feel agent-regret if her conduct was unimpeachable and this is not just regret about 
an outcome? I suggested that Jacobson’s picture of how we think about actions was not 
complex enough. We can be responsible for outcomes in virtue of our agency. This 
responsibility is the object of agent-regret. This let us see that we can assess our 
responsibility for an outcome not in light of our decisions, which can be flawless in and 
of themselves, but in light of the outcomes that arise and which we are responsible for 
in virtue of intentionally acting. The point of that was to get us past Jacobson’s challenge. 
In chapter 3, I added that we can also assess our responsibility for outcomes in other 
ways that do not depend on our assessment of the outcome itself. Thus, I suggested that 
agent-regret is not just regret about an outcome that spreads out to become regret about 
our responsibility for that outcome.  
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Now that I have set out my account of agent-regret, it is useful to contrast my account 
with several other broad accounts of agent-regret. As I noted in the introduction, 
although agent-regret is often encountered in the literature, it is often merely used for 
some quick point, or put to some purpose concerning moral luck, or dismissed with 
some scepticism. My aim here has not been to argue for my analysis of agent-regret 
against competitors in a crowded field. Rather, it has been to set out a plausible analysis 
of agent-regret. Still, it is useful to see how my account is distinct from some other broad 
ways of understanding agent-regret. Firstly, my account is distinct from accounts that are 
sceptical as to the nature of agent-regret. Such accounts hold that there is no such 
emotion as agent-regret, and that emotions like ordinary regret or guilt can cover cases 
like Maddie and the lorry driver. We encountered these in chapters 1 and 2, where I 
defended the idea that agent-regret was distinct from guilt and regret. My account is not 
sceptical as to the nature of agent-regret: I hold that there is an object of agent-regret, 
one’s responsibility for an outcome, and this differs from the object of guilt (one’s faulty 
conduct) and from mere regret (which takes as its object anything ranging from states of 
affairs to one’s own responsibility, so long as one does not regret that  one was 
responsible).  
I also aim to offer an account that is vindicatory. I do not merely say that were agent-
regret to exist it would have our responsibility for an outcome as its object, only to deny 
that our responsibility for an outcome should ever garner regret. What’s more, I aim to 
vindicate Williams’s claim that agent-regret tells us something about agency.  In chapter 
4, we will encounter accounts that suggest we are not responsible for unintended 
outcomes, or that even if we are responsible in this way it is unimportant, or it is only 
important because of factors that do not concern our agency—such accounts deny the 
propriety of agent-regret, at least as Williams understood it. We will see how my account 
differs from such accounts throughout chapters 4 and 5. 
What about non-sceptical accounts? We can already see that my account is different 
from the standard picture of agent-regret. It is important to note why my account differs. 
It is not necessarily that proponents of the standard picture have the object of agent-
regret wrong; rather, it is that they misunderstand why we might regret our responsibility 
for an outcome. My account differs because I suggest that the negative evaluation made 
about one’s responsibility can find a source other than one’s evaluation of the outcome.  
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My account is also broader than an interesting account that Carla Bagnoli offers. She 
argues that agent-regret comes from an evaluation of the value of alternative options.17 
In a sense, her account is a spin on the standard picture. On her account, one regrets 
not one’s responsibility, but the fact that in so acting one missed out on a valuable 
alternative. At least for some cases where one foresees the outcome, Bagnoli’s account 
is illuminating. The fact that the other option would have left his daughter alive, and his 
thoughts about the value of her life, will weigh heavy on Agamemnon’s mind. Yet clearly 
something is missing from this; Agamemnon did not just regret the fact he could not 
realise that value, he also regrets the damage he wrought on his own daughter. And 
Bagnoli’s account does not make so much sense of cases like the lorry driver’s. Although 
he might see the value of the alternative—that no child has died—surely this does not 
really capture how he thinks of matters. What is most salient is the horror of what he 
has done. Further, Bagnoli’s account fails to account for pure cases: it is not the value 
of the outcome, whether it is the outcome I chose or the outcome I forewent, but the 
value attached to my bringing it about, or not bringing it about. My account applies to 
the full range of cases of agent-regret. 
As well as setting out an account of agent-regret, I hope to have clarified exactly what 
outcome responsibility is, and to have shown how it lines up with agent-regret. 
Recognising that our responsibility for an outcome is the object of agent-regret also gives 
us a clear topic for the exploration of whether agent-regret is appropriate. I said in the 
introduction that agent-regret is significant: it is deep and widespread. It is a major 
emotion that swallows up much of one’s attention and time (as in the case of the lorry 
driver) and it is an everyday emotion that occurs in minor ways all of the time. To show 
that agent-regret is appropriate—to show that it is an emotion that we sometimes rightly 
feel—we need to show that it is an appropriate response to its object. For agent-regret to 
be appropriate, it needs to be the case that sometimes outcome responsibility is 
significant enough to justify swallowing up much of one’s time and attention, and for 
outcome responsibility to be moderately important in many instances in everyday life.  
This sets the task for Part II. I have presupposed (at 2.3.1) an account whereby we are 
responsible for outcomes that we did not intend. I called this by the not-too-catchy 
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 Bagnoli, “Value in the Guise of Regret.” See also Rosati, “Mortality, Agency, and Regret.” 
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acronym “SIO”. This held that for an outcome to be ascribed to my agency, I must have 
done something voluntarily. There are clearly two major obstacles to this. Firstly, if it 
turns out that we can only ascribe an outcome to someone’s agency if they intended that 
outcome, or if that outcome reflects their deep and genuine desires—like in TIO—then 
agent-regret will be inappropriate because we will not be responsible for those 
unintended outcomes, and thus cases of unforeseen outcomes like that of the lorry 
driver or Maddie will not be cases of responsibility, and will not be appropriate cases of 
agent-regret. (We still might find agent-regret in cases of foreseen outcomes; but that is 
partly why I have focused on unforeseen outcomes: there is more of a challenge to be 
faced here.) Secondly, if it turns out that we are responsible for outcomes that we did 
not intend but this responsibility is unimportant (like how a distant ancestor is, in some 
very attenuated sense, metaphysically responsible for the lorry driver killing the child), 
or unimportant in terms of agency, then this will also not be able to vindicate agent-
regret’s place in our lives or in our agency. So, we need to see that we are responsible 
for outcomes, and that this responsibility is important.
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Chapter 4 
Responsibility and the 
Unintended 
 
… it is in the nature of action that such regrets cannot be eliminated, 
that one’s life could not be partitioned into some things that one does 
intentionally and other things that merely happen to one.”  
Bernard Williams
1
 
 
In Part I, I argued that there is some conceptual ground, distinct from ordinary regret 
or guilt, for the emotion of agent-regret. Getting clear on the nature of agent-regret and 
its object is only half the task. Much of the contention around agent-regret has not been 
about how we understand its object, rather it has been about that object itself. Firstly, 
Are we responsible for outcomes, even if we did not intend to bring them about? 
For Maddie or the lorry driver to feel agent-regret, they need to be responsible for the 
smashed vase or the child’s death, despite the fact that they did not intend to bring about 
such outcomes, and their behaviour was faultless. Secondly, 
In what way does our responsibility for particular unintended outcomes matter? 
It may well be that we are, in some sense, responsible for unintended outcomes. But it 
might be that this responsibility is unimportant, or unimportant to these agents, just as 
we would think that metaphysical causal responsibility is ethically unimportant: it doesn’t 
matter to a distant ancestor, or to their sense of agency, that a descendant killed someone 
(and would not have done so had the ancestor not procreated). Mere causal 
responsibility doesn’t seem to count for much, so we need to show that outcome 
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responsibility is more important than just that. And we need to show the way in which 
responsibility for a particular unintended outcome (e.g. the driver killing the child) 
matters. 
The task we pick up in Part II is to answer these questions. We start, in 4.1, with the 
importance of outcome responsibility in general—that is, the importance of being held 
responsible for outcomes, where this is perhaps just limited to the importance of being 
responsible for intended outcomes. I suggest that we need some conception of outcome 
responsibility because outcome responsibility is central to our status as agents and to our 
self-respect. In 4.2 we will explore three attempts to understand what it means to be an 
agent, in terms of our responsibility for outcomes. The first is the picture Williams 
targeted in “Moral Luck”: it is the Kantian account that focusses on an agent’s own 
contribution. We will see that such an account fails to allow for outcome responsibility, 
so I quickly set it aside. I suggest that there is a way of understanding outcome 
responsibility as restricted to intended outcomes, and this can respect the importance 
of outcome responsibility.  
So why accept that we are responsible for unintended outcomes? In 4.2, I develop the 
idea that we are responsible for outcomes we did not intend, and this is because to be 
an agent at all is to be (open to being) responsible for outcomes we did not intend. I call 
this “Unintentionalism”. The Intentionalist denies that we need to be responsible for 
unintended outcomes in order to be agents. The rest of the chapter is an exploration of 
the ways in which the Intentionalist might both make sense of agent-regret and go on 
the offensive against the Unintentionalist. In 4.3 we explore the revisionist challenge to 
agent-regret that says that “agent”-regret doesn’t involve agency at all. In 4.4 we explore 
the rejectionist challenge that tries to debunk agent-regret. By the end of 4.4, we should 
see why we cannot take for granted, as I have done in chapter 2, the idea that we are 
responsible for outcomes we did not intend. This sets us up for a defence of 
Unintentionalism in chapter 5. In Chapter 6, we move on to why our responsibility for 
particular unintended outcomes is important. 
4.1 The importance of outcome responsibility 
What does it mean to be an agent? In the most basic sense, agents change something or 
do something. Agency is obviously linked to being responsible for outcomes in the 
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domain of agency that concerns practical agency. Given the sort of cases we are 
discussing—smashed vases and slain children—we will focus solely on practical agency 
rather than theoretical agency, and we will focus on the element of practical agency that 
concerns the impact we make on the world (i.e. not the aspect concerning weighing up 
reasons).2  
Practical agency makes an impact on the world. 
Why is outcome responsibility important to our practical agency? Take Honoré’s claim 
that:  
“If actions and outcomes were not ascribed to us on the basis of our 
bodily movements and their mental accompaniments, we could have 
no continuing history or character. There would indeed be bodies 
and, associated with them, minds. Each would possess a certain 
continuity. They could be labelled A, B, C. But having decided 
nothing and done nothing these entities would hardly be people.”3  
This connects being responsible for outcomes to our practical agency—to doing things.4 
If outcomes were not ascribed to us on the basis of the exercises of our agency, we would 
have on the one hand bodies and minds, and on the other hand we would have 
outcomes. But there would be no link between the bodies and minds on the one hand 
and the outcomes on the other. Our movements and our mental exertions would be 
unrelated to outcomes in the world. Outcome responsibility establishes such a link 
between our bodies and minds and the world. It establishes a link (and a link that runs 
in a specific direction) that lets us say that certain changes in the world, the fact that 
certain outcomes have come about, are down to what people, qua agents, have done. It 
does this, as we have seen in chapter 2, by ascribing these outcomes to one’s agency, 
thus it provides the link required. 
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 Allan Beever says that “In choosing to act, we launch ourselves upon the world, but it follows that we 
choose outcome responsibility only if outcome responsibility is built into the notion of choosing to act. 
But there is no reason to think that choosing to act necessarily involves a commitment to outcome 
responsibility.” Beever, “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law,” 488. My argument 
is that outcome responsibility is built into launching ourselves upon the world.  
3
 Honoré, “Responsibility and Luck,” 29. 
4
 See also Stephen Perry’s discussion at Perry, “Honoré on Responsibility for Outcomes,” 71–72. Here, 
Perry discusses several of the issues we will come on to in chapters 5-6.  
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Stephen Perry agrees. He thinks that these considerations should show us that:  
“The concept of outcome-responsibility is a necessary concomitant 
of the concept of agency, since not every outcome to which our 
actions causally contribute is properly attributable to us as agents”.5 
Outcome responsibility lets us distinguish ourselves from mere forces of nature, such as 
are involved in certain forms of metaphysical causal responsibility. Perry is right that 
outcome responsibility narrows what we are responsible for, but the positive side is as 
important: outcome responsibility connects us to the world such that we can influence 
it as agents.  
Outcome responsibility establishes the connection between an agent and the 
world. This connection is central to practical agency. 
Our agency is clearly important to us and given the role of outcome responsibility in our 
agency, it seems that outcome responsibility must also be important to us. I now want 
to sketch two specific ways, both of which arise in the outcome responsibility literature, 
in which our outcome responsibility is important to us.  
Our status as persons. 
One particularly important connection that is often brought out in discussions of 
outcome responsibility is between outcome responsibility and our status as persons.6 
Roughly the idea is that it is central to the idea of a person that persons can make an 
impact on the world, if we could not make that impact on the world we would not be 
persons; because being able to make an impact presupposes that we are responsible for 
outcomes, our status as persons presupposes that we are responsible for outcomes. No 
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 Perry, 72. Both Perry and Honoré occasionally use the language of “authorship”, see also Honoré, 
“Appreciations and Responses,” 227. Note that I distinguish not only between a causal link and an agential 
link, but also between an agential link and an authorial link; see above at 2.3.1 and below at 5.1.4. 
Authorship involves intent or the deep self.  
6
 Honoré makes this claim at several points: Honoré, “Responsibility and Luck,” 15, 40; Honoré, “The 
Morality of Tort Law,” 76; Honoré, “Being Responsible,” 134–35. Perry stresses how we are persons in 
virtue of being agents Perry, “Honoré on Responsibility for Outcomes,” 72. See also Duff, Answering for 
Crime, 2009, 100. Note, Duff lays more stress here on intentional agency. And see Gardner, From 
Personal Life to Private Law, 64–71. Gardner claims that decision-makers are “would-be world-
affecter[s]” (66): if Gardner is right, then our status as persons understood as a claim about our status as 
weighers of reasons also relies upon our responsibility for outcomes. 
84 
 
doubt that there is something right about this. Yet it strikes me that we should not rule 
out the idea that there could be persons who are not agents.7 And there could be 
societies with very different structures to ours where persons are not regarded (at least 
not as individuals) as agents.8  
I want to rest, then, with a more restricted claim: outcome responsibility underpins our 
status as persons because we think that agency is a central part of personhood.9 Although 
someone could be a person without being responsible for outcomes, they would be 
lacking some important part of personhood as we regard it;10 further, being an agent is a 
central part of how most or all of us (where this “us” is culturally bounded) conceive of 
ourselves as persons.11  
Outcome responsibility is central to our conception of what it means to be a 
person, because we see persons as practical agents, and practical agency 
presupposes outcome responsibility. 
Self-Respect 
Responsibility for outcomes also relates to our self-respect.12 It is important to the 
woodworker that he can carve a blue jay or a cardinal, it matters to the builder that he 
can make a house. And this is true over and above merely coming out with a good plan 
to carve a cardinal or build a house. We need to make sure that our picture of agency 
captures this and thus accords with our self-respect. 
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 Take those with locked-in syndrome (See Jean-Dominique Bauby, The Diving Bell and the Butterfly.) 
For an example from the philosophical literature, we might think that Brains in Vats are persons. My 
point is that those with a rich mental life who can exert no influence on the world might be persons. 
8
 Charles Taylor suggests the idea of a “first-person standpoint” was absent before Augustine: Taylor, 
Sources of the Self, 130. See Chapters 7 and 10 especially. For the family as the basic ethical unit, see 
Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational; Miller, Humiliation. For society as the important ethical unit, see  
MacIntyre, After Virtue.  
9
 The claim in the literature is ambiguous: is outcome responsibility central to the status of persons 
however we construe persons, or just to our status in the way that I suggest below?  
10
 See Nelson, “What Child Is This?,” 30–33; Schechtman, Staying Alive, 71–72, 103–4, chaps. 5-6. 
Nelson and Schechtman both think that someone can be a person in virtue of how they are treated, even 
if they lack other typical characteristics. We discuss their views in a little more depth in chapter 6. 
11
 Raz takes a similar approach: Raz, FNTR, 251. 
12
 Raz also draws a link between responsibility and self-respect, see Raz, 245, 268. Honoré mentions self-
respect at Honoré, “Introduction,” 10; Honoré, “Being Responsible,” 131–32, 142.  
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What is self-respect?13 The Rawlsian characterisation seems about right: self-respect 
concerns successfully doing valuable things.14 If I see my bringing about an outcome as 
valuable, bringing it about will augment my self-respect; more generally, if I see being 
able to bring about outcomes as valuable, the fact that I am an agent will be important 
to my self-respect. Rawls explicitly assumes that our doings will not seem valuable, or 
will seem less valuable, if they fail to “call upon [our] natural capacities in an interesting 
fashion… [Otherwise,] they are likely to seem dull and flat, and to give us no feeling of 
competence or a sense that they are worth doing”; we want them to be of “suitable 
complexity and refinement.”15 Being responsible for outcomes allows us to have a greater 
variety of plans and goals than if we were only responsible for, say, the workings of our 
minds. Further, many of these things are difficult and seem worthwhile. We could not 
sculpt, woodwork, play sports, build, and so on, if we were not responsible for outcomes 
in the world; and we seem to deserve respect for the changes we make in the world. 
These changes are not easily achieved, and rest on some potent capacities. (We’ll 
consider this more in 5.1.3) 
Being responsible for outcomes is a central pillar of our self-respect. 
Were we not responsible for outcomes, we would be worthy of less respect than we 
actually do deserve as authors of change in the world.  
4.2 Views of agency and responsibility 
Thus, being responsible for outcomes is important. What we need to now see is when 
someone exercises their agency, when an outcome can be ascribed to an agent. In 
chapter 2, I introduced SIO: for an outcome to be ascribed to my agency, I must have 
intended to do something (I must have been doing something voluntarily), and must be 
appropriately causally related to that outcome, but I need not have intended that 
outcome. In this chapter, I explore why one might prefer TIO: for an outcome to be 
ascribed to my agency, I must have intended to bring about that outcome, and must be 
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 I don’t distinguish self-respect and self-esteem. 
14
 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 67.  
15
 Rawls, 440. See the “Aristotelian Principle” at Rawls, sec. 65. Rawls grants some people may derive self-
respect from menial tasks, but most of us require complexity Rawls, 432–33.  
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appropriate causally related to that outcome. I will set out why one might accept TIO, 
and how proponents of TIO might oppose Williams’s account of agent-regret.  
Before focussing on these, I first want to very briefly present the picture that Williams 
takes as his target in “Moral Luck”. The idea that we are responsible for outcomes even 
when we did not intend them is set in contrast to another position: that we are only 
responsible for something if we fully controlled it, if it arose solely due to our 
contribution.16 Nagel offers a clear statement of this position: “Prior to reflection it is 
intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed for what is not their fault, or 
for what is due to factors beyond their control.”17  
On such an account we should, as Williams put it, “allocate blame and responsibility on 
the ultimately fair basis of the agent’s own contribution, no more and no less.”18 This is 
the morality system that we discussed, in relation to guilt, in 1.3. Yet these accounts tend 
to suggest something further; not only are we judged on our own contributions, but our 
own contributions are all that count as ours. Nagel exemplifies this. Much of his “Moral 
Luck” clearly concerns what it means to be a responsible agent as opposed to being 
merely “a portion of the larger sequence of events”.19 Nagel is not just interested in 
judgment but also in what counts as down to my agency; he expresses this when he runs 
together “the area of genuine agency, and therefore legitimate moral judgment”.20 What 
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 For control, see, most vividly, Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals, sec. I. 
Williams cites Kant as his target at Williams, “Moral Luck,” 20–22, 38. And see Nagel, “Moral Luck.” 
For intention-based accounts, see Crisp, “Moral Luck and Equality of Moral Opportunity,” 9–10. Also 
Smith, TMS, II.iii.intro. For a superb discussion of this see Russell, “Smith on Moral Sentiment and 
Moral Luck.” Andrew Ashworth offers a similar sort of view for criminal liability Ashworth, “Taking the 
Consequences.” On Ashworth’s account, the harm or risk of harm might affect delineating the offence, 
but whether the harm actually occurs should not Ashworth, 122. See also Edwards and Simester, “Crime, 
Blameworthiness, and Outcomes.” Note that many of these intention-based accounts can be interpreted 
in two ways: they hold us responsible solely for our intentions, or they hold us responsible for the 
outcomes that we intend. The former is of the ilk that I will set aside for this discussion, the latter could 
be seen as a version of what I below called TIO and should not be dismissed on the back of dismissing 
the more restricted account that I here set aside.  
17
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 25. 
18
 Williams, ELP, 194. Our own contribution is supposedly all that matters because our own contribution 
is supposed to “possess some special, indeed supreme, kind of dignity or importance.” Williams, “Moral 
Luck,” 21. See also 38. 
19
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 37. 
20
 Nagel, 35. Gardner discusses how Nagel runs together the judgment of agency and an account of agency 
at Gardner, From Personal Life to Private Law, 60. See also when Nagel clearly discusses responsibility 
rather than judgment when he discusses “the point of view which makes responsibility dependent on 
control” Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 31. 
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counts as my own contribution—and thus what counts as down to my agency, what 
outcomes I am responsible for—is, on such accounts, what I control or intend. As 
Davidson put it, supposing that we control (only) the movement of our bodies: “We 
never do more than move our bodies: the rest is up to nature.”21 The gunman moved 
his body and that can be ascribed to him, but nothing else can be. One hand pulled the 
trigger, another guided the bullet.  
Such accounts take a hard line on agent-regret. They deny what I have argued in chapter 
2: namely, that we (do or should) conceive of our actions as involving more than our 
own decisions, and as assessable in light of more than merely these decisions. The lorry 
driver can regret that the child died and might even admit he was in some (merely causal) 
sense responsible for it, but this responsibility does not cut through to his agency nor to 
how he should understand his action. Although he may regret the outcome, he should 
not care about it as an important fact about his agency, and thus should not feel 
something like agent-regret. 
For the most part, I will not discuss such accounts, except to provide further contrasts 
in chapter 5. “Contribution-based” accounts of agency suffer from one major flaw: they 
end up as nothing like accounts of practical agency. If we think that what counts as down 
to my agency is given solely by the extent of my own contribution, then we’ll quickly hit 
the realisation that there’s nothing in the external world that arises solely due to my 
contribution, and so I won’t be able to make any impact on the world.22 As Nagel put it, 
“the area of genuine agency…seems to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless 
point.”23 Thus it is unable to account for our responsibility for outcomes, unable to 
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 Davidson, “Agency,” 59. Note that Davidson does think we can attribute the death to the agent because 
we can redescribe the wounding in terms of pulling the trigger, see  Davidson, 57–59. 
22
 See Feinberg, “Problematic Responsibility in Law and Morals,” 348–51; Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 32. For 
the claim that we lack responsibility because we also do not contribute to our traits, see Strawson, Freedom 
and Belief.  See also Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 17. The idea that we are not in control of our talents 
has led to some central debates in the philosophy of sport concerning merit, see: Carr, “Where’s the 
Merit If the Best Man Wins?”; Loland, “Simon on Luck and Desert in Sport”; Morris, “Moral Luck and 
the Talent Problem”; Simon, “Deserving to Be Lucky.” I am inclined to think that if an account holds 
that we cannot praise Paul Scholes because he was not in control of becoming so talented, then so much 
the worse for that account of praise. 
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 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 35. 
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properly capture our status as persons, and unable to properly account for the self-
respect that we accord ourselves.  
We need to move away from this in order to make sense of the idea that we are 
responsible for any outcomes in the world and are thus practical agents. My focus will 
not be on defeating such a view; rather, I start from the idea that we are responsible for 
outcomes, and our status as persons and self-respect rightly rests on this. My aim is to 
make this picture plausible, not to defend it from scepticism. Let’s turn to TIO. On this 
account, we are responsible for outcomes so long as we intend to bring those outcomes 
about, or bring them about voluntarily, or in bringing them about act on some deep 
values. (These construals are distinct and one can do something intentionally without 
reflecting some deep values, but I will tend to talk of “intended” outcomes, for 
simplicity.24) 
TIO allows that it might be partly down to luck whether or not I am responsible for an 
outcome because it allows that whether I do successfully realise my intention might need 
the intervention of luck (see 5.1). What the intention-based element resists is the idea 
that we are responsible for unintentional effects: for outcomes that arise because I have 
acted but which were not intended (though such accounts might hold us responsible for 
what we reasonably foresee, counting this as part of the intention, see 5.3.1). Rather than 
seeing unintended outcomes as the products of my agency, such an account sees them 
as “swallowed up by the order of mere events.”25 So, we are not subject to luck insofar 
as we are not responsible for unintended outcomes.  
It can be tempting to assume that outcome responsibility plays its role in our self-respect 
and our status as persons in virtue of its relationship with unintended outcomes. After 
all, much of the discussion of outcome responsibility—particularly in Honoré—concerns 
when we are responsible for outcomes that we did not intend to bring about and the 
importance of our responsibility for outcomes in the world. But it is one thing to say 
that our self-respect and conception of ourselves as persons depends upon being 
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 Adam Smith’s account leaves us responsible for both consequences that “were someway or other 
intended, or those which, at least, show some agreeable or disagreeable quality in the intention of the 
heart” Smith, TMS, II.iii.intro.3.  
25
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 36. 
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responsible for outcomes, it is another thing to say that they depend upon our 
responsibility for unintended outcomes. TIO can underpin the idea that we are agents 
who make an impact on the world, and thus it can capture status as persons and it can 
allow that we base much of our self-respect on our responsibility for various outcomes. 
Yet Honoré and Williams both think that our self-respect, our status as persons—
fundamentally, the very fact we are agents—depends upon the fact we can be responsible 
for unintended outcomes. Why? 
4.3 The nature of agency 
Why would we accept that we are responsible for unintended outcomes when TIO 
allows us to be responsible for outcomes, and thus can underpin our status as persons 
and self-respect? In 4.3.1, I set out the idea that we are responsible for outcomes that 
we did not intend to bring about because the nature of agency is such that, in order to 
be agents, we must be responsible for such unintended outcomes; and I set out an 
account that denies this. In 4.3.2, I suggest that we need to take agent-regret seriously, 
but this does not mean we must accept that we should feel agent-regret.  
4.3.1 Unintentionalism and Intentionalism 
Williams held that our propensity for agent-regret showed that we must either we get rid 
of the idea of agency as “fairly superficial” or hold that it is not superficial: 
“but that it cannot ultimately be purified—if one attaches importance 
to the sense of what one is in terms of what one has done and what in 
the world one is responsible for, one must accept much that makes 
its claim on that sense solely in virtue of its being actual.”26 
Williams thought that if we take agent-regret seriously, we must recognise that what we 
do involves the unintended effects of our actions, too: the “actual” makes its claim on 
me as an agent. Further, it would be an “absurdity” to hold that we could “entirely detach 
ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions, relegating their costs, so to 
speak, to the insurance fund, and yet still retain our identity and character as agents.”27 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 29–30. See also Williams, S&N, chap. 3; Williams, “Voluntary Acts and 
Responsible Agents.” 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 29. 
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To do so would be false to the picture of what it means to be an agent that is implied by 
our propensity for agent-regret, which respects the fact that “anything that is the product 
of the will [of our intentional agency] is surrounded and held up and partly formed by 
things that are not”.28 It isn’t just the actual, it is the unintended actual that matters. If 
Williams is right, then the fact that the unintended actual makes its claim on me is 
somehow based on what it means to be an agent. To understand the importance of 
agent-regret requires us to flesh out this picture of agency. It requires us to understand 
what it means to be an agent and why being an agent requires that we take responsibility 
for the actual.  
Tony Honoré also makes a similar claim at various points. Take the following quotation: 
 “[outcomes] are ascribed to authors, who accordingly count as 
persons; and it is by virtue of these ascriptions that each of us has a 
history, an identity and a character”29  
It is clear from the context that Honoré has in mind outcomes being ascribed to authors 
even when they did not intend to bring about these outcomes.  
Neither Williams nor Honoré offer us explicit and well-developed explanations of the 
relationship between unintended outcomes and what it means to be an agent. I think 
that two main claims lurk in the ideas, expressed by Honoré and Williams, that our 
responsibility for unintended outcomes is a central and important part of our agency.30 
It is one thing to say that the fact I am responsible for unintended outcomes is central 
to my status as a person. Here, it doesn’t matter which outcomes one is responsible for; 
this is akin to the claim that I have the features that allow me to be held responsible for 
the death.  It is another thing entirely to say that the fact I am responsible for some 
particular unintended outcome affects my identity.31 Here, it does matter which 
outcomes one is responsible for; this is akin to the claim that my responsibility for the 
death has some impact on me. In chapter 5, we will consider why exactly the ascription 
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 Honoré, “Responsibility and Luck,” 29.  
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 Others recognise that there are two claims, particularly in Honoré’s work. See Perry, “Honoré on 
Responsibility for Outcomes,” 70–72; Chapman, “Responsibility and Fault as Legal Concepts,” 216. 
31
 In John Gardner’s idiom, it is one thing to say that being basically responsible is central to my status as 
a person; it is another thing to say that being responsible for this very thing affects my identity. For basic 
responsibility see my chapter 2 note 69 
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of unintended outcomes to a person—to their agency—is central to their being an agent 
in the first place. In chapter 6, we will turn to the ways that responsibility for particular 
outcomes affects our identities. (The former claim goes with the idea that our status as 
persons depends on being responsible for outcomes; the latter relates to our self-respect 
but identity also encompasses features that do not relate to our self-respect.) 
In those two chapters, I will be defending and exploring the idea that we are responsible 
for unintended outcomes because of the nature of our agency. I call this position: 
Unintentionalism about agency: Agents are responsible for unintended 
outcomes because the nature of our agency leaves us responsible for unintended 
outcomes. 
This is an account of why we are responsible for outcomes that we did not intend. The 
Unintentionalist says that not only are we responsible for the outcomes we did not 
intend, but that being responsible in such cases is central to being an agent. SIO is true 
because to be agents we must be responsible for certain unintended outcomes.  
My aim, as I noted in the introduction, is to vindicate Williams’s account of agent-regret 
and the impacts that he supposed agent-regret had: namely in revealing to us something 
about our agency. But what sort of account contrasts with Unintentionalism? 
Intentionalism about agency: The nature of our agency does not leave us 
responsible for unintended outcomes. 
Intentionalism nicely lines up with TIO. Still, one could accept SIO but deny the 
Unintentionalist line; for instance, one might think that although some outcomes can be 
ascribed to an agent even though they did not intend that outcome, this is not because 
the nature of agency leaves us responsible for unintended outcomes.  
Thus there are three sorts of position that one might take up, granted that agents are 
responsible for some outcomes, and that we need some agential element in order to 
leave people responsible as agents so we need (something like) intentions to figure at 
some level. One could hold that agents are responsible for unintended outcomes so 
long as one had some intention in play and this is because the nature of agency leaves 
us responsible for such unintended outcomes (Unintentionalism). One could hold that 
92 
 
agents are responsible for unintended outcomes so long as one had some intention in 
play but we are not responsible because of the nature of our agency, instead agency itself 
leaves us responsible only for intended outcomes (Intentionalism+SIO). Or one could 
hold that agents are responsible for outcomes only if they intended those outcomes 
(Intentionalism+TIO).  
Why would we accept Intentionalism? Well, because the idea that we are agents in 
virtue of being able to shape the world to our desires (etc.) is a powerful one and is a 
plausible picture of agency. I won’t set out to defend Intentionalism, because I take it 
that it offers a fairly plausible picture of agency that we can broadly see the attractions 
of. Instead, I want to focus on why one might deny Unintentionalism, whether or not 
one thinks that we can be responsible for unintended outcomes in some other way.  
4.3.2 Setting the dialectic 
One of the lures of agent-regret, and thus of being held responsible for unintended 
outcomes, is that it seems so realistic. We do seem to be responsible for outcomes we 
do not intend to bring about; the lorry driver does seem to regret not just that the 
outcome arose, but that it was because of him. Williams thought that the fact that agent-
regret seems to have such a place in our lives told against rival accounts. As I noted in 
the introduction, Williams was a proponent of the idea that our reactions and emotions 
were an important sign of what we are and what matters to us. He thus held that it would 
be an “insane concept of rationality”—an insane conception of what it means to be a 
rational practical agent—which insisted there was no place for agent-regret.32  
Much as we must respect our emotional reactions and recognise that they often are 
deeply revealing, we can’t just assume that every type of reaction or emotion is 
appropriate: there is space for bugs in the system. Yet there is a prima facie case to be 
made for the importance of agent-regret, and for the importance of what seems to be its 
object: namely, our responsibility for outcomes, even when we did not intend to bring 
about those outcomes. If you are an Intentionalist (or if you accept the contribution-
based picture that I have set aside), how do you account for the fact that the lorry driver 
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seems to be in a special situation in virtue of what he has done? One option is just to 
rule out agent-regret on the strength of theory—agency just is the transference of our 
intentions or desires into the world—but that is dialectically inert. It becomes a mere 
butting of heads to merely assert the plausibility of agent-regret or the truth of some 
account of agency that rules it out.  
In the next two sections, I want to sketch two broad challenges that account for the prima 
facie plausibility of agent-regret yet stand as genuine challenges to Unintentionalism. 
Although these challenges might allow that there is some other reason why we are held 
responsible for outcomes (as I noted, an Intentionalist might accept SIO), it should 
become clear that they all chip away at the idea that we feel agent-regret, or that agent-
regret tells us anything interesting about our agency. Yet they stand as genuine challenges 
because they take agent-regret seriously. Yet they do not think it would be an absurdity 
to hold that we could detach ourselves from the unintentional aspects of our actions and 
still retain our identity and character as agents; according to these challenges, the 
Unintentionalist goes wrong in claiming that to be agents we must be open to being 
responsible for unintended outcomes. Yet they recognise the plausibility of holding that 
we rightly feel agent-regret and go some way towards explaining why agent-regret seems 
to have such a place in our lives.  
The first approach is revisionist: such an account offers an explanation of agent-regret 
that does not suppose that ascribing the death of the child to the driver matters because 
of some relation with his agency; it instead focusses on some other feature such as our 
picture of a virtuous person, or our attachments, to explain why we might feel “agent”-
regret. The second is rejectionist: it offers an explanation of why we hold ourselves 
responsible for outcomes that shows why agent-regret seems to occupy a role in our lives 
yet also why we should reject the idea that we are responsible and thus should abandon 
agent-regret.  
Such approaches accept that agent-regret seems to have a role in our lives. But they go 
on to deny the underlying Williamsian picture. In showing how an account of agency 
can reply to these challenges yet still make room for agent-regret, I will provide the 
backbone of an account of agency that Williams did not offer, but which helps explain 
why we might have to be held responsible for unintended outcomes in order to be 
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agents. We come on to this in chapter 5; before then, we must explore some versions 
of these challenges in depth. 
4.4 The Revisionist approach 
On a revisionist approach, we can say not only that there’s something terrible about the 
child’s death, but that there might also be something special about the agent being caught 
up in such a nasty affair that allows the lorry driver to feel an emotion distinct from 
ordinary regret. He is not responsible just because he is an agent, but there is something 
about his involvement that attaches him to the outcome and leaves him responsible or 
gives him some special ground for (some special form of) regret. The first approach says 
that he feels something like agent-regret because he takes on responsibility; this is not 
because his agency demands it of him but because good people take responsibility even 
when they do not have to. We look at this in 4.3.1. The second approach says that the 
driver does not feel agent-regret, rather he feels personal regret, which is distinct from 
ordinary regret. This involves caring about our connections to the world, rather than 
about our agency. We look at this in 4.3.2. Whether or not such accounts leave us 
responsible for unintended outcomes (whether they accept SIO or TIO), they deny that 
we are responsible due to the nature of our agency. I argue that neither account explains 
enough: it’s not clear why we are responsible, or should take responsibility, if this is not 
linked to what it means to be an agent; and it is not clear why any such connection 
matters. 
4.4.1 Revisionism about responsibility 
The Intentionalist denies that we are responsible, in virtue of being agents, for outcomes 
that we did not intend to bring about. But perhaps we can find a source, other than our 
agency, that explains why we should take responsibility for these unintended outcomes. 
For instance, we might see agent-regret as properly responding to our epistemic 
limitations. Although I dismissed this account in 1.3.2, we can see it as revisionist: if it 
turns out that (actually) I was not at fault and thus the outcome should not be attributed 
to my agency, it might still be good for me to act and feel as if I were at fault because 
(for all I know) I might have been at fault. For instance, Jacobson thinks that the lorry 
driver should not feel agent-regret, and he should only ascribe to himself the outcomes 
he intended. Yet Jacobson also holds that “in some sense he should have such feelings” 
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of agent-regret.33 Jacobson thinks that we would “have doubts about the character of a 
driver who too easily adopted the attitude of a spectator, when he was the causal agent 
of some disaster.”34 This is because someone who feels something like agent-regret 
properly scrutinises himself; an agent who does not feel agent-regret doesn’t scrutinise 
himself properly.35 Agent-regret is misplaced from the point of view of agency because 
the agent is not actually responsible and not actually at fault, but by taking responsibility 
by thinking she was at fault, she shows herself to be an admirable human being. She has 
the virtue of epistemic humility. 
Another form of revisionism doesn’t focus on our doubts about fault; rather it focusses 
on what sort of person might take responsibility for unintended outcomes.36 Suppose 
that it’s true that as agents only intended outcomes are ascribed to us. Still, there is a 
sense in which unintended outcomes are metaphysically causally linked to our agency. 
Do we have any reason to think that although our agency does not demand it, this causal 
link gives us grounds for a special form of regret? One might think that there is virtue 
in taking responsibility, as Susan Wolf puts it, “in an expansive rather than a narrow 
way.”37 Why would it be virtuous to think our (perhaps merely causal) responsibility for 
unintended outcomes matters when qua agents we are not responsible?38 Because to 
ascribe responsibility (and the ensuing liabilities) to ourselves even when our picture of 
agency does not demand that we do so is to be virtuous in a way akin to being generous.39 
We should take responsibility not because of our status as agents, but because of our 
status as virtuous people.  
The Unintentionalist holds that we are responsible for outcomes just in virtue of our 
agency. There is no further step required to take responsibility, we just are responsible. 
The Intentionalist denies this. But the Intentionalist can add that we are not only agents; 
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we are people and we care about being good people. On this picture, we can take 
responsibility by ascribing outcomes to ourselves and this responsibility is not forced 
upon us by our very agency.40 Why would we do this? Because caring in this way is part 
of being a good person. In this sense, we should care about our responsibility for 
unintended outcomes, and we should respond by imbuing this merely causal 
responsibility with more importance, and by responding to it with something like agent-
regret.41 Agent-regret deserves its place at the table as a virtuous mistake, a cognitive error 
(about which parts of our agency matter) that makes us better people. Still, we must take 
responsibility—this is not forced on us by our status as agents. 
Virtue revisionism: we ascribe responsibility to ourselves for unintended 
outcomes not because of our agency, but because to take responsibility in such 
cases is virtuous.42 
The lorry driver, were he not to hold himself responsible for the child’s death, would 
not show any flaw in his understanding of himself as an agent. Yet good people are 
epistemically humble, or good people are generous. The lorry driver, depending on the 
account we favour, shows that he is too sure of himself, or that he is ungenerous and 
uninterested in the people with whom he shares a world.43  
But this account has a problem—a problem we will also locate more broadly in other 
revisionist accounts at the end of 4.4.2. A bystander may generously offer to pay to fix 
the vase, but although we might “appreciate and even admire the bystander’s offer, we 
might also be slightly puzzled by it, or even, in certain cases, resent it.”44 Yet we expect 
Maddie to offer to fix the vase.45 More fundamentally, we expect her to admit that she 
smashed it. But why? It’s no good to say that we expect her to admit she smashed it and 
to fix it just because she is, say, causally responsible. That doesn’t explain why she would 
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ascribe the outcome to herself or why we would hold her responsible, given that the 
presupposed picture of agency says that this ascription doesn’t matter qua agency. There 
needs to be an explanation of why it is virtuous to take responsibility for something that, 
purely as an agent, she is not responsible for. What is it about the fact an agent is 
somehow causally implicated that makes it the case that it’s virtuous to take responsibility 
as if one were an agent, even though one did not intend to bring about that outcome? 
It’s not clear to me that the revisionist has an acceptable answer—we will return to this 
in more depth soon. 
4.4.2 Wallace’s Revisionism 
Jay Wallace offers a different approach. He is sceptical about agent-regret as Williams 
describes it and sets out to offer an alternative.46 Wallace sees Williams as forging a 
distinction between “impersonal and agential forms” of regret.47 Impersonal regret is the 
regret of the bystander or the regret we feel about things that just happen in the world 
like the distant earthquake.48 Wallace recognises the need for some sort of distinction 
here: there are forms of regret that are more personal and which are appropriately felt 
by those who stand in a certain relation with the object of regret, yet which are not 
appropriate for bystanders. Williams offered us a distinction between agent-regret and 
ordinary regret; Wallace draws the distinction elsewhere, holding that the relevant 
distinction is between impersonal and personal regret.49 
What is personal regret? Wallace holds that to feel any emotion one needs to be 
attached to the object of that emotion.50 Impersonal regret arises when we have some 
loose attachment (for example, an attachment to the value of human life in general, or 
a weak attachment to this person) but no close attachment to the object of that emotion 
(such as an attachment to my wife).51 Sometimes events affect me or something else to 
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which I am (closely) attached. In such cases, I am personally involved. Personal regret, 
as opposed to impersonal regret, arises when we have close attachments to the object of 
regret, and these attachments justify, and arouse, a regret that is not open to those who 
lack a close attachment.52 Personal regret is broader than agent-regret because we can be 
personally involved not just via our actions (as in agent-regret), but also in who we are 
and the situations we face.53 So, Wallace offers in lieu of agent-regret another emotion: 
personal regret. 
Wallace’s revisionism: we are personally connected to certain things and this 
connection colours our regret as distinct from ordinary regret.  
Wallace’s conception of personal regret nicely captures how there could be various 
forms of regret, established by various forms of connection, that are not reducible to 
ordinary bystander (impersonal) regret. A parent whose child is killed can feel a special 
form of regret because it was her child, to whom she is attached.54 It is clear that she has 
good reason to react to this event in a special way: because she has an important 
connection to her son, it is a personal misfortune for this parent that her son died. 
Recognising this is a worthwhile addition to any understanding of regret.55  
Yet Wallace thinks that our agency implicates us in outcomes only when our agency is 
voluntary: Wallace accepts TIO.56 So Wallace does not want the lorry driver to feel a 
special sort of regret in virtue of his responsibility for an outcome. Instead, Wallace 
thinks that “it is perhaps a personal misfortune for the lorry driver that the child died as 
a result of his own actions; insofar as this is something that happened to him, he has 
special agent-relative reasons for regret about the outcome that don’t equally extend to 
uninvolved third parties.”57 So the lorry driver is connected to the outcome in a way that 
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a bystander is not, but this is passive: killing the child is something that has happened to 
the driver, the connection is foist upon him. After all, he killed the child due to bad luck 
and he had no intention of doing so. Still, he can feel personal regret because he is 
connected to the death of the child. So, Wallace thinks the driver is connected to the 
child’s death, but this is not through his responsibility as an agent.  
We might think that this can help bolster virtue revisionism by providing the link that 
makes it appropriate for a good person to take responsibility for outcomes she did not 
intend. In fact, Wallace’s revisionism faces the same problem: it isn’t clear why the 
driver is connected to the child’s death in any way that matters. Wallace thinks that the 
fact that the parents of the child can feel personal regret shows that personal regret, not 
agent-regret, is “the more fundamental category of attitudes.”58 It is our connections, it is 
what happens to us, that establishes a narrower form of regret. But there are many forms 
of personal regret and these can be strikingly different.59 As Jules Holroyd points out, a 
road safety campaigner could also feel personal regret at the child’s death; yet we would 
expect this regret to be of a different “kind or intensity to that of the parent or driver”.60 
We cannot just posit that the driver is connected to the child, we need to see how he is 
connected.  
Consider what connects the lorry driver to the child’s death. It can’t be some prior 
connection like love, which is what connects the child’s mother in a way that arouses 
personal regret. Now, it wouldn’t be a surprise were the lorry driver to feel personal 
regret because he witnessed the accident at close hand. His regret would be more 
personal than that of someone who read about the incident, but his cab-mate or a 
bystander would have just the same personal connection. Perhaps the lorry driver is 
concerned by the role that this death will play in “the trajectory of [his] own individual 
biography”.61 What impact will it have? Well, Wallace thinks that, unlike the 
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bystanders’, the driver’s biography takes “a macabre turn.”62 This hints at something 
other than mere proximity, but again raises the question why does the fact that “the child 
died as a result of his own actions” affect his biography?63  
It’s all well and good saying that the child dying as a result of the driver’s actions is 
“something that happened” to the driver.64 But why is the driver attached to the 
unintended consequences of his actions?65 Why do we think it happened to him? 
(Presumably we wouldn’t talk this way about a bystander.) Wallace doesn’t tell us about 
the nature of the connection involved in the driver’s case. The most obvious connection 
is that one is “causally implicated in something unfortunate through one’s agency.”66 This 
is the answer I offer—and it is Williams’s answer—although I think that this is a particular 
sort of causal connection.67 And I will explain, in chapter 6, why this sees his biography 
take a macabre turn.  Wallace doesn’t explain why being causally implicated through 
one’s agency, or why the fact that the child dies as a result of the driver’s actions, gives 
any form of personal connection that could underpin personal regret or affect one’s 
biography.68 Unless Wallace can tell us what connects the lorry driver to the child’s death 
and why that connection is important, he doesn’t provide us with a convincing alternative 
to agent-regret.  
The revisionist needs to offer an account of why we do or should take responsibility for 
certain outcomes that we did not intend to bring about, or why we thus feel a special 
sort of regret based on some non-agential connection. But they must do so without 
appealing to our agency itself, because to say that we are responsible for unintended 
consequences of our actions in virtue of being agents is just to offer the Unintentionalist 
picture of agent-regret where agent-regret rests on a conception of our agency.  
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If one does not think that we are actually responsible for unintended outcomes (one 
accepts Intentionalism+TIO), it’s far from clear why we would have any reason to act as 
if we were responsible.  On the other hand, if one accepts Intentionalism+SIO but 
denies Unintentionalism, it’s far from clear why we are responsible for outcomes if this 
doesn’t stem from our agency; after all, to be outcome responsible simply is for this 
outcome to be ascribable to one’s agency, and surely that means that the outcome is 
ascribed to you due to a feature of your agency rather than some extraneous feature. Of 
course, this is not a knock-down challenge to revisionism, but it puts the revisionist on 
notice: they’d better offer a plausible explanation of why it is virtuous to feel agent-regret, 
or of why we are, or should hold ourselves to be, responsible. The versions we have 
encountered so far do not manage to do that. In chapter 5, I suggest the 
Unintentionalist’s explanation is better: the nature of our agency is such that we are 
responsible for unintended outcomes because, to even achieve intended outcomes, we 
must exercise fallible abilities that could misfire and bring about these unintended 
outcomes. 
4.5 The Rejectionist approach 
Now we move away from revisionism to rejectionism. The rejectionist does not merely 
deny that agent-regret should have a place in our lives, nor do they try to offer an 
alternative vindication of why we might hold ourselves responsible; rather, the 
rejectionist explains why agent-regret has a place in our lives—why our responsibility for 
unintended outcomes seems to be important—before explaining why it should not have 
that place. The rejectionist approach I want to focus on draws on what I will call the 
debunking argument.69 In short, it says that agent-regret and the idea that we are 
responsible for unintended outcomes is a remnant of past ethical conceptions that we 
find hard to shake off; in cool reflection, we realise that we are employing something 
like magical thinking in holding ourselves responsible for outcomes we did not intend. 
This explains why we hold ourselves outcome responsible and feel agent-regret. Yet we 
also see that we should not hold ourselves responsible for unintended outcomes because 
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the idea that we are responsible for unintended outcomes rests on dodgy foundations: 
it rests on the magical idea of pollution.70 
Let’s explore the idea of pollution in a little more depth. Past societies have held the 
idea that a woman after childbirth or someone involved in a killing is polluted.71 This 
sort of example is widespread and has a long history: ideas like pollution and the 
deodand (which we explore shortly) can be found in Greek, Roman, Hebrew, Christian, 
and Medieval British ethical thought and legal practice.72 No surprises, then, if such ideas 
influence our thinking. I will focus on one form of pollution that we find in a particular 
historical legal practice, the deodand: an object (or an animal) involved in a death that 
is then, because of its involvement, given to the family of the deceased, the King, local 
good causes, or the church.73  
The deodand was mostly a practice of liability; but this was liability on the basis of an 
ascription: the deodand must face the sacrifice or be cleansed because the death can be 
ascribed to it.74 The deodand—unlike the scapegoat, which bears the cost despite not 
having occasioned the harm—75 is held liable because it was responsible for that outcome. 
I will focus on just one justification of the practice of invoking deodands.76 This 
justification is not acceptable to us; the explanation is “intelligible…[but] it rests on… 
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intrinsically erroneous, meaningless, or absurd [premises].”77 On this sort of explanation, 
people thought that an object that was involved in a harm required a form of expiation 
or sacrifice because the object is polluted (and polluting to others), and the sacrifice of 
the object somehow cleanses it.78 The harm, the outcome, is ascribed to the object which 
becomes a deodand, and this ascription is significant because it leaves one polluted. 
The problem for the Unintentionalist is that there seems to be something eerily similar 
between the pollution-based story of the deodand and their story of outcome 
responsibility. In both cases, an outcome—generally an unpleasant one—is ascribed to 
an object or an agent despite the fact that they did not intend to bring about that 
outcome.79 As Williams put it, we think that when it comes to the lorry driver “there is 
something special about his relation to this happening, something which cannot merely 
be eliminated by the consideration that it was not his fault.”80 In Roger Crisp’s view: “The 
special relation in question is most plausibly seen as involving a secularized version of 
the notion of ritual uncleanliness and pollution”, and if we think this is true then this 
should make us question the basis of agent-regret and the idea that we are responsible 
for outcomes we did not intend to bring about.81 After all, despite the long historical 
influence, we do not think that ideas about moral pollution are reasonable, we think 
they should be discarded. Much as Anscombe held that if we get rid of God we must 
get rid of law-driven ethical theory, if we get rid of pollution—as we see that we should—
we should get rid of agent-regret and Unintentionalism.
 82  
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Pollution debunking: we think we are responsible for unintended outcomes 
because of the influence of ideas about pollution. This explains why we think 
we are responsible, but also shows that we are not responsible. 
Faced with these thoughts about pollution, the Unintentionalist can’t help but feel 
uncomfortable. There clearly is enough similarity between pollution and being held 
responsible for unintended outcomes to render the debunking story plausible. Were 
the debunking explanatory story true, then we should abandon the idea that we are 
responsible for unintended outcomes because we only link these outcomes to our 
agency because we see these outcomes as polluting.  
Rejectionism strikes deep because it also impugns the Unintentionalist’s picture of 
personhood and self-respect. If the rejectionist is right, the Unintentionalist is wrong 
about agency, thus the Unintentionalist also fails to explain why outcome responsibility 
is central to our status as persons. The worry is that Williams thought agent-regret 
showed us something deep about agency and human nature—but if the rejectionist is 
right, he does no such thing. 
Yet it is also important to recognise the limits of this challenge. The debunker does not 
show that the Unintentionalist account of agency does in fact rest on the idea that we are 
polluted by causal associations. Rather, it shows that the Unintentionalist account might 
rest on a dodgy idea. It allows room for a reply.83 If we show that there is an alternative 
explanation for why we feel agent-regret and hold ourselves responsible for outcomes 
in a way that does not involve pollution, we defuse this challenge. The fact that there is 
a plausible competing explanation for our ascriptions of responsibility for unintended 
outcomes that discredits such ascriptions does not render our ascriptions inappropriate 
so long as we can offer a competing explanation that vindicates these ascriptions.  
4.6 Moving forward 
In the first part of this chapter, I sketched why outcome responsibility is important to 
our status as persons and to our self-respect. I suggested above that we are responsible 
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for outcomes that we did not intend to bring about; further, I have tied this to a view of 
agency: even when we do not intend those outcomes we are responsible for them 
because of the nature of agency. The challenges we have met in this chapter all 
presuppose a central thought: that being responsible for unintended outcomes is not 
central to being an agent. They suppose that we could just as well be fully functioning 
agents were we not responsible for unintended outcomes. Further, whether rejectionist 
or revisionist, Intentionalists can make some steps towards accounting for the fact that 
agent-regret often seems appropriate.  
Now that we have seen some ways in which one might challenge the Unintentionalist, 
we can mostly set the specific challenges aside: our job now is to try to offer an acceptable 
competing explanation that vindicates our propensity to feel agent-regret, and that bases 
this in what it means to be an agent. This needs to show that we are indeed connected 
to unintended outcomes as agents and it needs to be a realistic explanation. How to take 
on this challenge? It should be clear that we need to establish a link between agents and 
outcomes in order for there to be practical agents, and this is the role played by the 
concept of outcome responsibility. Intentionalists and Unintentionalists both accept this. 
The important issue is how we establish this link.84 I will argue that the way in which we 
are linked to the world as practical agents demands that we are responsible for certain 
unintended outcomes: this is because we are fallible beings who can only make an 
impact on the world through fallible abilities. 
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Chapter 5 
Agency, Abilities, and the 
Unintended 
 
“The mature agent… will recognize his relation to his acts in their 
undeliberated, and also in their unforeseen and unintended aspects. 
He recognises that his identity as an agent is constituted by more 
than his deliberative self.” 
Bernard Williams1 
 
In this chapter, I explain why the nature of our agency leaves us responsible for 
unintended outcomes. The purpose of this chapter is to establish that we are responsible 
for unintended outcomes. It is not to explore the importance of individual instances of 
responsibility: as I noted at 4.3.1, it is one thing to establish that we are responsible for 
unintended outcomes, it is another thing to consider the importance of being responsible 
for this or that unintended outcome. We come on to this latter point in chapter 6.  
In 5.1, I defend the idea that to intentionally bring about an outcome, we must use 
fallible abilities that may fail to bring about that outcome and might lead to unintended 
outcomes. In 5.2, I suggest that in order to explain how unintended outcomes arise, we 
sometimes must appeal to exercises of these fallible abilities, and this leaves us 
responsible for them as agents. In 5.3, I bolster this by reflecting on how a mature agent 
understands her relationship with the world: the mature agent understands that in order 
to make any impact on the world she must use these fallible abilities, and she recognises 
that sometimes her actions lead to these unintended outcomes. So, not only is the nature 
of agency such that we are responsible as agents for unintended outcomes, but an agent 
who properly understands her relationship with the world appreciates this. In 5.4, I show 
how this gets us past rejectionism: instead of relying on a spooky view of pollution, we 
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can ground Unintentionalism in a plausible understanding of human interaction with 
the world. 
5.1 Agency and abilities 
How can we exercise our practical agency and change the world? In 5.1.1, I consider 
Raz’s sketch of an idea (that he does not endorse) that we cannot be responsible for 
outcomes in the world and consider how we can move past this. In 5.1.2, I introduce a 
picture of agency that says we can make an impact on the world by using fallible abilities 
that do not guarantee success. In 5.1.3, I further consider the fallible nature of these 
abilities. in 5.1.4, I consider authorship. 
5.1.1 Being in the world 
In From Normativity to Responsibility, Joseph Raz sketches, in order to rebut, a way of 
thinking about our relationship with the world. On this view of our place in the world, 
being a human in our world is like “being in an alien environment, tossed about on the 
waves of fortune whenever we venture beyond our thoughts and intentions.”2 On this 
picture, we are only responsible for what we absolutely control, but the world is torrid 
and untameable—it is riddled with luck. Once we step outside our minds, we might be 
causally responsible for things in the same way the officer (from 2.3.1) is thrown onto 
the button by the wave, but we never have absolute control over any element in the 
world, and thus never exercise our agency.3  
On this picture, things happen, and sometimes things happen through us, but this alien 
environment is untameable and unmanageable. We are not responsible for what 
happens in it. This picture clearly corresponds with the contribution-based picture, the 
picture Williams took as his target in “Moral Luck”, that we set aside in 4.1.4 According 
to it, anything that is not under our absolute control is not our responsibility. It sees 
stepping out into the world as taking a gamble, and when we gamble we are not 
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responsible for what results, rather Lady Luck, or Fortuna, or Nature is responsible. 
The gunman pulled the trigger, but divine providence guided the bullet.  
In chapter 4, I suggested that we should set aside such views and instead focus on views 
that do allow us to be responsible for at least some outcomes in the world. But how 
should we picture the world if we do not see it as tossing us about on waves of fortune? 
I want to start by following Raz and considering how we can be responsible for outcomes 
that we intended to bring about. On this picture of the world, although we might 
sometimes be buffeted by waves that we cannot control or resist, we can also surf these 
waves to achieve our own ends.5  
Raz gives us a useful way of understanding how we can be responsible for outcomes in 
the world without just seeing ourselves as buffeted around by the waves of luck. We 
need not think that a lack of absolute control undermines our responsibility.6 After all, 
we can distinguish between “playing roulette” and “cooking, eating, shopping” and other 
such activities.7 The first is a gamble, the latter are not, even though they depend on 
some luck for their success. Even though these activities require luck, they also require 
judgment over when they will (most likely) succeed, and the exercise of various skills.8 
Although these actions depend “on matters over which we have little influence [they] 
are not gambles.”9 The fact that there are certain matters involved over which we do not 
have influence does not mean that the action, or the occurrence of the outcome, is itself 
outside of one’s control; the fact that certain matters are down to luck does not mean 
that I am not responsible for that outcome.10 The point is simply that just because luck 
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 I employ this metaphor in Wojtowicz, “Agent-Regret and Sporting Glory.” 
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is involved, or because something is outside of my absolute control, it does not mean it 
is not mine: my responsibility, my action, an exercise of my agency.11  
That is because in such situations the occurrence of these outcomes depends to some 
degree, and possibly to a very large degree, upon me. We can better understand this 
influence if we take a practical example. Take baking a trout. I often succeed in baking 
trout, but luck is certainly involved. Sometimes, I can’t bake a trout. For instance, the 
oven isn’t working. In such cases, I don’t even try to bake it; I’ll freeze it for another 
time or do it in the pan. And it’s always possible that whilst cooking it I fail. Perhaps an 
emergency distracts me and the trout goes up in smoke, or the power goes out and I’m 
left with lukewarm fish. It’s also possible that I merely forget about it or doze off. My 
being able to serve a baked trout depends upon luck both in terms of having the right 
opportunities (the working oven) and on several factors that come into play once I have 
started (not forgetting, etc.). These aspects are not (entirely) within my control, yet it 
certainly is not merely a successful gamble that I successfully bake a trout. On this 
picture of the world we are not tossed about on the waves of a maelstrom, with the world 
tossing us from side to side. We live in a world of waves—the world is certainly not under 
our full control—but some of these waves help us achieve our ends.  
5.1.2 Abilities and responsibility12 
I take it that we can see a distinction between a gamble and baking a trout, and that a 
key factor is that the well-cooked trout in some way stems from what I do: the trout gets 
baked because of the steps I take. But we need a clearer idea of how these two cases are 
distinct, and why the successfully cooked trout is ascribable to me.  
By “gamble” we should have in mind fair bets about outcomes that the gambler is not 
involved in as a participant. Further, let’s stipulate that this is a random gamble, like 
betting on the Grand National and choosing the horse with the funniest name. When 
we gamble, our agency may be implicated at some level; for instance, we place a bet. Jan 
the gambler does two things: he stakes his position and then he lets things play out. But 
whether, say, Numbersixvalverde wins the National is based on how things work out in 
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the world; it is independent of Jan’s placing the bet. Although Jan’s agency features in 
placing the bet—and we will return to this just below—it doesn’t feature in whether the 
outcome he has bet on arises: it doesn’t feature in whether Numbersixvalverde wins. 
We do not attribute Numbersixvalverde’s victory to Jan. 
But consider the case of baking a trout. I don’t just state what I hope will happen, and 
then hope that it happens. Rather, I take constructive steps to a well-cooked trout. We 
can also understand broadly this in terms of abilities or skills.13 For instance, I have the 
ability to cook trout that is constituted by the fact I can take a range of steps that 
contribute towards the trout getting cooked properly.   
An agent has an ability to bring about an outcome if she can take constructive 
steps towards that outcome. 
Because these steps contribute towards that outcome, the outcome can be ascribed not 
just to luck—although we will of course want to allow that luck has its influence—but to 
the agent who takes those steps. And because the person intentionally exercises these 
abilities, we can ascribe the outcome to her not just as a person but as an agent (I will 
say more on this in 5.2.2). One doesn’t just hope for the outcome, one takes steps that 
help to bring it about. 
What do I have in mind with these constructive steps? Examples will help. When it 
comes to the trout, I slice the skin to ensure it cooks more evenly, I season it to ensure 
it tastes good, I put some foil over if it starts to look a little dark (because these steps can 
be reactive, too), and so on.14 I don’t just select an outcome and hope for it; rather,  I set 
myself to cook the trout, and by taking certain steps (or exercising my abilities) I make 
it more likely that the trout gets successfully cooked.15 The trout is nicely cooked because 
I took these steps; we can see how these steps make the outcome more likely: putting 
foil on the trout helps to keep direct heat off of it, slicing the skin helps it to cook more 
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evenly. There is an explanatory link between the steps taken and the outcome arising. 
Because I decided to cook the trout and took these steps (which made a well-cooked 
trout more likely given my decision), we can ascribe the successfully cooked trout not 
just to luck or mere events, but to what I have done as an agent.  
When we ask why the trout turned out well, when we set ourselves to a causal 
investigation, we won’t merely cite the way the world goes, we will cite the steps I have 
taken, and this will be agential because I have taken such steps intentionally.
16
 Thus there 
is no reason to think these outcomes are caused merely by the world or luck.17 We can 
resist Nagel’s thought that agency gets “swallowed up by the order of mere events.”18 
Instead, we can grant that although we might need luck on our side for these outcomes 
to arise (more on this in 5.1.3), the agent’s contribution cannot be reduced to a mere 
event. Even if an agent’s intervention is in some sense an event, it is no mere event: it 
involves paradigmatically agential elements, namely the author’s intentional activities. 
To swallow this up into the order of mere events is to ignore this paradigmatically 
agential element.  
But when Jan places a bet on Numbersixvalverde winning the National at five-to-one, 
things are different. He has an ability to place the bet. He can walk up to the counter, 
fill in the form, and hand over the slip. He is responsible for placing the bet. But is Jan 
responsible for his victory? Is he responsible for having an extra £50 in his pocket? I 
want to suggest not.
19
 (I expand this at 5.1.3 and 5.2.3). The point is that there’s nothing 
Jan can do to influence winning the bet. He can place a bet, but that is not an ability to 
win; Numbersixvalverde’s speed in the race, rather than any ability on Jan’s part 
(supposing the bet was random or on a hunch), determines whether he wins his bet. 
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Whether Jan wears his lucky socks or crosses his fingers makes no difference: he doesn’t 
take constructive steps towards winning, he takes steps towards placing the bet.20 
This contrast with Jan reinforces out an important point. When I cook a trout, I’m not 
just responsible for, say, sticking the trout in the oven in a way akin to handing a slip to 
the bookie. I’m responsible for the fact it was well-cooked. This is because there is an 
interaction between my abilities and the outcome. Sometimes this can be dynamic, for 
instance I can respond to how the trout is cooking; but that is a separate point. The 
point here is that Jan just places a bet, it’s not like he places a bet in a specific way that 
makes him more likely to win.
21
 The steps I take do not just start off a process, rather 
they connect to the end result.  
Still, Jan’s exercise of his abilities does seem to play some role in explaining his victory: 
after all, he wouldn’t have won had he not placed the bet. Let me further nuance my 
claim: one’s abilities can play some role in explaining an outcome without being 
sufficient to make one responsible for that outcome.
22
 Jan’s abilities did contribute to 
some extent to his victory: he only won because he placed the bet. Yet when we want to 
explain why he won, his placing the bet seems insignificant when compared to 
Numbersixvalverde’s running the race. Not so when I bake a trout: when we want to 
explain why dinner was properly cooked we must appeal to my abilities. This fits with 
what I said about causation at 2.3.1: whether we see some action as a cause and (as we 
can add here) the extent to which it is a cause will depend upon the significance that 
action seems to hold in explaining why the outcome arose; further, this may be context-
dependent, with factors appearing more or less salient depending upon the sort of 
outcome. What I want to make clear here is that even if we might say that one’s abilities 
played some role in the outcome arising, unless this is significant enough we will not say 
that one is responsible. (Note that this allows that sometimes more than one agent makes 
a significant contribution: sometimes more than one person can be responsible.) 
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I hope it is clear that there is a relevant difference between these cases. I do not aim to 
offer a fully fleshed-out account of abilities and constructive steps, nor of their 
relationship to outcomes and responsibility. To that extent, I leave my account 
undeveloped and ecumenical. Yet I hope that the difference between baking a trout and 
betting on Numbersixvalverde is clear. I am responsible for the baked trout, Jan is not 
responsible for winning the bet, and this is because of the role that our abilities play in 
explaining why these outcomes arise.  
Before moving on, it is important to address a misunderstanding about how these steps 
make an outcome more likely. One might be tempted to think that an agent is 
responsible proportionate to how likely, or how much more likely, their skills make the 
outcome. I suspect that this is not an illuminating way of thinking about things. If a sniper 
has a 50% chance of hitting his target, then he will only hit in fifty out of a hundred 
possible worlds, but in that world where he does hit the target it is far from clear that he 
is only 50% responsible (whatever that means). Rather, the outcome came about 
because he fired in this manner. This presupposes that luck cooperated with him, but it 
would be odd to think of luck being also responsible. Perhaps this is because, as we 
discussed above at 2.3.1, in our causal inquiries we often leave certain factors as 
background conditions: in hitting the target we just assume that, say, the wind was normal 
and did not, as it would in one of those hundred possible worlds, blow the bullet off 
course. What’s more, although we will grant that other factors had to cooperate, this 
does not mean that we cannot say the sniper is responsible for the death. I take it that 
there are interesting questions surrounding our abilities, the probabilities they lead to, 
and how we divide up responsibility; but the important point for us is that abilities let us 
attribute an outcome not just to the workings of the world but to an agent, and this is 
because the abilities contribute to the outcome arising—they contribute sufficiently much 
for us to say she is responsible.   
5.1.3 Fallibility 
To provide a more plausible picture than the contribution-based account that sees us as 
pushed around by the waves of luck, which we set aside, our picture needs to be realistic. 
I will discuss this realism in more depth at 5.4, but I take it that it would be unrealistic 
to think that our abilities grant us omnipotence over any aspect of the world. My 
approach is not to deny that we are in a world beset by luck, but to offer a more plausible 
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picture of how that luck interacts with our agency.  I take it that all of our abilities, all of 
the constructive steps we might take, are fallible. It is never true that I can exercise my 
ability and guarantee that the outcome will arise. Sometimes I will be unable to exercise 
my ability, other times I will exercise it and it will misfire because our abilities do not 
work every time, or it will be thwarted by a stroke of bad luck extrinsic to the operation 
of that ability.  
All our abilities are fallible.23 
This recognition of fallibility, combined with our understanding of abilities, provides the 
basic account of agency which fits with a picture of the world in which we are beset by 
luck—we must deal with those waves, we cannot just shape the world to our will—but 
which allows for us to make an impact on the world. When I have an ability, I can bring 
about that outcome; perhaps I cannot bring it about in every case, but in similar cases I 
have taken these steps (perhaps in the past, perhaps in other possible worlds) and they 
have produced that outcome.24 Rather than thinking that we are thrown this way and that 
and have no influence, we can instead see that we are able to change the world through 
our abilities that let us shape the world in this way or that. Still, we can admit that we do 
not have total control over the world, since that would be unrealistic. 
But how fallible can our abilities be whilst still leaving us authors of the outcomes that 
arise when they succeed? It is important to note two things. Firstly, I do not suppose 
that we require a high level of success in order to author an outcome. This distinguishes 
my account from Raz’s. We come on to this again at 5.2.4, but Raz thinks that to be 
responsible, you must have a near-certain chance of success. I disagree, because I think 
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 One problem concerns how we construe an ability. Is it an ability to φ that succeeds 98% of the time, 
or is it an ability to φ 98% of the time? See Herstein, “Responsibility in Negligence,” 179–84. Herstein 
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bake trout is not to say that in this very instance I will succeed, but to say that I will succeed in certain 
cases. See Honoré, “Can and Can’t”; Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” 
87; Perry, “Honoré on Responsibility for Outcomes,” 78–79; Raz, FNTR, 246–47. 
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that to understand our responsibility for outcomes in the world, we need to understand 
how we can be responsible even for unlikely outcomes. To my mind, a footballer is 
responsible for scoring a free-kick even though it was unlikely that he scored.25 Secondly, 
I reiterate that I do not just base authorship on the probability of success. Rather, what 
is important is the interaction between our abilities and the outcome arising.  
Let me illustrate this by comparing a footballer scoring a free-kick with Jan’s bet on 
Numbersixvalverde. Jan had a one-in-five chance of winning the bet. Andrea Pirlo was 
a wonderful free-kick taker, yet he would score no more than one-in-five of his attempts 
at goal.26 Still, it seems to me that when he succeeded, we want to ascribe the outcome 
of the ball going in the net to Pirlo qua agent, such that we can say Pirlo scored the goal. 
But he is no more likely to score than Jan is to win, and I have said that Jan is not 
responsible for his victory. So why is Pirlo responsible for scoring but Jan is not 
responsible for his victory? Isn’t there a sense in which they both do all they can do: Jan 
places the bet, Pirlo kicks the ball? 
Much as I did not just put the trout in the oven, I did so in a way that helped to ensure 
the trout would cook well, Pirlo does not just kick the ball. Although we should admit 
that he needed some luck—more luck than I need in baking a trout—the steps Pirlo took 
contributed to scoring, in a way that Jan’s steps did not contribute to winning. For 
instance, Pirlo adopted a specific technique that involved hitting the ball with only the 
first three toes and doing this made him more likely to score.27 Pirlo’s abilities do not 
just let him kick the ball—they let him kick the ball in a particular way that causes it to 
move this-way-or-that. Although the rate of success is low, his success is, to a significant 
extent, down to his own contribution. Because his steps were constructive to the end of 
scoring and were a significant factor in explaining the goal, we ascribe scoring to his 
agency.  
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 Some statistics suggest that players score with attempts direct from free-kicks 7.5% of the time: “What 
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Here is one further, related, thought that might motivate the distinction between the 
gambler and the responsible agent, even when skills are highly fallible: although Jan has 
a one-in-five chance of winning, that is independent of anything he does in placing the 
bet. His lucky socks make no difference. But the chance of most of us scoring a free-
kick is pretty small. Pirlo’s skill makes it such that he has a one-in-five chance of scoring 
(as opposed to a one-in-fifty chance if you or I have a go).   
Still, a one-in-five chance would be a terrible chance of successfully boiling an egg: we 
might deny that someone who can boil an egg only one-in-five times is responsible for 
their successful supper. Quite right, too: all I want to point out here is that a process can 
be highly fallible whilst still counting as an ability. How likely the chance of success must 
be in order for that to count as an ability will depend on various features and will be 
context-dependent (as noted above). Whether I am able to score a free-kick or cook an 
egg will depend on whether my steps increase the chance of success, but the requisite 
chance of success will vary depending on the task at hand. If I do have such an ability, I 
can be responsible for the outcome arising. I hope this section has further clarified this. 
5.1.4 Authorship 
So far, I have only discussed intended outcomes. It is vital to recognise that any account 
of responsibility for intended outcomes also needs to pay attention to how we are 
responsible for outcomes; as we saw in 2.3.1, accounts of our responsibility for intended 
outcomes need to establish a connection between the agent’s intention and the outcome, 
otherwise cases arise where the agent intends the outcome and it arises, but it doesn’t 
arise because of the agent. The abilities account is an account of when these intended 
outcomes can be ascribed to an agent, of when they arise because of the agent and her 
intention. Abilities let the agent not just have an intention but set that intention into 
motion so that she can change the world. As Ulrike Heuer puts it: “without them, no 
forming of an intention or reasoning what to do can achieve anything.”28  
Given our understanding of abilities, we can see how agents can, having formed 
intentions, achieve things. What’s more, in the cases we have discussed, the outcome 
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can be ascribed to her as an agent and, because she intended to bring about that 
outcome, it can be further ascribed to her intentions (or to her desires, or to her deep 
self). In such cases, the outcome arises because of her exercise of her abilities, and the 
outcome somehow manifests her intentions, her deep self, etc. Such agents are not just 
responsible for outcomes, they author them:  
When an agent is an author, she does what she intends, expresses her own 
values, or (at the very least) she does what she has in mind.  
It is important to bear in mind that authorship in this sense is a thicker variety of 
outcome responsibility: she is responsible as an agent—that outcome can be ascribed to 
her agency—but she is also responsible as an author (a valuer, etc.). This construal is 
broad to be ecumenical over what deeper thing is responsible. 
I will not deny that there is an important connection between an agent, her desires, 
values, or intentions and the outcomes she creates in the world; and I think it is obvious 
that this connection is very important.29 I also allow that we are responsible for a variety 
of outcomes yet I am “most fully the agent of, and thus most fully responsible for, 
[outcomes] which I bring about intentionally”.30 And I grant that conduct being 
attributable to an agent’s core values (etc.) makes them “an agent in a strong sense, an 
author of her conduct, [who] is in an important sense answerable for what she does.”31 
My point, developed in the rest of this chapter, is that this strong or full type of agency—
the sense involved when we author the world in line with our intentions or our desires—
is not the only important connection between an agent and outcomes. I will deny that 
on the one hand we have mere causal responsibility or mere involvement where we are 
tossed about by the waves of the world, on the other we have full-blown authorship, and 
there is nothing in between. My argument will run from the idea that in order to make 
sense of our responsibility for intended outcomes, in order to make sense of our 
authorship, we must already grant that we are responsible for unintended outcomes. 
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This is because our fallible abilities leave us responsible for certain unintended 
outcomes, and agency is based on these fallible abilities. 
5.2 Unintended outcomes and abilities 
I have argued that we can be responsible for outcomes, and we can be authors of those 
outcomes, in virtue of the fact that we have certain fallible abilities.  But why would it be 
the case that “if one attaches importance to the sense of what one is in terms of what 
one has done and what in the world one is responsible for, one must accept much that 
makes its claim on that sense solely in virtue of its being actual.” 32 The Intentionalist can 
admit that there is something that makes its claim on us solely in virtue of being actual: 
that is, the intended outcome that arises (as with all exercises of our agency) partly due 
to luck. We are agents responsible for certain outcomes in the world only because they 
do actually arise, and whether they do actually arise is not fully in our control—it is not 
the sort of thing that happens by fiat—thus what we are responsible for depends not only 
on our intentions but also on the outcomes arising: our responsibility depends on the 
actual.  But Williams clearly meant more than this. The cases he discussed did not just 
involve the idea that sometimes we need luck in order to bring about the outcomes we 
intend; he focussed instead on cases where something we did not intend arose because 
of what we did. Granted that agency involves abilities, and setting oneself to achieve an 
outcome, why should we grant that the nature of agency itself leaves us responsible for 
such unintended outcomes?  
I will now argue that the abilities-based picture of agency tells in favour of 
Unintentionalism. I start in 5.2.1 by sketching the basic claim: that when I intentionally 
put my abilities into play I am responsible for the outcomes that arise, including 
unintended outcomes, and that is because the fact these outcomes arise can be traced 
to my agency and my intentional exercise of certain abilities. This is just what it means 
to be outcome responsible. In 5.2.2 I show that we should still be regarded as outcome 
responsible as agents even when we did not intend to bring about these outcomes. In 
5.2.3 I explore how this relates to causation.  In 5.2.4 I compare my account with several 
                                               
 
 
32
 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 29–30. 
 119 
 
others. In 5.3, I move on to bolstering the basic claim, and to considering our self-
understanding as agents. 
5.2.1 The basic claim 
The basic idea is simple. Imagine that someone sets off to author some change in the 
world: Maddie wants to carry the vase safely across the room, the driver wants to get to 
the depot. But, in exercising their fallible abilities, they fail to bring about the intended 
outcome. Instead, some other outcome arises. In our cases, the vase smashes and a 
child dies. How are we to regard these outcomes? Authorship is not at issue, because 
there is no intention (or desire, or value) that corresponds to the outcome that arises. 
Yet it also seems wrong to think of these agents as mere objects blown about by the 
waves of fortune. In such cases we are not like the officer who is literally tossed by waves 
onto the button that fires the torpedo to sink the Bismarck. It would be misleading to 
think of us as potential agents who try to act but instead have all the agential character 
of what we have done “swallowed up by the order of mere events.”33 Surely when Maddie 
tries to carry the vase and, instead of succeeding, she drops it, this doesn’t just result 
from the world going about its causal practices, somehow operating through Maddie; 
rather, it results from Maddie deciding to exercise her ability… and failing. Still, Maddie 
has intervened in the world, just not in the way she wanted. It isn’t just that Maddie 
intervened, rather Maddie as an agent has intervened. The outcome arose because she 
exercised her powers as an agent: she had an intention, and because of this she set to 
using her abilities that are her only way of realising such intentions. 
The basic claim: an agent is responsible for an outcome when the outcome arises 
because of her intentional exercise of a fallible ability. 
On this picture, agents intervene in the world through their exercise of a fallible ability, 
it’s just that sometimes this fallible ability misfires and leads to some unintended 
outcome. The agent causes the unintended outcome through intervening via her ability. 
Thus, the Unintentionalist is right: the nature of our agency does leave us responsible 
for unintended outcomes because we can only be agents through fallible abilities, and 
                                               
 
 
33
 Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 36. 
 120 
 
because we exercise our agency through these fallible abilities we are, in virtue of the 
nature of our agency, responsible for the unintended outcomes that may arise when we 
try to achieve things.  
The problem for the Intentionalist is that in order to be responsible for intended 
outcomes in the world, we need to make an impact on the world. But the only way of 
doing that is through our fallible abilities. Of course, the Intentionalist might try to deny 
that agency (as opposed to authorship) matters, or they might try to deny that outcome 
responsibility is any real sense of responsibility. But the basic problem is that if they 
want to do this they need to give an explanation of why our agency is swallowed up in 
the order of mere events when it comes to unintended outcomes but is not when it 
comes to intended outcomes. And they need to allow that we exercise our agency when 
we realise intended outcomes because Intentionalists are concerned not just with the 
quality of our intentions but with how we manifest them. I can explain the added 
importance we attach to authorship—manifesting our desires is important—but I do so 
without denying that our agency is powerful, important to us, yet fallible. My 
Unintentionalist account pays heed to the impact that our agency can have on the world.  
The Intentionalist seems to underplay the importance of agency by putting so much 
stress on authorship. 
The basic claim also allows the Unintentionalist to offers a more nuanced view of 
failures. The Intentionalist account can make sense of our failures in our intentions, and 
in our selection of certain abilities such as when we select an ill-suited ability. That is 
because the Intentionalist account can say it is bad to intend to build the world’s tallest 
statue (it shows some aretaic failing of being vainglorious); and it can say that it is a bad 
idea to try to build the world’s tallest statue out of cake (that is a terrible means to adopt: 
cake is not structurally sound). Further, the Intentionalist account can make sense of the 
idea that you have failed to achieve something since it can say you are responsible for 
the desired outcome only if the desired outcome arises; if you intend to bring about 
some outcome and the outcome cannot be ascribed to you then you have failed. None 
of this requires positing that the agent is responsible for any unintended outcomes. 
But can the Intentionalist make sense of the variety of ways in which we can fail in the 
execution of our intentions? There are different kinds of failure. As we saw in 2.2, much 
as an earthquake that kills lots of people is worse than one that does not, different 
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actions, and one’s responsibility for different outcomes, can be better or worse. 
Chipping the vase slightly is better than smashing it to smithereens; the difference 
between Pirlo hitting the wall and the ball going out for a corner or blazing the ball 10-
feet over the crossbar can be important, not least for the shape of the game. (We say 
things like “He may have missed, but he’s won them a corner.”) But how do we make 
sense of the difference between these forms of failure, of the ways in which our agency 
might fail? One might just appeal to the different states of affairs and suggest that Pirlo 
or Maddie feel worse because their ordinary regret is worse when the outcome they 
bring about is worse. But that doesn’t seem right. Surely Maddie’s failure as an agent is 
worse when she smashes the vase than when she merely chips it. She did worse as an 
agent—albeit through no fault of her own. In order to account for this, we need to 
attribute the outcome to Maddie and we can’t do this if we just focus on what she 
intended. The basic claim lets us say that Maddie is responsible for smashing the vase 
because she picked up the vase trying to exercise her ability to carry it safely, and because 
of this the vase smashed. She failed by being responsible for smashing it (or by being 
responsible for chipping it). Thus, the Unintentionalist can make sense of the variety of 
ways in which we can fail. 
5.2.2 Agency 
It is important that we make clear how this picture is agential. We have plenty of non-
agential abilities (reflexes, being able to digest, etc.) and stones and spiders are also 
“able” to do things.34 Our focus is on agency and the ways in which one might be 
responsible for an outcome as an agent. Many of the abilities discussed above will be 
physical skills (although not all, since some will be abilities like planning); were they 
mere bodily reactions, we would attribute outcomes not to my agency but to my body. 
Much as when the officer is thrown against the button, if my hand just starts to knit or if 
I wake up having been sleepwalking and find that I have been knitting then although we 
might attribute the outcome to me as a person or as a body, we cannot attribute it to my 
agency.35 Although we may be responsible in some way or another for such outcomes, 
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intended or not, the basic claim restricts itself to when an agent intends to do something: 
I set myself to achieve that outcome, and I exercise my abilities to take these steps to 
increase the likelihood of that outcome arising. I intend something, and then I exercise 
my abilities. This explains why it is my agency that is implicated.36 After all, it is plausible 
to hold that our intentions are paradigmatically agential elements and, as I noted in 2.3.1 
and just above in 5.1.2, we are resistant to the idea that this can be reduced to a mere 
event. 
This gets us past another worry that might arise out of our discussion of deodands from 
chapter 4. The deodand is not sentient, or at least not human.37 If we ascribe outcomes 
to persons even when they do not intend them, we threaten to remove their mental lives 
from the question of responsibility and make them into something more like a thing.38 
We are responsible in the very same way a “mindless instrument” is responsible.39 
Humans are turned from persons into objects.40 As Sandra MacPherson puts it, this 
mindless responsibility gives us “less-than-agentive culpability”—but it would presumably 
also be less-than-agentive liability, answerability, and ascribability.41 It would reduce 
outcome responsibility to something closer to metaphysical causal responsibility. Yet 
our responsibility in such cases is not mindless: after all, we are only responsible as 
agents when we intend something.  
The basic claim also helps us see why SIO—the view that we are responsible for an 
outcome so long as we are doing something voluntarily, that we saw Davidson, Honoré, 
and Williams all held—is compelling. As I noted at 2.3.1, there does seem to be a 
difference between an officer who is writing a letter and is then thrown by the waves into 
the button, and an officer who presses the wrong button. The first officer might be doing 
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something intentionally, like writing a letter, but his intentional doings are not causally 
relevant to the Bismarck sinking.42 He might as well be treated as a mindless object. But 
the second officer had an intention and set about using his abilities to realise that 
intention, this explains why the Bismarck sank. Our pictures of intentionally-exercised 
abilities accords with this. In one direction, intentions are paradigmatically agential so 
help to carve out the agential as opposed to the merely bodily; SIO pays heed to the 
agential/bodily distinction. In the other direction, in order to do anything intentionally 
we must use fallible skills and in acting we run the risk of bringing about other outcomes, 
so our agency will figure in explaining why many outcomes have arisen even if we did 
not intend to bring about such outcomes; SIO pays heed to the fact that we are fallible 
and can make an impact on the world despite intending to bring about something else. 
5.2.3 Causation 
It is also important to recall that outcome responsibility is a form of causal responsibility, 
but this ascribes an outcome to one’s agency and this is a form of causal responsibility 
that is more limited than the causal responsibility we find in metaphysical causal 
responsibility. As I said in 2.3.1, following Honoré, I suppose that outcome 
responsibility attaches to a more limited variety of causal attribution that lines up with 
the attributions ordinary people might make. So, the “because” in the basic claim—that 
an agent is responsible when an outcome arises because of her intentional exercise of 
an ability—is not the because of but-for; rather, it means that, given the ways in which we 
ordinarily might make our attributions, we will attribute the outcome to, say, Maddie’s 
action.  
Maddie’s action explains for us why the outcome arose. It is important to consider what 
impact the agent’s exercise of her ability has on the world. Clearly a good explanation 
of why the trout burnt to a crisp is that I tried to cook it. Still, because we deny simplistic 
but-for accounts, the fact that you are responsible for some outcome does not mean that 
you are responsible for other outcomes that follow from it. For instance, I have said that 
the guard in Palsgraf was responsible for Palsgraf’s injuries; but at some point this 
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responsibility runs out: Palsgraf’s grandson found that his family name brought plenty 
of amused reactions from interlocutors but the guard bears no responsibility for this.43 
At some point, we take certain actions as background conditions, and they lose any 
explanatory power: we look instead to the fact that his grandmother was involved in a 
famous court case, and the guard starts to drop out of the picture. 
Likewise, it strikes me that Jan was not responsible for winning his bet.
44
 One might think 
that what I have said at 5.1.2 is compatible with Jan being responsible for the victory, 
just not as an author. Yet Jan not only fails to author his victory, he is also not outcome 
responsible for it. Why? Because although the outcome would not have arisen had he 
not exercised his abilities—he would not have won any money had he not made the bet—
his exercise of an ability doesn’t carry any significant explanatory load in explaining his 
victory. Yes, he intentionally placed a bet, but when we ask why he won, his intentional 
purchase of the ticket seems to fade into the background:45 he won because 
Numbersixvalverde won the race, not because of any of his abilities. (This is even clearer 
with lottery cases and long shots: someone who buys a lottery ticket or bets on Leicester 
City winning the Premier League seems to play too small a role in winning the bet, 
although we recognise that but for placing the bet they would not have won, we do not 
think the victory can be ascribed to them.)  
This is not to say that Jan’s abilities don’t figure at all in our explanations; after all, I 
allowed above that one’s abilities can play some role without one being responsible for 
an outcome. The point is that Jan a placing a bet doesn’t contribute enough to his 
winning, at least compared to Numbersixvalverde’s victory. So, we do not ascribe the 
outcome to him, we do not think he was outcome responsible. This is further borne out 
when we consider the ways in which we might apply answerability and liability to his 
case. As I made clear in chapter 2, outcome responsibility is distinct from answerability 
and liability, but we can be held liable and answerable for bringing about certain 
outcomes. We can hold Jan answerable for placing the bet and may blame or praise 
him for doing so; further, we can hold him answerable for how he uses his money, and 
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praise and blame him for how he uses it. But would it make sense to hold him 
answerable for winning, or to praise or blame him for winning? I don’t think so. Clearly, 
this is not conclusive proof that Jan is not responsible for winning, since there may be 
other bars to answerability or liability for winning, but the idea that he is not responsible 
for winning receives some support from the idea that it would be mistaken to hold him 
answerable or liable for winning on the basis of being responsible for this because he 
does not seem to be responsible for it: his abilities are too insignificant in his victory for 
us to grill him, or force liabilities on him, on the basis of those abilities. 
What we are responsible for also sheds light on our feelings of agent-regret. Perhaps Jan 
can come to feel agent-regret over placing the bet (his bet comes up in conversation with 
a new friend who turns out to be virulently anti-gambling); but although he might regret 
winning, he cannot come to feel agent-regret over winning. Turning to our lorry driver, 
there’s a difference between being responsible for setting off on a journey and being 
responsible for killing a child. This difference is manifested in his emotions. If he thinks 
that he is only responsible for setting off on his journey, he seems to move away from 
agent-regret as we tend to characterise it: as regretting the fact he killed the child. 
Regretting that he set off on the journey is one thing, and it is still agent-regret; regretting 
that he killed the child, or regretting that he is responsible for that death, is quite another 
thing. According to the basic claim, he can regret that he killed the child, and this is 
because he tried to exercise his ability to get from one place to another and in doing this 
he ran over the child. His mother, on the other hand, cannot feel agent-regret because, 
although she was responsible for giving birth to the driver, her actions and abilities are not 
relevant to our inquiries into why the child died—we take it as given that the driver exists, 
and her giving birth to him plays no significant explanatory role. 
Of course, part of the problem is delineating exactly when we rightly hold people 
responsible, and by appealing to ordinary attributions I do not help to solve this problem 
of when exactly it is appropriate to attribute an outcome to someone. But I do explain 
why, when we do make such an ascription, we ascribe that outcome to someone’s 
agency: because it arose because of his intentional exercise of an ability (e.g. an ability 
to drive safely) and that ability failed to achieve his aim. The “because of” gives us the 
causal element of outcome responsibility, the intentional exercise gives us the agential 
element. The point of this section is to reinforce the plausibility of the basic claim by 
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showing that it involves agential causation yet that it need not entail that we must be 
responsible for everything that follows from our agency.  
5.2.4 Situating my account 
It’s important to situate my account in the context of similar accounts offered by Ulrike 
Heuer, Stephen Perry and Joseph Raz. What links these accounts is that they all, to 
some extent, notice that we can be responsible for outcomes, where this is compatible 
with an absence of full control, and that we are sometimes responsible for an outcome 
we did not intend because of its relationship to our abilities.  
Raz’s influence is most clear in my starting point: that of trying to distinguish 
responsibility from a lack of responsibility by way of a distinction between gambling and 
using one’s abilities. This lets us establish that we can be agents in the first place. One 
significant difference with Raz’s account is that my account allows for far greater 
fallibility. Raz thinks that we have a “domain of secure competence” such that “if we set 
ourselves to do something we will.”46 What’s more, we are “entitled to [use these abilities] 
without reflecting on the prospects of successfully performing them”, and that is because 
we will succeed if we set ourselves to.47 Raz places some stress on how this relates to our 
sense of who we are and our self-respect.
48
 For instance, he uses the example of 
becoming frail, and how this will affect my view of myself: I am no longer the sort of 
person who can carry the heavy vase.49 But it should also be clear that Andrea Pirlo, 
despite not being able to know he will succeed, derives a large dose of self-respect from 
scoring free-kicks. Raz’s account of the positive side of our abilities, his account of 
authorial responsibility, is too restrictive to get us further than understanding our 
responsibility for some very simple tasks.50  
Like Raz, I start by considering what it means to be responsible for an intentional action, 
unlike Raz, I think we can be responsible for outcomes that we are unlikely to achieve. 
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But our pictures are similar: we are responsible because these abilities relate us to the 
world, and we can be responsible for unintended outcomes because these abilities can 
fail. Stephen Perry starts from a different point, setting up a separate account for 
intentional outcomes that he discusses in much less depth.51 Perry’s account of 
responsibility for unintended outcomes begins in medias res, assuming that we are 
sometimes responsible for unintended outcomes and trying to work out the best way of 
understanding strict liability by considering how we should cash out outcome 
responsibility, focussing on the role of foreseeability and the steps we could take to avoid 
an outcome (we will discuss foreseeability a little more at 5.3.1).52 My account focusses 
less on how we should understand these abilities and how they rely on foreseeability; 
instead, my account provides the groundwork: I focus on how our abilities make a 
difference in the world, and why this leaves us responsible for unintended outcomes. 
My account also differs from Perry’s in another way. Perry emphasises what we could 
avoid by successfully exercising our abilities. Presumably (I don’t think Perry makes it 
explicit) the lorry driver is responsible for the child’s death because he could foresee the 
general risk of killing whilst driving; and the lorry driver, had he successfully exercised 
his ability to (safely) get to the depot, would have avoided killing the child. I focus instead 
on the outcomes that arise given we exercise our abilities. Now, it should be clear that 
in many of these cases this will line up with what we could have avoided, simply because 
we often avoid these unintended outcomes by succeeding: the driver could have avoided 
killing the child precisely by doing what he can do, namely driving safely. But 
foreseeability seems to be at a few removes from the basic point that our agency causes 
these outcomes; still, foreseeability is a useful layer of complexity added to the picture, 
and we will return to it briefly. 
Ulrike Heuer argues that an agent is responsible for an outcome if “she exercises skills 
and capacities that allow her to control the relevant outcomes. She is responsible for a 
failed action, if the failure is a mistake which occurs in the exercise of her capacities”.53 
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My account is similar to Heuer’s: responsibility for outcomes depends upon the fact 
that we exercise these fallible skills. But here are two differences. Heuer thinks that “it 
casts the net too wide” if an account of responsibility leaves us responsible for traffic 
accidents.54 Yet it strikes me that we are responsible in such cases: after all, the child died 
because the driver was driving. Secondly, Heuer speaks of our failures in terms of 
“mistakes” and that might not quite align with my point, although this depends on what 
Heuer means by a mistake. We can hear “mistakes” as quite close to “faults”.55 What I 
hope to have brought out is that—even when we do our best—sometimes our abilities 
will fail. This is just the nature of our abilities: they are never going to guarantee success, 
so whenever we use them, even properly, they might fail. Even the best tennis player in 
the world sometimes hits a shot out.56 Of course, it might not be clear when our actions 
are faulty, when we make a mistake, or when we have properly used our abilities and 
for whatever reason it has failed.57 But I hope to have brought out how we can fail just 
because we are fallible, and this need not indicate any fault on our part. It is just part of 
being human.  
What links these accounts and mine is that they all attempt to understand responsibility 
for outcomes, in ways that respect our fallibility. I hope to have shown that a plausible 
account of how we can make any impact on the world in the first place requires that we 
exercise fallible abilities, and that these fallible abilities can lead to unintended results 
that cannot just be reduced to the order of mere events. Rather, they arise because of 
what we have done as agents. Thus, we are responsible as agents for unintended 
outcomes. The basic claim, and the Unintentionalist picture of the nature of agency, 
makes sense of the role that our agency plays in the world. 
5.3 The mature agent 
In 5.3, I have two aims. One is to show that the Unintentionalist offers the most plausible 
picture of agency by offering considerations that fit with the claims made in 5.2 to 
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reinforce the plausibility of the basic claim. But the main aim here is to consider not just 
what it means to be a responsible agent, but how we think of ourselves as agents.  
5.3.1 Foreseeability 
Consider cases where the agent knows that if they try to achieve one outcome they also 
make another undesired outcome more likely. Pirlo knows that he has a 1-in-5 chance 
of scoring, a 3-in-5 chance of missing completely, and a 1-in-5 chance of getting a corner 
kick. Pirlo intends to score, he does not intend to miss.58 But given that Pirlo is aware 
that if he elects to take the steps that would see him score he could also give away a goal 
kick, it would be bizarre to say that he is responsible for giving away a goal kick merely 
in a causal sense, or as a body moved this-way-and-that by luck, rather than due to his 
agential intervention.  
We are responsible as agents for certain foreseen outcomes. 
Now, some stripe of Intentionalist will allow that what one intends encompasses some 
of the likely effects of one’s actions.59 Perhaps agents are responsible when they 
knowingly take a risk,60 or perhaps they are responsible in a “derivative” sense if the 
outcome follows from something done intentionally.61 Or we could expand the 
Intentionalist picture by considering what we should have foreseen.62 But whatever 
modifications we make to the Intentionalist account will only account for cases where 
the outcome is fairly likely. The Intentionalist cannot keep the character of her position 
according to which we are responsible only for what we intended and, for instance, hold 
the lorry driver responsible. 
                                               
 
 
58
 For a discussion of a variety of views on what counts as intended, especially in the criminal law, see Duff, 
Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, chap. 2.  
59
 See some of the views of intention discussed at Duff, chap. 2. There are differences between foreseeing 
and intending an outcome; for a discussion of some differences in terms of liability and answerability see 
Duff, Answering for Crime, 2009, 63–69. 
60
 Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability, 79–80.  
61
 For discussion of this see Heuer, “When Things Go Wrong: Responsibility for Failure and Negligence,” 
sec. 2. 
62
 It seems plausible that we should be responsible (and liable) for risks even if we did not actually foresee 
them, see Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” 84. See also Coleman and 
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The Intentionalist also fudges matters with less-well-defined risks. Take making an 
omelette. This isn’t a difficult task like Pirlo’s free-kicks; rather, the ability to make an 
omelette is one that almost always succeeds for any good cook. But any good cook who 
has made enough omelettes will also have ruined a few. Likewise, everyone who has 
driven a car has had a skid or a narrow miss, and we all know that driving is to some 
extent dangerous. In fact, we know that all of our abilities are fallible. As Perry puts it: 
“The knowledge that we only ever have partial or imperfect control over our interactions 
with the external world is itself a fundamental aspect of our sense of our own agency.”63 
Whenever we act we know that our abilities might fail and might give rise to unintended 
outcomes, even if we have no determinate picture of what might arise, and even if we 
have no particular reason to think that we are likely to fail in this instance. 
This is important in two respects. Firstly, it adds another layer of plausibility to the basic 
claim: it isn’t just that all our abilities might fail, it’s that we know this. We act knowing 
that, although we intend to change the world in one way, we cannot guarantee the 
contours of how things will turn out. As such, it seems that as agents who weigh up 
matters and intend things, we exercise our abilities aware that we might bring about 
unintended outcomes, even if we do not know what these outcomes might be. It seems 
that we should not just attribute these outcomes to some causal workings of the world—
rather, they should be attributed to us as agents, since we made the choice to act knowing 
that we could bring about some unintended outcome. It underplays the role of 
someone’s agency in the world if we reduce their role to a mere event rather than an 
agential intervention. 
5.3.2 Self-understanding  
The second respect concerns our self-understanding. My point in this section is that an 
agent who understands their agency, and their relationship with the world, in a realistic 
manner—what we might, following Williams, call a “mature agent”—recognises that their 
abilities could always misfire and recognises their responsibility for unintended 
outcomes. 
                                               
 
 
63
 Perry, “Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts,” 83.  
 131 
 
If I do not think that I am responsible for the unintended outcomes of my actions, then 
I seem to hold my ability to bring about intended outcomes at arm’s length. Pirlo, if he 
takes an Intentionalist attitude, admits he can take constructive steps towards an 
intended end (the goal) but seem to push away the aspects of the ability that might lead 
towards other unintended ends (goal kicks and corners). Even though he knew the ball 
might go out for a goal-kick, he denies that this is down to him. This, I want to claim, 
suggests an immaturity as an agent. But why? Why would he have to accept 
responsibility for the failures as well as the successes? Because we can only achieve 
success (or failure) through our abilities, but these abilities are by their nature fallible 
and can have unintended impacts. For an agent to see himself as responsible for an 
outcome, he needs to recognise that he has an ability—and he needs a proper 
understanding of that ability.  
My point comes out in an analogy with pride and shame.
64
 Take the widespread picture 
of pride and shame whereby they relate to parts of who I am, and this can extend to, 
say, my relationships and associations with others: I see someone as forming part of my 
identity insofar as they are part of my family. As such, I might feel proud if that person 
has an impressive feature (they are very smart). They bolster my own identity by making 
the family of which I am part into an impressive family, and this redounds to me. But 
do I really identify as part of that family if the same family member’s bigoted nature 
does not arouse in me even a modicum of shame? If I too readily would dissociate that 
member from my own identity, then it seems that my prideful identification is flawed: I 
do not seem to really identify with them. Either I do not properly understand how my 
relationship connects me to this family member (namely, in a way that might engender 
pride or shame), or I take a bad-faith and disingenuous view of this connection. 
Likewise, what sort of attitude do I take towards my own abilities if I accept responsibility 
only for intended outcomes?65 We can think of this in terms of specific abilities. How 
does Pirlo see himself if he doesn’t accept responsibility for the unintended outcomes 
that follow from his free kicks? He might genuinely think he has an ability that never 
leaves him responsible for unintended outcomes, but this would show that he takes an 
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unrealistic view on his own abilities; he sees himself as impinging on the world only 
when he succeeds yet we know he makes an impact on the world when he acts and fails 
to bring about the outcomes he intended. Or he might be disingenuous, trying to avoid 
responsibility in the same way that the bad-faith family member tries to avoid shame. 
And how does he see himself as a practical agent overall, if he only accepts the intended 
results of his actions? Again, it seems as though he would have a disingenuous grip on 
his agency, akin to the grip of the bad-faith family-member, or he would have an 
unrealistic view of the way in which he is an agent. Not only might he show that he fails 
to properly appreciate particular abilities, but he fails to properly appreciate his status as 
an agent. 
Further, we can consider his self-respect (either as an agent, or regarding particular 
abilities).66 To take a disingenuous or unrealistic attitude towards these skills is to 
undermine his self-respect. That is because his ability to impact the world in various 
ways is central to his self-respect, as we saw at 4.1. If he holds his abilities at arm’s length, 
he holds the grounds for his self-respect at arm’s length. His abilities are the ways in 
which he can make this impact on the world, so to hold them at arm’s length in the way 
the bad-faith family member holds his relatives is to distance himself from centrally 
important grounds of his self-respect. Alternatively, if it turns out that he accepts only a 
gerrymandered subset of his abilities then he takes an unrealistic view of the grounds of 
his self-respect, so his self-respect is ill-founded.  
Failing to take responsibility for the unintended outcomes of one’s actions belies 
a disingenuous connection with one’s own ability (or general abilities as a 
practical agent) or an unrealistic view of one’s own abilities.  
This affects our self-respect, leading to a tenuous connection with one’s self-
respect or grounding self-respect on a false picture of oneself. 
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The overarching point is that an agent who accepts responsibility for the impact of his 
actions only when he intends those impacts does not have a realistic picture of himself 
as an agent. Of course, the mature agent might not have to accept responsibility in each 
instance; a dose of immaturity, an occasional shirking of responsibility, does not stop 
you from being a mature agent. Yet one must accept responsibility for unintended 
outcomes in at least some, and perhaps the majority of, cases. We return to this in 
chapter 7. 
This brings us to the passage from Williams with which I opened this chapter.67 In 
“Voluntary acts and responsible agents,” Williams seeks to give us an idea of a mature 
agent.68 The idea, as Williams sketches it, is fairly obscure and he never, to my 
knowledge, developed it in any depth. But the rough idea is that the mature agent has 
some understanding of himself and how he interacts with other people and the world. 
It strikes me that this is what Williams had in mind in “Moral Luck” when he claimed 
that agent-regret tells us something about agency.69 Our propensity for agent-regret shows 
that we realise we are related to the world through being responsible for unintended 
outcomes. To be mature agents—to properly understand our relationship with the 
world—we need to accept that our abilities are fallible and with that comes responsibility 
for outcomes we never intended to create.70  
This also captures Susan Wolf’s position. Wolf holds that moral judgment should focus 
on intentions and authorship, but she offers the idea that it is virtuous for us to accept 
responsibility even if we are not “objectively” responsible (see above 4.3.1). I do not 
read Wolf as a revisionist. Instead, “objectively” responsible seems to correspond to 
being morally responsible, and moral responsibility concerns what we intentionally bring 
about or the content of our intentions being reflected in the world. Wolf claims that we 
need to take account of the other ways in which we interact with the world as agents. 
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Hence her claim, regarding her slightly-negligent version of a lorry driver who thinks he 
is no more responsible than an equally negligent driver who does not hit a child:  
“The problem is not that he refuses to accept what responsibility he 
objectively has for the child’s death; it is that he fails to take 
responsibility for it, in a way that goes beyond that. He reveals a sense 
of himself—his real self, one might say—as one who is, at least in 
principle, distinct from his effects on the world... It is as if he draws a 
circle around himself, coincident with the sphere of his will.”71  
Someone who takes responsibility only insofar as they are morally responsible cuts 
themselves off from the world even if this is all that is “objectively” (morally) required. 
The point is that there are other ways in which we are connected to the world: like how 
we are connected as fallible agents. 
As such, I think we can develop a workable picture of the sense in which it is virtuous 
to take responsibility for such outcomes. As I said at 4.3.1, it was not clear why it is 
virtuous, nor was it clear (as I stressed in 4.3.2) why the agent, compared to bystanders 
or others who are connected to the outcome, has a special relationship with it and thus 
can take responsibility. But we might now see the sense in which it is virtuous. Agent-
regret is not morally required, where morality is a narrow notion concerning the 
voluntary. But we are responsible qua agents. Wolf lays some stress on liability, which 
might explain why she compares this virtue to generosity.72 No doubt we might be 
generous in accepting responsibility outside of the moral; but there is another virtue 
involved, a virtue close to wisdom: we accept that we are responsible for more than just 
what we intend, and see that our interactions with the world reach beyond our intentions. 
Agent-regret, in taking as its object our responsibility for outcomes, even if these are 
unintended, manifests this wisdom. It is the emotion of a mature agent. 
5.4 Vindicating Unintentionalism 
Let me summarise what I have tried to do in this chapter and see how it gets us past the 
challenges of chapter 4. Firstly, I started by introducing the abilities-based account and 
explained how it allows us to ascribe outcomes to agents and allows for our authorship. 
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This was a point about how we can be agents in the first place. I then suggested that it is 
plausible to understand an agent as responsible for an unintended outcome if that 
outcome arose because she tried to bring about some other outcome—after all, she 
intentionally exercised an ability, thus she was involved as an agent, and that outcome 
arose because she exercised that ability. I then developed this by considering how agents 
understand themselves, arguing that a mature agent who properly understands her 
relationship with the world accepts the basic claim and recognises that she is only an 
agent in virtue of having fallible abilities that leave her responsible for outcomes she 
never intended to bring about.  
I do not suppose that this shows, as Williams thought, that the Intentionalist offers an 
“insane concept of rationality”, nor that an agent who is not mature fails to at least have 
a picture of agency.73 The Intentionalist offers a reasonable picture of what it is like to 
intentionally make a mark on the world. But they fail to recognise the importance of 
our abilities, and how these abilities connect us to the world. If our purported 
responsibility for unintended outcomes is swallowed up into the order of mere events, 
why doesn’t the same happen to our responsibility for intended outcomes? How can 
the Intentionalist hold that we are responsible for outcomes in the world but that this is 
only the case when we intend to bring about that very outcome? My account lets us say 
that we are agents when we make an impact on the world through the exercise of our 
abilities. It gives us agency, as opposed to the order of mere events, in the first place. 
And then it lets us add that we can have a more robust connection, a fuller sense of 
agency, when we add to these abilities a connection between our intentions and the 
outcomes that arise. This is not to say that the Intentionalist cannot make back some 
ground, nor is it to prove that the Intentionalist’s account is dead and buried. The point 
is that the Unintentionalist offers a more robust and more plausible—and, when 
accepted by the agent, a more mature—picture of what it is like to be a human agent.  
Let’s now turn to see how this puts down the challenges we encountered in chapter 4. 
In 4.3, we encountered the revisionist. The revisionist approaches we encountered 
suggested that we might take responsibility for outcomes even though we were not, qua 
agents, actually responsible. They granted that we may have been causally responsible 
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and suggested that it would be virtuous to take responsibility. But it was far from clear 
how we could take responsibility. Not only was it unclear why, say, the lorry driver 
should take responsibility as opposed to a bystander, but it was also unclear what it 
would mean to take responsibility given that such a picture holds that he was not 
responsible as an agent. In this chapter, I suggested that the Unintentionalist picture, 
whereby we are responsible for outcomes because of the nature of our agency, allows 
us to make sense of the idea that we are responsible for these unintended outcomes in 
a straightforward way. We are responsible as agents because those outcomes arose due 
to the ways in which we, as agents, exercised our abilities—it’s just that these abilities 
failed to work out.  
The rejectionist, who we encountered in 4.4, offered us a powerful challenge to 
Unintentionalism: we only hold ourselves responsible for outcomes that we did not 
intend to bring about because we see that we are somehow related (perhaps causally) to 
that outcome and imbue this relationship with importance in a way akin to how ancient 
ethical views would say that a relationship to certain outcomes polluted an agent. There 
were enough parallels between outcome responsibility for unintended outcomes and 
pollution-based accounts of ethics for this to at least be a plausible explanation of why 
we hold ourselves responsible for unintended outcomes and why we feel agent-regret.  
The explanation offered in this chapter gets us past that worry. It rests on a plausible 
story without any hint of spookiness. In this chapter, I have sought to counter the 
rejectionist challenge by explaining our attachment to unintended results not in terms of 
a discarded ethical theory, but through an appeal to our fallible status as human beings.74 
Rather than grounding our responsibility for unintended outcomes in some spooky 
ethic of pollution, we can see that this is actually founded in our status as human agents.  
This account wears its plausibility as an account of human agency on its sleeve: we all, 
throughout our lives, beginning with some of our earliest interactions with the world, 
recognise that we are fallible and lack absolute control but are able to make some impact 
on the world. But that impact is imperfect and is shaped by our limitations. In order to 
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make any impact on the world we must use our abilities. But all of our abilities are 
fallible. In utilising them, we run the risk of bringing about various unintended 
outcomes, and because these outcomes are generated by our agency we are responsible 
for them as agents rather than in some other causal sense. That has been the argument 
of this chapter. I hope to have conveyed a realistic picture of agency—and, more than 
that, a realistic picture of human agency. Given our fallible status, a mature agent who 
understands her relationship with the world accepts that she is responsible for certain 
unintended outcomes.  
5.5 Agency and agent-regret 
Let’s return to agent-regret. I argued earlier that we feel agent-regret when we regret our 
own responsibility for an outcome. Were we responsible only for outcomes that we 
intended to bring about, we might allow for some forms of agent-regret: for instance, 
when we bring about an outcome intentionally but only do this because it is the lesser 
of two evils (what I have called “foreseen outcomes”). Yet central cases of agent-regret 
arise over unintended outcomes. The purpose of this chapter has been to bolster the 
claim made in Part I: that we are sometimes responsible for outcomes even when we 
did not intend to bring them about. Thus, we might be responsible for unintentionally 
running someone over or breaking a vase. 
Of course, seeing that responsibility for unintended outcomes is central to our status as 
agents, and seeing that mature agents must accept this responsibility, shows us that 
particular instances of being responsible for an outcome (like being responsible for the 
child’s death) must be significant to some extent. But the fact that human agents are 
responsible for unintended outcomes, and mature agents accept this responsibility, 
doesn’t explain the difference between being responsible for a broken vase and a child’s 
death. We are responsible for these outcomes, and mature agents accept this. But, for 
all we have seen in this chapter, both killing a child and breaking a vase are exercises of 
our agency and might be significant in exactly the same way: as exercises of our agency 
in general.  
What is the significance of being responsible for smashing a vase as opposed to killing 
a child? Let me put this another way. In general, emotional reactions to an object 
presuppose that one cares about that object. In fact, emotions and care seem to go hand-
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in-hand: to care about something is to be prone to certain emotional reactions to it, and 
to be prone to certain emotional reactions is to care about it.75 Given that agent-regret is 
an emotion, and that agent-regret takes as its object one’s responsibility for an outcome, 
this presupposes that in order to feel agent-regret one must care about one’s 
responsibility for an outcome.   
To feel agent-regret is to care about one’s responsibility for an outcome. 
It is one thing to show that being responsible for unintended outcomes matters insofar 
as it underpins our agency. Based on this chapter, we clearly should care to some extent 
about the fact we are responsible for unintended outcomes, and this is because we care 
about being agents. But it is quite another thing to show that these instances of 
responsibility matter in anywhere near the way presupposed by agent-regret: in a way 
that justifies caring about these particular instances of responsibility in importantly 
different ways. 
Agent-regret is about particular instance of responsibility, it is not just about one’s status 
as an agent. There clearly is a difference in what Maddie and the driver care about, yet 
they both exercised their agency. To understand agent-regret we need to see the ways in 
which particular instances of responsibility matter and understand why and how we care 
about them. I will argue, drawing on Williams and Honoré, that our responsibility for 
particular outcomes affects our identities. We now turn to this.
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Chapter 6 
Identity 
 
“For am I not what I am, to some degree, in virtue of what others 
think and feel me to be?”1 
Isaiah Berlin 
“…we know that in the story of one’s life there is an authority exercised by 
what one has done, and not merely by what one has intentionally 
done.”2 
Bernard Williams 
 
In this chapter we turn to why responsibility for particular outcomes matters to both the 
agent herself and to others. I have already established in chapter 5 that, in virtue of our 
status as agents, we are responsible for unintended outcomes; and in virtue of being 
mature agents we must accept responsibility for these unintended outcomes (or, at least 
for many of them). But seeing that we are responsible—and that being responsible in 
general is central to our status as agents—doesn’t tell us about the significance individual 
instances of responsibility (e.g. smashing Zack’s vase, killing the child) have for us. What 
is the significance of one’s responsibility for an unintended outcome? And do we rightly 
care about being responsible for, say, the child’s death? 
In 6.1, I set out Honoré and Williams’s claims about responsibility and identity. They 
offer the idea that being responsible for this or that outcome affects our identities in 
different ways. We need to understand how this can be the case. In 6.2, I introduce the 
idea of an ethical identity. This includes features like our ethnicities and genders, and 
some philosophers hold that one’s ethnicity or gender is essential to being that 
individual. Is it plausible to suppose that outcome responsibility can play a similar role? 
In 6.3, I explore Meir Dan-Cohen’s argument that our ethical identities are affected by 
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the outcomes for which we are responsible. Dan-Cohen’s argument revolves around 
Williams’s claim that Gauguin could not, if he succeeded, regret his decision to become 
a painter; Dan-Cohen’s argument is that Gauguin is essentially a painter and that another 
figure, like Gauguin but a failed painter or a bank clerk, would not be Gauguin. I suggest 
that Dan-Cohen’s argument is too strong. 
In 6.4, I argue that what we are responsible for is important because it conditions how 
we see ourselves and how other people react to us. Our ethical identities engender such 
reactions, but where Dan-Cohen’s account goes wrong is in making these reactions 
respond to essential features of an individual. Instead, I argue that our ethical identities 
also comprise of non-essential features. Such features are part of our identities insofar 
as they underpin such reactions. I argue that being responsible for an outcome is a 
feature of mine that affects my self-conception and interpersonal reactions: this is how 
outcome responsibility affects our identities. In 6.5 I show how the picture of ourselves 
as potent agents that we saw in chapter 5 further vindicates the importance that, in 
reacting in these ways, we give to our responsibility for outcomes. By the end of this 
chapter, we will have the material that will allow us a proper understanding of agent-
regret and many of its nuances: we return our focus directly to agent-regret in chapter 7. 
6.1 Honoré and Williams on responsibility and identity 
To vindicate agent-regret, I need to show that we care about instances of responsibility 
and that we rightly care about them. To do this, I take up Honoré’s idea that being 
responsible for an outcome affects our identities. As I noted at 4.3.1, there are two lines 
of thought here. One holds that our status as persons depends upon being responsible 
for outcomes; this relates to our discussion in chapter 5 concerning how one can make 
an impact on the world. The second line of thought is that our particular identities 
depend upon the particular outcomes that we are responsible for.3 Honoré presents this 
latter idea at several points: 
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“… outcome responsibility is… central to the identity and character of 
the agent…We are the people we are and have the character we have 
largely because the dealings in which our bodies and brains are 
involved, if in some aspect intentional, are attributed to us as the actions 
of persons with a continuing identity.”4 
“[outcomes] are ascribed to authors, who accordingly count as persons; 
and it is by virtue of these ascriptions that each of us has a history, an 
identity and a character”5 
“Outcome responsibility, as I conceive it, is the idea that certain 
outcomes of our conduct… are ours... We identify with them and 
others attribute them to us. They form a constituent of our individual 
character and identity, without which we should lack achievements and 
failures both in our own eyes and in those of others.”6 
“Finally, it is outcomes that in the long run make us what we are.”7 
It’s also important to note that—although it isn’t obvious in any of these passages, it is 
clear from the broader argument—Honoré means this to apply to unintended outcomes 
as well as intended outcomes.8 The idea is that the outcomes for which we are 
responsible affect “who we are”.9  
Williams also offers a similar idea: 
“One's history as an agent is a web in which anything that is the product 
of the will is surrounded and held up and partly formed by things that 
are not…if one attaches importance to the sense of what one is in terms 
of… what in the world one is responsible for, one must accept much 
that makes its claim on that sense solely in virtue of its being actual”10 
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He also links the idea of a mature agent to the ways in which they recognise their 
identities are shaped by what they, perhaps inadvertently, do.  
“The mature agent… will recognize his relation to his acts in their 
undeliberated, and also in their unforeseen and unintended aspects. 
He recognizes that his identity as an agent is constituted by more than 
his deliberative self.”11 
We can find a central core to all of these thoughts, whether put across as claims about 
identity, narrative, history, character, our sense of who we are, or human life.12 The point 
is that one’s responsibility for an outcome can affect who one is.  
Our identities depend upon our responsibility for particular outcomes. 
There is something obviously right about this claim. Take Arthur Ripstein’s contention 
that: “Outcome responsibility is a familiar and pervasive feature of human life—persons 
think of themselves, and of each other, in terms of the impact that they have in the 
world. It is difficult to imagine what human life would be like without it. Our conception 
of interpersonal interaction is shaped by it, as is our autobiographical conception of 
ourselves as persons… Once Honoré has drawn our attention to it, the idea of outcome 
responsibility is familiar, and everywhere.”13 This captures the core notion of identity I 
defend, but Ripstein does not expand on it; the thought that our responsibility affects 
our identities is, in much of the literature, left as a sweeping statement, rather than a 
precise claim. We need a far better understanding of how exactly our responsibility for 
outcomes has an effect on our identities and, perhaps more importantly, what our 
“identities” are.  
                                               
 
 
11 Williams, “Voluntary Acts and Responsible Agents,” 32.  
12
 Both Honoré and Williams use the term “character”, but this might be misleading. There is an 
unproblematic way of talking about character, like when we say that the wine has a full-bodied character; 
this just means that it has certain features. But it also has a more loaded philosophical use. I will suppose 
that they are just using the unproblematic sense of character and will not explore whether outcome 
responsibility directly affects our character traits, because this strikes me as implausible.  
13 Ripstein, “Private Law and Private Narratives,” 37.  
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6.2 Ethical Identity 
One way of talking about identity concerns classical issues in philosophy of personal 
identity, and this is often couched in terms of our “metaphysical identity”.14 Popular 
theories of metaphysical identity hold that identity is given by one’s bodily or 
psychological continuity.15 There’s no suggestion that our responsibility for outcomes 
affects our bodily or psychological continuity.
 
Being responsible for, say, running over 
the child doesn’t affect the driver in this way. Not that this should worry us. Proponents 
of the idea that outcome responsibility affects our identities do not claim that outcome 
responsibility affects features commonly thought to constitute our metaphysical 
identities.16  
It should be clear that there are other notions of identity in play than the metaphysical 
sense. One sense of “identity” that is often set up in contrast to metaphysical identity—
notably by Kwame Anthony Appiah—is ethical identity.17 Take features like one’s 
gender;18 ethnicity;19 religion; being hearing or deaf;20 or the period in which one was 
born.21 These features have been held to constitute our ethical identities.  
One way of understanding ethical identity is as comprised of essential features of an 
individual. On this essentialist understanding of ethical identity, we cannot determine 
whether an individual is this individual just by appealing to bodily or psychological 
continuity, rather these ethical features are also essential to being this individual.22
   
                                               
 
 
14
 Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 22–24.  
15
 For Williams’s own views, which concern bodily continuity, see Williams, “Personal Identity and 
Individuation”; Williams, “Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity”; Williams, “The Self and the 
Future”; Williams, “Resenting One’s Own Existence.” See also Kripke, Naming and Necessity, 40–53, 
110–14.  
16
 Without outcome responsibility “There would indeed be bodies and, associated with them, minds.” 
Honoré, “Responsibility and Luck,” 29.  
17
 Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?,” 495. See also Appiah, The Ethics of Identity. For discussion 
see Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 22–24.  
18
 Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?,” 494–95; Mikkola, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and 
Gender,” sec. 4.2.2; Williams, S&N, 122; Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, xi, 10.  
19
 For the race/ethnicity distinction see Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?,” 496–99.  
20
 See R M Adams’s discussion of Helen Keller at Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of 
Evil,” 60.  
21
 See Williams, “Imagination and the Self,” 40–45.  
22
 Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?” is clearly an effort to establish essential features. Witt does 
not concern herself with essential features, see Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 16–24. 
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Essentialist-Ethical Identity: certain ethical features are essential to being this 
individual (across time or possible worlds).
 
The difference between metaphysical and ethical identity concerns the features that they 
hold relevant to identity. An individual who is metaphysically identical might not be me 
in terms of ethical identity. JW, although identical to me in terms of personal identity 
but with different features relevant to ethical identity—perhaps JW was taken at birth and 
raised female,
23
 or adopted and raised in Vietnam—24is not be me (if Essentialist-Ethical 
Identity is right).  
For it to be plausible that these features constitute our ethical identities and that this is 
an important notion of identity, we need to see what significance these features might 
have. One way to think about this is that ethical identities make an ethical difference 
(hence “ethical”), and this is manifested in social reactions, our self-conceptions, and the 
projects we can pursue.25 For instance, they affect how others treat us and interact with 
us. Being female, or Catholic, or a 19
th
 Century Central European minor royal will affect 
how other people will react to you and treat you. So, our ethical identities affect our 
interpersonal reactions. It is just as important to note that many of these features will 
affect our view of ourselves.
 
This is unsurprising: if certain of my features affect how 
others see me, and presumably these features in others affect how I see them, then they 
will likely affect how I see myself. So, my ethical identity affects my self-conception. Of 
course, this differs from how one’s metaphysical identity affects one’s self-conception: 
the claim here is that, say, one’s ethnicity or gender will affect how one thinks of oneself. 
There is also one further impact, which relates in various ways to our self-conceptions 
and interpersonal reactions. As Appiah puts it: “I was born into the wrong family to be 
                                               
 
 
23
 Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?,” 494. 
24
 Witt offers this example Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 51–56. See also Williams, “Imagination 
and the Self,” 40; Williams, “Resenting One’s Own Existence,” 224–25. Witt notes (The Metaphysics of 
Gender, 51.) that Vietnamese and British Jake would not be psychologically continuous and would have 
markedly different psychologies. So perhaps models of metaphysical identity based on psychological 
continuity can account for this. 
25
 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 68–69; Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 23–24, 72–73. For discussion 
of self-conceptions and interpersonal reactions, see Nelson, “What Child Is This?,” 30–33; Schechtman, 
Staying Alive, 71–72, 103–4, chaps. 5-6.  
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a Yoruba chief and with the wrong body for motherhood.”26 Our ethical identities 
condition our lives by determining what projects we can pursue.27  
Our ethical identities include features that affect interpersonal reactions and our 
self-conceptions, as well as the projects we can pursue. 
So, features that comprise our ethical identities have a significant role in how we live our 
lives. They are ethically significant. The essentialist claim is that these features not only 
affect our interpersonal reactions and self-conceptions but are essential to being a 
particular individual. That is because we are more than just what is given by the metaphysical 
picture.
28 
It strikes me as highly plausible that who we (essentially) are is given by more than mere 
metaphysical identity, and our ethical identities do contain some features essential to an 
individual being that individual. But, in section 6.4, I will argue that certain of our 
features condition these reactions—and thus are ethically significant features of our 
ethical identities—without being essential features of an individual. That is to say that 
there are features that comprise our ethical identities that are conditioning but which are 
not essential. Yet for now our focus is on an essentialist understanding of ethical identity, 
according to which the features of our ethical identities are essential to being this or that 
individual. Can this help us shed light on the importance of outcome responsibility? Of 
course, many of the features of our ethical identities that we considered above—ethnicity, 
gender, the period in which we were born, and at least the fact of our being raised in a 
certain religion or none—are given or formed from a very young age. Can responsibility 
for an outcome be an essentialist feature of our ethical identities?  
Meir Dan-Cohen thinks so. In order to understand his account we need to explore a 
puzzling part of “Moral Luck”: Williams’s claim that Gauguin, if he succeeded, could 
                                               
 
 
26
 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, xii. See also Appiah, 15–17. For a more extreme example: “No fifth-
century Athenian could behave just as Agamemnon or Achilles behaved. No thirteenth-century Icelander 
could have behaved quite like the men of the tenth century.” MacIntyre, After Virtue, 131. See also 
Williams, ELP, 161.  
27
 Appiah, “"But Would That Still Be Me?,” 499; Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 21–22, chap. 3. Perhaps 
there are goods internal to certain practices (MacIntyre, After Virtue, chap. 14; Raz, “The Practice of 
Value.”) and participation in these practices presupposes certain identities.  
28
 The answer to ““But would it still be me?”… reflects our self-conception as social agents rather than an 
external metaphysical/scientific truth like the necessity of origin” Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 23. 
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not regret his decision to become a painter in Tahiti.29 Williams’s argument is that 
Gauguin’s life “derives an important part of its significance for him” from the fact that 
he has succeeded and can evaluate his life in terms of being a painter.30 Yet it is not clear 
why this rules out regret. Dan-Cohen argues that Gauguin cannot regret his decision 
because his decision gives him his identity, and so he cannot regret the decision for 
without it he would not exist.31 Exploring this will allow us to see one way of 
understanding how outcome responsibility might affect our identities and will allow us a 
better understanding of an important part of “Moral Luck”. But I will argue that Dan-
Cohen’s picture is unrealistic; to understand the impact outcome responsibility has on 
our identities, we need to move away from essential features: we need to move away 
from thinking about identity in terms of whether this would be the same individual 
across time or worlds.  
6.3 Dan-Cohen and Gauguin 
Dan-Cohen thinks that:  
“people's identities are fixed in the course of their lives, the variations 
on the actual course of a person's life which we can intelligibly imagine 
while retaining the person's identity, that is the variations that would still 
count as variations on the life of the same person, are limited. If the 
imaginary departure exceeds a certain threshold, no sense can attach 
to the claim that we're still imagining the same person.”32 
In this section, I want to explore this position, show how it relates to outcome 
responsibility, and argue that it fails. Before proceeding, I should note that Dan-Cohen’s 
position does not explicitly use the language of ethical identity or outcome responsibility, 
and he develops various nuances that I will only briefly discuss in the footnotes. Yet his 
picture certainly captures the spirit of an attempt to understand our responsibility for 
                                               
 
 
29 
Williams held that this does not apply to all decisions, but only to those projects that help to form an 
agent’s “stand-point of assessment” Williams, “Moral Luck,” 35. It must relate to “the agent’s sense of 
what is significant in his life.” Williams, 36. 
30 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 35.  
31
 Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity.” For a more detailed expression of Dan-Cohen’s views on identity see 
Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self.” These are reprinted in, respectively, Dan-
Cohen, Normative Subjects; Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts. Both of these collections extend Dan-
Cohen’s thoughts. 
32
 Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 8. 
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particular outcomes as features of our ethical identities, and I hope that my exposition 
respects that. 
6.3.1 Dan-Cohen and identity 
Dan-Cohen starts with the idea that when a project is “defining” it is momentous enough 
to “play a sufficiently dominant role in the person’s identity.”33 For instance, Dan-Cohen 
says that had he joined the Navy or become a violinist (these careers are all projects) 
then the figure who had lived that life would not have been him (he is a law professor).34 
There is something plausible about this in light of our self-conceptions and interpersonal 
reactions; think about the ways in which these various career projects would condition 
his own view of himself, his life plans, and the ways others interact with him. Had he 
been a sailor then producing an academic treatise, writing an insightful paper on Bernard 
Williams, or getting a professorship would likely have had less importance—or at least a 
different significance—and although there would have been certain codified forms of 
respect in military matters, he would not expect to be revered by students just as 
Professor Dan-Cohen would not expect to be saluted as he stepped onto ship.  
Dan-Cohen’s is a point about what features are essential to being a particular individual.35 
It is undeniable that our life stories are important, yet a more moderate position holds 
that the individual who lives that life may remain identical to an individual who lives a 
wildly different life: both the Captain and the Professor are Meir Dan-Cohen. Dan-
Cohen’s view is different. He holds that our life stories affect the identities of the persons 
who live those lives such that the same person could not have lived a wildly different 
life. The Captain and Professor are distinct individuals. Comparing Captain and 
Professor is like comparing Dan-Cohen’s actual life “to the life of a medieval knight or 
                                               
 
 
33
 Dan-Cohen, 7–9. Dan-Cohen also thinks minor projects (like reading this thesis) can affect one’s 
identity, albeit through being part of a larger whole: Dan-Cohen, 17–18; Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and 
the Boundaries of the Self,” 966, 972; Dan-Cohen, “Constructing Subjects,” 23–25. This is important if 
one wants to defend the idea that outcome responsibility affects our identities, and that this occurs in 
more cases than just major cases like Gauguin’s project. 
34
 Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 9–10.  Dan-Cohen suggests there is a “historical” possibility but not a 
“counterfactual” possibility of this being him. What is important in considering ethical identity is that 
there is no counterfactual possibility of the violinist being Dan-Cohen. 
35
 Dan-Cohen connects narratives and identity Dan-Cohen, 7–8. But our narrative identities are amenable 
to social or individual pictures, see 6.2 and see also Dan-Cohen, “Socializing Harry.” Thus it strikes me 
that Dan-Cohen’s account is close enough to the sense of ethical identity I have sketched and can serve 
as an illustration of what it would mean for one’s responsibility for an outcome to affect one’s identity. 
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a Hebrew prophet”;36 but it’s not just that the lives are as different as they are from a 
knight or a prophet, rather the “subject of that life” is a different person.37 Dan-Cohen 
thinks that not only would he have had a different life story, but he would be a different 
individual: Captain Dan-Cohen and Professor Dan-Cohen are different people and the 
individual who is Captain Dan-Cohen could not be Professor Dan-Cohen, much as he 
could not be the Hebrew prophet.  
On Dan-Cohen’s picture, if Gauguin succeeds then his life is altered, as is his identity: 
he, the successful painter, could not be the unsuccessful painter.38 Gauguin-successful is 
nearly as different from Gauguin-failed as he is from a knight or a prophet. Thus we can 
understand why Gauguin cannot regret deciding to become a painter if he succeeds and 
becomes one. To regret what he has done involves Gauguin wishing that things were 
otherwise; but given that his success is central to who he is, this involves wishing “that he 
were someone else.”39 
Dan-Cohen holds that by succeeding Gauguin becomes a different individual to 
the individual he becomes by failing, thus Gauguin cannot regret his success 
because success makes him who he is.  
We will soon return to the discussion of Gauguin—and will consider whether Dan-
Cohen’s argument is plausible. Before doing that, then we need to see how projects 
relate to outcome responsibility. 
6.3.2 Outcome responsibility and projects 
Take the example of Muhammad Ali beating George Foreman in the Rumble in the 
Jungle to affirm his status as the best boxer in the world. This is a project that can succeed 
only by Ali beating Foreman. If Foreman had fainted before the fight, or collapsed due 
                                               
 
 
36
 Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 9. 
37
 Dan-Cohen, 9.  
38
 Dan-Cohen, 12–13.  
39
 Dan-Cohen, 13. This is “incoherent”. One might, in feeling regret, prefer not to have existed at all, 
which is not incoherent: Dan-Cohen, 22. See Williams, “Resenting One’s Own Existence.” For further 
reflections on the limits of how past events condition our lives and identities and how this affects what we 
might regret, see Adams, “Existence, Self-Interest, and the Problem of Evil”; Wallace, The View from 
Here, chap. 5.  
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to some illness, Ali would not have beaten Foreman or affirmed his supremacy.40 What 
this project needs to succeed is for the outcome “winning the fight” to be attributed to 
Ali. He needs to be responsible for beating Foreman.  
For our projects to succeed, we need to be responsible for certain outcomes (at least, 
this is true for any project that seeks to make an impact on the world). To build on an 
example from Williams (which he does not develop, so it isn’t clear he has exactly my 
picture in mind), there is a difference between having a project to cure injustice in some 
part of the world, and a project that I cure injustice in the world.41 But we must be careful 
about how we understand the project to cure injustice because if injustice is cured by 
someone else, then my connection to that outcome might not be the right sort to 
establish the success of my project. For instance, if Archie has a plan and I step back 
from any involvement, it’s not clear that my project has succeeded. Rather, something I 
want to happen (injustice is cured) happens, and it happens independently of my project. 
For my project to succeed I have to be involved, I have to be responsible for at least 
some outcomes. If Archie’s plan is best, then for my project of curing injustice in the 
world to succeed, I need to be involved; perhaps I need to do the event logistics, or help 
to secure funding, or perhaps I realise that it’s best that I do not get involved and give 
up on my project for the greater good of the injustice being more efficiently cured. The 
point is that any world-directed project must be a project for me to succeed.42 For a father 
to have a project that his son succeeds, the son must succeed partly through the father’s 
help; otherwise, he just hopes his son succeeds and is glad when he does.  
So, outcome responsibility figures because for that project to succeed, I need to be 
responsible for some outcome (e.g. the absence of injustice in that part of the world). 
The success or failure of our (world-directed) projects depends upon being 
responsible for outcomes. 
Whether Gauguin succeeds in his project to become a painter depends on whether he 
is responsible for certain outcomes, namely whether he is responsible for the production 
                                               
 
 
40
 Perhaps this is good extrinsic luck, but perhaps not: Ali doesn’t just want the title, he wants to win it.  
41
 Williams, “PCM,” 13–14.  
42
 See also Williams, ELP, 55–56. 
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of beautiful pictures in this new style.43 So, if Dan-Cohen is right, responsibility for 
outcomes alters our identities insofar as it is central to the success of our projects, and 
successful projects are essential parts of our identities.  
As an aside from identity talk, this understanding of the relationship between projects 
and outcome responsibility also lets us see why Honoré was right in another claim about 
the importance of outcome responsibility. He claimed that without outcome 
responsibility “we would lack both achievements and failures.”44 For me to achieve 
something, for something to be an achievement of mine, I must be responsible for some 
outcome or other. This further expands on the related idea, discussed above at 4.1, that 
we gain much of our self-respect as potent individuals from the impact we make on the 
world. We gain much of our self-respect through our achievements, and many 
achievements rely upon our responsibility for outcomes. We saw in chapter 5 that our 
abilities are central to our self-respect, but now we see something more: our 
responsibility for particular outcomes is central to our self-respect because this 
responsibility grounds many of our achievements. 
Further, as I argued at 5.2.1, the abilities-based account of outcome responsibility allows 
us to make sense not just of our achievements, but also of our failures, and the particular 
ways in which we can fail: I fail in this way or that because I am responsible for this or 
that unintended outcome. Outcome responsibility is central to both achievements and 
failures. 
Many of our achievements and failures depend upon our responsibility for 
outcomes. 
It should be clear that the success or failure of many of our projects depends upon our 
responsibility for outcomes; what’s more, this responsibility is central to our 
achievements or failures.  
                                               
 
 
43
 This is put more clearly in terms of responsibility for outcomes, as opposed to the success of projects, 
at Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self,” 963. 
44
 Honoré, “The Morality of Tort Law,” 76. See also Honoré, “Being Responsible,” 128, 131–32; Honoré, 
“Appreciations and Responses,” 223.  
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6.3.3 Gauguin’s regrets 
Let’s return to Dan-Cohen and how this responsibility might affect our identities. His 
approach to Gauguin, combined with our understanding of the role of outcome 
responsibility in the success or failure of our projects, offers a way of understanding the 
claim that outcome responsibility affects our identities. 
Dan-Cohen’s position on identity holds that success or failure in certain projects 
is so important that it alters our identities. Success in our projects depend upon 
our responsibility for outcomes, thus our identities are affected by our 
responsibility for certain outcomes.  
Thinking about projects was a useful way of seeing Dan-Cohen’s argument; but we can 
extend the spirit of his claim beyond the scope of projects. For instance, although some 
people try to understand the lorry driver as failing in a project to drive safely, this might 
stretch the language of “projects”.45 We could just as well hold that certain events and 
our responsibility for certain outcomes also affect our lives enough to alter our identities. 
Being responsible for this or that outcome might be so important—whether or not it is a 
project—that it would not be me were I not responsible for that outcome. Oedipus, in 
killing Laius, so conditions his life that a figure who did not kill Laius would not be 
Oedipus, but we don’t need to hold that Oedipus had a project. 
It might well be that Oedipus or the lorry driver is so conditioned by the event that we 
cannot imagine them as not having killed Laius or the child respectively. This is more 
plausible the greater the extent to which the event conditions the rest of their lives, and 
so will be more prominent when the lorry driver looks back decades later than when he 
reflects on what happens as he struggles to get to sleep that night after killing the child. 
Yet, despite its plausibility in some cases, Dan-Cohen’s account gives us an implausible 
view of our own reactions to our past successes or failures. 
Consider Gauguin’s reactions to his success. He might feel lucky, or relieved, or grateful 
for his success. But does that translate into feeling grateful that he is this person not 
                                               
 
 
45
 Wolf, “The Moral of Moral Luck,” 11. Tannenbaum puts this in terms of realising one’s ends: 
Tannenbaum, “Emotional Expressions of Moral Value,” 53–55. 
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another? It’s far more plausible to hold that his gratitude is directed at the fact he 
succeeded, and his relief is relief that his life turned out this way and a reflection on how 
he could have failed. His thoughts do not seem to attach so much to who he is, but to 
what he has done. When he thinks about what life would have been like had he had a 
stroke of bad luck and failed, he thinks of the life of a failed artist thousands of miles 
away from his family whom he abandoned in pursuit of a worthless dream.46 How should 
our Gauguin (the Gauguin who succeeded) react when he thinks about such a figure? 
When he thinks of this possibility, he is not just imagining some figure—like him but not 
him—as failing; rather, he imagines what life would have been like for him had he failed. 
Dan-Cohen must deny this, yet surely Gauguin can imagine himself suffering this dismal 
fate. He is imagining himself; he is not imagining in the way he imagines a Hebrew 
prophet. 
And consider what a failed Gauguin might think. He can surely wish that he had 
succeeded—he does not just regret the decision, but his failure. We can see this in 
another famous example. In On the Waterfront, Marlon Brando’s character famously 
says “You don't understand. I coulda had class. I coulda been a contender. I coulda 
been somebody, instead of a bum, which is what I am…” If we hold that what we do is 
an essential part of who we are, we have to deny this: a contender would have been a 
different individual.
47
 For either Brando’s character or a failed Gauguin, it’s far from 
clear that in wishing that he had succeeded he wishes he was a different person. Instead, 
he just wishes that his life had gone differently.48 Finally, take the lorry driver. Does the 
lorry driver really regret being who he is? No. Rather, he wishes that he had never killed 
someone. He might have had a different life had he taken a different route that morning 
or had the child not chased his ball into the street, but it still would have been him.49  
                                               
 
 
46
 On Dan-Cohen’s picture, it is not lucky for this Gauguin that he succeeded, because to be this Gauguin 
he must have succeeded, see Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 18–19. 
47
 Thanks to Max Lewis for this example. 
48
 Dan-Cohen thinks there is an important disanalogy between failure and success, insofar as failure does 
not lead to an identity (“not-painter”). Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 16–17. This doesn’t get past my 
problem: that failed-Gauguin’s regret is not that he wants to be a different person (for that is what the 
successful Gauguin is—on Dan-Cohen’s picture—and it would be just as incoherent to wish to be a 
different, but successful, person) but he wants to have succeeded. 
49
 See Wallace, The View from Here, 144–47. 
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Dan-Cohen denies that this is a problem.
50
 He thinks that his account properly captures 
the importance of success and failure. Yet it jars with a very natural way of thinking about 
how successful characters understand the possibility of failure, and how unsuccessful 
characters understand their failures. Dan-Cohen’s account requires a major overhaul of 
our emotional responses; is there a more plausible, less revisionary, way of 
understanding what Williams and Honoré were getting at? 
6.4 Conditioning Features 
I hope that it is clear from the above discussion of Dan-Cohen’s position that, even 
though I reject Dan-Cohen’s analysis, our lives can be very different depending on 
whether we succeed or fail at certain projects; more broadly, our lives differ depending 
on the outcomes for which we are responsible. But the idea that our lives can go different 
ways can be seen as more or less significant. Recall, from 4.4.2, Wallace’s claim about 
the driver’s biography. Wallace thinks that the driver’s “biography has merely taken a 
macabre turn”.51 Just as much as Dan-Cohen’s account is too strong, the idea that the 
driver’s biography has merely taken a macabre turn surely downplays matters. Both 
Honoré and Williams clearly want to attach some importance to outcome responsibility 
and talk of identity crystallises this importance. To vindicate the importance of our 
responsibility for particular outcomes by appealing to the relationship between 
responsibility and identity, we need to capture this importance. We must offer 
something that is more plausible than Dan-Cohen’s claim, but which is strong enough 
to take seriously the importance of outcome responsibility such that it can make an 
impact on our identities.  
We have already seen that our self-conceptions, interpersonal reactions, and the projects 
that we can pursue are ethically significant. The next step comes in seeing that these 
reactions can respond to features that are not essential to being this individual.
52
 When 
we think about who I am, we should not just try to imagine how I could be different or 
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 Dan-Cohen, “Luck and Identity,” 18–20. 
51
 Wallace, The View from Here, 42. 
52
 See Herstein, “Responsibility in Negligence,” 175. Herstein draws attention to Raz, Value, Respect, and 
Attachment, 33. 
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what features of mine need to remain consistent to make some figure, across time or 
worlds, me. Instead we can focus on what I am actually like.53  
Take an analogy. We might ask whether a party composed of Enoch Powell, Margaret 
Thatcher, and Theresa May could be the Labour Party. Clearly not. Yet a party of Nick 
Clegg, Caroline Lucas, and Nicola Sturgeon isn’t all that far away from New Labour. 
This might be because the Labour Party is committed to a left-of-centre economic 
policy, with some liberal social policies: any party that lacked these elements, and had 
members of a rightward and illiberal bent, would not be the Labour Party. Knowing this 
is useful, but it doesn’t tell us everything there is to know about the Labour Party, nor 
does it explain outsiders’ reactions to the Labour Party, nor how party members think 
of it. To explain this, we need to capture its leftward lean, the influence of Momentum, 
and its recent policy moves. We do not just want to know what the Labour Party could 
be, or what sort of entity could be the Labour Party. We want to know about the current 
“identity” of the Labour Party that conditions how we (either as outsiders or members) 
react to it. But we do not think that these features, nor the party leadership, are essential 
to the party being the Labour Party. Still, it is appropriate to talk about these features as 
being part of the identity of the Labour party. 
Another way of seeing the difference between essential features and what I’m 
considering here is through a contrast between the constraints on the lives we can lead 
and the ways in which we move within those constraints. Take Appiah’s claim that he 
could not be a Yoruba chief. Essential features of our ethical identities condition our 
lives by placing limits on our projects but also by opening up certain avenues.54 Were we 
to imagine a figure who was a Yoruba chief, it would not be Appiah. But this doesn’t tell 
us much about Appiah as he actually is. To get anything like the rich and ingrained 
reactions people (philosophers, readers of his New York Times column, his friends, his 
family) have to Appiah, and the reactions he has to himself, we need to understand how 
his life went within these bounds, how he staked a claim to one possibility or another. 
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 Marya Schechtman offers an important statement of this distinction at Schechtman, Staying Alive, 1–3. 
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 155 
 
Essential features might not tell us, depending on how we flesh it out, that Einstein gave 
us special relativity or that Springsteen could sing. But these features are important to 
who these people are. Whether Gauguin sees his life as a success or a failure, whether 
we see Gauguin as a despicable creep preying on vulnerable women or as a masterful 
artist depends upon more than the features essential to him.  
We need to look to the features that constitute identity in a non-essentialist sense; these 
are what I will call conditioning features of one’s ethical identity.55 An essential feature 
of one’s ethical identity determines what one could be and affects one’s self-conception 
and interpersonal reactions; a conditioning feature does not determine what one could 
be but it does affect one’s self-conception and interpersonal reactions. These are 
conditioning insofar as they condition the reactions others have to the agent, how the 
agent thinks of herself—thus they are ethically significant. 
Is it plausible, though, to hold that these features are part of our identities? Yes. Firstly, 
as David DeGrazia makes clear, it is only in certain philosophical contexts that questions 
of identity concern essentialist features; more often they concern what I have called 
conditioning features of one’s identity.56 Secondly, conditioning features of our ethical 
identities are clearly significant even if they are non-essential. What is it about a feature 
that makes it such that it constitutes who I am? We should want these features to “make 
a difference” to how I am thought of.57 I said at 6.2 that our ethical identities affect our 
social interactions, self-conceptions, and the life plans we take up. Even if one objects 
to calling this liberalised notion “identity”, Honoré and Williams were clearly trying to 
appeal to something important when they connected responsibility with identity—and 
these conditioning features are clearly important features of an individual, even if they 
are not essential to her being that individual. Features like Springsteen’s musical prowess 
or Einstein’s achievements are not essential to Springsteen or Einstein being that 
individual; but they are significant, even if they are not essential. Hence, we can capture 
the importance that Williams and Honoré were after with their appeals to “identity”.  
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 One could also understand this as one’s “biographical identity” see Golub, “Personal Value, 
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 DeGrazia, Human Identity and Bioethics, 78. 
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 Appiah, The Ethics of Identity, 68.  
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One’s ethical identity includes conditioning features that are non-essentialist but 
which condition one’s social interactions and self-conception. 58 
It is important to note that this conception has two important parts: 
There are features (whether essential or conditioning) that comprise one’s 
ethical identity.59  
For instance, my character traits, my sense of humour, and my gender will all be features 
that are part of my ethical identity. Some of these features might be essential, my point 
is that they are not all essential.  
The second part is that: 
These features underpin certain reactions.60 
These reactions include social interactions and our self-conception. (Conditioning 
features might also affect the projects we can take up, but I will set that aside.) Included 
amongst these reactions will be emotions like pride, shame, disgust, and agent-regret.61 
Although the connections between these features and reactions will be complicated and 
I will not explore them, it should be clear that there is some relationship between these 
features and these reactions.  
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 These features will differ between people, and this will allow us to distinguish between agents; it is a 
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I suggest that we should see the relationship between our responsibility for an outcome 
and our identities in terms of conditioning features of our ethical identities, whereby 
what we are responsible for is a conditioning feature of our ethical identities. This allows 
us to respect the importance of being responsible for an outcome without construing 
that importance as essentialist, and thus without leading to Dan-Cohen’s revisionist 
position: what I am responsible for affects how others react to me, and how I think of 
myself, but it would still be me if I were not responsible for that outcome.  
Is this plausible? It strikes me that this is clearly true. One obvious way in which outcome 
responsibility is a conditioning feature and affects reactions to us is by way of our 
successes. As I said above at 6.3.2, it should be clear that Gauguin lives a very different 
life whether he succeeds or fails, and this will be a conditioning feature of his ethical 
identity. Likewise, Muhammad Ali’s self-respect would rightly be bolstered by his 
victory; this takes on a third-personal guise: he would have received less admiration and 
have had less of an aura had he lost. His victory in the Rumble in the Jungle meant he 
was seen in a certain way and saw himself in a certain way, including in a way that affected 
his (self-)respect.  
But this doesn’t tell us much about cases of agent-regret, because it doesn’t tell us much 
about how unintended outcomes are conditioning features. This comes out when we 
consider failures. George Foreman is known now not for his boxing, but for his grills 
(and for his unconventional child-naming choices). Clearly, we would have regarded Ali 
and Foreman differently had Foreman triumphed. There are also cases where a failure 
itself conditions how we see someone: Jean Van de Velde is known for losing The Open 
Championship in 1999. How we think of him, as well as, surely, how he thinks of 
himself, is conditioned by this failure. We do not need to leave this discussion to cases 
of projects and their failures; it should be just as clear that our responsibility for 
outcomes, detached from our projects, grounds our reactions.  Think about the various 
ways we might think of the lorry driver. If he kills the child, we’ll think about him 
differently to if he hits the child and the child is left bumped, bruised, but mostly okay. 
 158 
 
In fact, he is a killer.62 When Maddie smashes the vase, the vase’s owner may now think 
of her as “the girl who smashed my vase”.  
This is not to say that every instance of responsibility plays this role, and I will nuance 
this in chapter 7.
63
 But it is true that our responsibility for an outcome is often a 
conditioning feature, and we do not have a full picture of one’s ethical identity—of who 
someone is—if we do not pay heed to the role that outcome responsibility can play. 
Others agree. Arthur Ripstein called attention to how “Our conception of interpersonal 
interaction is shaped by [outcome responsibility], as is our autobiographical conception 
of ourselves as persons”; this is a “familiar and pervasive feature of human life”.64 John 
Gardner points out that any story of a life that omits the outcomes for which one is 
responsible will seem, at least to us, “strange and attenuated”.65 So, our responsibility for 
outcomes is indeed a conditioning feature that affects our self-conceptions and 
interpersonal reactions, and it plays a widespread and familiar role in our lives. 
6.5 The significance of instances of responsibility 
I have argued that the effect outcome responsibility has on our “identities” is as a 
conditioning feature that engenders ethically important reactions. I have appealed to 
reactions from the first-personal to the third-personal, and suggested that these are 
clearly ethically significant, and thus our responsibility for particular outcomes plays an 
important role in our lives. If our responsibility for particular outcomes is important, we 
can see that it is an appropriate object of agent-regret. But a worry lurks: are these 
ethically important reactions appropriate reactions to our responsibility for outcomes? 
After all, much as we might worry that agent-regret is prevalent but is inappropriate, we 
might worry that if our responsibility is important only because of prevalent reactions, 
this doesn’t let us see that our responsibility is important and rightly a part of our 
identities, so it won’t help us vindicate agent-regret.  
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One response here is that the fact these reactions are so ingrained leads to a Strawsonian 
conclusion. Williams claimed that we (we humans, as we are) cannot imagine our lives 
without agent-regret and responsibility for unintended outcomes;66 likewise, we have 
seen that Ripstein and Gardner think our reactions to outcome responsibility are deeply 
ingrained: our responsibility for outcomes clearly plays a role in the ways in which we 
think of ourselves and others. Further, “our natural human commitment to ordinary 
interpersonal attitudes… is part of the general framework of human life, not something 
that can come up for review as particular cases can come up for review within this general 
framework.”67 Given that we find our reactions to ourselves and others conditioned by 
responsibility for various outcomes, and given that this is widespread and commonplace, 
we should not think that we can just excise these reactions and keep a grip on a 
recognisable human life.68 The significance of our responsibility for outcomes is given 
by the significance of our reactions to our responsibility for outcomes.69 
Further, this lets us see that agent-regret is proper, in two ways. Firstly, it is a widespread 
and deep emotion, so it needs a significant object—and our outcome responsibility is 
significant insofar as it plays this role in our reactions. Given that agent-regret responds 
to our responsibility for particular outcomes, we see that agent-regret responds to 
something significant. Secondly, agent-regret is (at least in many cases) one of these 
reactions—to feel agent-regret is to see myself as a killer or a vase-breaker—so we cannot 
just excise agent-regret from our emotional lives.  
I noted in the introduction that our reactions are important guides in revealing what is 
important to us, and how we think of ourselves. If one accepts this, the Strawsonian 
conclusion will likely be satisfactory. But the Strawsonian conclusion can be deepened, 
and in doing this we see a response to a challenge to it: that although this syndrome of 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 29.  See Raz, FNTR, 235. 
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reactions clearly has a role in our lives, and cannot just be abandoned on a whim, our 
reactions might be inescapable but ill-founded. We might be mistaken to react in this 
way and to treat our responsibility as significant despite what even the Strawsonian says.  
Drawing on chapter 5, I want to sketch the outlines of a reply that shows that our 
responsibility for outcomes is significant to who we are independently of our reactions 
to it.
70
 By seeing that these ethically-significant reactions respond to a feature of an agent 
that is plausibly significant independently of these reactions, we can set aside the worry 
that they are somehow misguided. To do this, I want to contrast my account with a 
similar effort by Raz. In From Normativity to Responsibility, Raz tries to vindicate the 
inescapability of our reactions, including agent-regret, to what we do and how this 
connects to “our sense of ‘who we are’.”71 Raz recognises there is a Strawsonian argument 
lurking, but is not satisfied with the inescapability of these reactions: it is one thing to 
show that we have these reactions, it is another to show they are “justified, and to explain 
their significance in our lives.”72 These reactions are inescapable, but are they rightly 
inescapable? 
Raz’s approach turns around the independently plausible claim that our abilities are 
significant features of our ethical identities.73 Being able to fish or woodwork is a part of 
who I am. On Raz’s picture, individual instances of responsibility are significant, and 
our reactions towards them are justified, in virtue of the significance of our abilities and 
the role they play in our identities. By reacting to particular instances of being 
responsible for an outcome, we “are simply affirming” that we have such abilities that 
allow us to be held responsible.74 Likewise, when others hold us responsible, they 
“acknowledge our mastery of those abilities”.75 When Ali beat Foreman, it affirmed that 
he was the world’s best boxer, and our reactions of awe at his success made sense in 
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 This is an attempt to show why our responsibility for an outcome has a place in our ethical identities. 
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 Raz, FNTR, 235. For further discussion of Raz’s approach see Raz, “On Normativity and 
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light of the connection between being responsible for beating Foreman and his abilities 
that made him responsible. What’s more, were we not to have these reactions (to 
ourselves, or were others not to react in ways that hold us responsible), it would be akin—
at least in some cases—to denying that an agent has such abilities that make these 
attributions of responsibility appropriate.76 This amounts to denying that I have this or 
that identity, given the place, for Raz, of abilities in identities.  
So, our responsibility for particular outcomes is significant insofar as responsibility is 
based on our abilities, and by reacting to these instances of responsibility we affirm that 
we have such abilities. These abilities carry the load when it comes to the ways in which 
responsibility relates to identity. When it comes to agent-regret, agent-regret is 
appropriate insofar as it admits responsibility for some outcome, and in doing so it 
vindicates that I do indeed have this ability which is part of my identity. The ability is 
the significant feature of who I am, the reaction to being responsible for an outcome 
affirms this.  
Raz is right in citing our abilities as conditioning features of our ethical identities, and he 
is also right that in accepting responsibility we often vindicate our possession of that 
ability. But Raz fails to explain the independent significance of our responsibility for 
outcomes. For Raz, being responsible for some outcome, and reacting to this 
responsibility, is significant only as an affirmation of our abilities. Yet affirming the 
importance of our abilities does not tell us about the importance of particular instances 
of responsibility themselves. This is problematic on two fronts. Firstly, it’s far from clear 
that Pirlo needs to think his responsibility for each missed free-kick matters in order to 
affirm that he has an ability; after all, he can just cast his mind back to the free-kicks he’s 
scored before, and the lorry driver can think about the times he has driven safely. I 
argued in chapter 5 that agents are responsible for unintended outcomes because these 
proceed from their abilities; but, as I noted at the end of 5.5, it doesn’t follow that each 
instance of responsibility matters, nor does this tell us why we should care about an 
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instance of responsibility (as opposed to our status as agents). Raz’s explanation doesn’t 
account for why we might still want to hold someone responsible when we can 
independently verify his possession of an ability. Secondly, and more importantly, to 
hold that individual instances of responsibility are important solely insofar as they 
vindicate that we have particular abilities fails to explain what we have seen so far: that 
responsibility for particular outcomes is significant and affects how we think of an agent. 
Our driver who kills the child has the same abilities as a variant where he injures the 
child—but only our driver is a killer. We need to find a way of showing why these 
instances of responsibility are themselves significant such that we can justify why they 
play a role in our identities; we must ensure that our picture doesn’t put the significance 
of being responsible for an outcome entirely in instrumental terms.  
As I have said, Raz places great importance on the place of our abilities in our identities; 
but Raz also holds that these abilities are significant because of how they relate to our 
status as practical agents; they relate to the impact I can make on the world, and 
condition the things that I can do in the world.77 Still, as Raz recognises, we see our 
abilities as doing more than just showing that we are potent; they are particular ways in 
which we can be potent, and in developing this ability over that, we show what we care 
about and the sort of impact we want to have over the world. Likewise, we might see our 
responsibility for particular outcomes as doing more than just showing that we have 
certain abilities. Our responsibility for a particular outcome is also significant as a 
manifestation of our agency in the world.  
We don’t just make an impact on the world, we make particular impacts and are agents 
in particular ways. Painters cannot just paint, they must paint particular things; agents 
cannot just act, they must perform particular actions and must be responsible for 
particular outcomes.  When we act, we act in particular ways and, as I made clear in 
chapter 5, this sometimes results in unintended outcomes. My responsibility for an 
outcome is significant because it is the way in which I, perhaps unintentionally, make a 
mark on the world. It is significant aside from just being a sign that I have a particular 
ability. Rather, my responsibility for a particular outcome, although relying on having 
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certain abilities, is also a manifestation of my agency. My responsibility for an outcome 
is how I act as an agent who does this or did that; and I need to be responsible for this 
or that, whether it was intended or not, in order to be an agent. Thus my responsibility 
for particular outcomes is significant. 
It is important to note that the significance of these manifestations of agency depends 
on how we think of ourselves as agents. Were we to think of ourselves as tossed about 
on the waves of an unforgiving world then a retreat to the inner citadel seems inevitable: 
what we are—what would and should affect how we see ourselves and how others see 
us—would depend upon features of ourselves that were entirely in our own control. But 
if we think of ourselves as potent but fallible, as I argued in chapters 4 and 5, then we 
will have a different idea. We will see ourselves as responsible for unintended outcomes 
and will recognise that our particular impacts on the world are significant as 
manifestations of our (fallible) agency. These impacts are the ways in which we are 
agents. So, the significance of being an agent might (see 4.1) rest on the significance with 
which we imbue being an agent, and our understanding of agency: as fallible. 
But this is not circular. This does not implicate our interpersonal reactions, it implicates 
our basic conception of an agent. Our responsibility for particular outcomes is significant 
because of a particular view on agency but is significant independently of our the 
ethically significant interpersonal reactions and self-conceptions we have been 
discussing. Yet our interpersonal reactions and self-conceptions appropriately respond 
to our responsibility for outcomes. By treating our responsibility for outcomes as 
features of our conditioning identities, we treat our status as agents as significant, and we 
show that we think that making an impact on the world is important. The inescapability 
of our reactions to our responsibility for unintended outcomes is not arbitrary or 
mistaken but can instead be seen as a way of recognising—and bolstering—the 
significance of being responsible for particular outcomes. This idea of “manifestation” 
is nebulous, and I have not fully sketched it, though I hope we can see the difference 
between manifesting our agency and a sign that we are agents, and that we can recognise 
that it is at least plausible that manifestations are important to our “identities” as agents. 
Raz’s account tells us that the particular things we do are important, and we rightly react 
to them, because this vindicates that we have particular abilities; having particular 
abilities is important, and this is because being an agent is important. I agree, but I add 
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that the particular things we do are important not just as signs that we have these abilities 
or that we are agents, but as manifestations of our agency. So, not only is outcome 
responsibility important insofar as our responsibility for particular outcomes is a feature 
that affects our self-conceptions and interpersonal reactions in a seemingly inescapable 
way; more than that, our responsibility for particular outcomes is itself significant in light 
of manifesting our potency over the world and explains why we have these reactions: 
they are a response to the ways in which we manifest our agency in the world. 
Thus, we see what might be wrong with Pirlo denying his responsibility for missing a 
free-kick matters (or just straight-up denying that he was responsible). We need not say 
that in denying that his responsibility matters he denies that he has certain abilities. 
Instead, we can set the problem in another way: an agent’s responsibility for a particular 
outcome is an important feature in how we react to that agent, and how that agent 
conceives of himself; these reactions are, as a whole, inescapable; they are rightly 
inescapable because our responsibility for outcomes is independently significant as a 
manifestation of our powers over the world. That is not to say that every time we have 
an impact on the world it matters (we discuss this further in 7.1). But often our impacts 
on the world do matter, and this is because we see ourselves as potent in particular ways. 
Scoring goals is significant in a way that, say, treading on the carpet is not. So, generally, 
scoring goals will affect how Pirlo thinks of himself. So why would he think he can 
exempt himself from those reactions in this case? He better have a good explanation to 
hand, because in denying responsibility, or denying that this instance of responsibility 
matters, he exempts himself (in this case) from central human reactions, and seems to 
ignore the independent significance of his responsibility for an outcome. We explore 
this a little more in chapter 7, in light of the external view.  
6.6 Responsibility and identity 
In this chapter I introduced the idea that our responsibility for outcomes affects our 
identities. I started by sketching how Honoré and Williams both advance this idea, 
noting that it has garnered some support as plausible and insightful. We considered the 
idea that essential features of our ethical identities are altered by what we are responsible 
for. I suggested that this was not a convincing way of understanding Gauguin’s situation: 
he does not regret being Gauguin, nor does a failed Gauguin wish he was someone else. 
Yet in introducing ethical identity I stressed how it conditions our self-conceptions, 
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interpersonal reactions, and projects; features can affect these reactions without being 
essential to that individual.  
I suggested that this is the best way of understanding the identity claim: not only does it 
avoid the implausible extremes of Dan-Cohen’s position, but it captures the importance 
of being responsible for an outcome. We do not need to say, as Dan-Cohen says, that 
Gauguin cannot regret his success because to regret it would be to wish he was someone 
else. Rather, who we actually are (in a way that conditions how we see ourselves and how 
others see us) depends on, amongst other things, the outcomes for which we are 
responsible.  
Being responsible for an outcome is important because of the role this plays in how we 
think of ourselves and others; this leads to a Strawsonian conclusion: we cannot just 
abandon these reactions for they play an important part in human life. But there lurked 
a worry that we might be somehow mistaken, so it helped to bolster this by showing why 
these reactions might be appropriate by demonstrating the significance of our 
responsibility for outcomes without appealing to our reactions. I suggested that Raz’s 
approach doesn’t get us quite far enough because it shows only the significance of our 
abilities. Instead, I suggested that we can establish the significance of our responsibility 
for outcomes by way of the significance of our potency over the world. Particular 
outcomes are not just significant as signs that we have certain abilities, or that we are 
agents; rather, they are the manifestations of our agency. Much as painters paint 
particular works, agents are responsible for particular outcomes, and we are agents in 
being responsible for particular outcomes. 
This lets us finally vindicate agent-regret. Agent-regret responds to our responsibility for 
an outcome. This responsibility is significant because it is a manifestation of our agency, 
and it underpins our identities—playing a seemingly-inescapable, and ethically 
significant, role in our lives. Agent-regret is an appropriate reaction because our 
responsibility for outcomes is significant; it is significant in a variety of circumstances and 
can be deeply important, such as when the driver becomes a killer (which we will discuss 
further in chapter 7). So, agent-regret finds itself an appropriate object that can vindicate 
its depth and prevalence as an appropriate reaction to a deep and prevalent feature: 
one’s responsibility for particular outcomes.  
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Interlude: Gauguin 
I want to apply my account to Gauguin’s inability to feel regret, to tie up the loose end 
from above left by Dan-Cohen’s account failing to help us understand Gauguin’s 
situation. Here is another approach. Gerald Lang suggests that Gauguin gains a new 
“evaluative perspective” on matters by succeeding, and this explains why he can’t feel 
agent-regret.78 This goes wrong, but in a different way to Dan-Cohen’s account. There is 
a difference in evaluative perspectives between a Gauguin who adopts a project to paint 
in Tahiti and one who does not. Adopting the project to set off for Tahiti will “condition 
[his] later desires and judgments.”79 If he commits to going to Tahiti then the values that 
he previously wavered over are now solidified, he commits to the idea that becoming a 
painter is the supremely important task of his life.80 But both a successful and a failed 
Gauguin think a painterly life is supremely important.  
The reason Gauguin cannot feel regret is that he has achieved the things that he thinks 
are worthwhile. It is success that makes the project significant, not in terms of making 
the project something Gauguin sees as worthwhile but in terms of realising the valuable 
thing that he sought. If we grant Williams’s assumption that Gauguin does not change 
his projects, we can see why he won’t be able to feel regret: he has achieved what he sees 
as worthwhile.81 A failed Gauguin has no success, no responsibility for any particular 
outcome that lets him achieve what he thinks is worthwhile.82 The difference is not in 
the values they hold, but whether or not they realise those values by becoming painters.83 
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It is a difference not in the sort of people they want to be, but in the sort of people they 
are.84
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Chapter 7 
Agent-Regret in our Lives 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I expand on how what we have seen so far affects various features of 
agent-regret. In 7.1, I consider how what we care about affects the ascription of outcomes 
to agents and our reactions to this responsibility, before applying this to the external 
view. In 7.2, I show how the relationship between identity and outcome responsibility 
explains several cases of pure agent-regret. In 7.3, I consider moving on from agent-
regret; I argue that agent-regret shifts over time, but an agent who feels agent-regret 
should not end up feeling mere regret. In 7.4 I explore the expression of agent-regret. 
7.1 Care 
In this section, I consider how what we care about relates to agent-regret. This will let us 
see how there can be a divergence in judgments over whether someone is responsible 
and thus whether they will (or should) feel agent-regret. It will also provide a more 
nuanced understanding of the role of outcome responsibility in our identities and will 
help us understand the external view.  
7.1.1 Care and Identity 
What we care about affects our ethical identities. It can have this effect in two distinct 
places. Firstly, it can affect which outcomes are ascribed to an agent in the first place. As 
I noted in 2.3.1, whether we ascribe an outcome to an agent—more broadly, whether we 
ascribe an outcome to any event—will depend upon the purposes of our inquiries and 
our own interests. Of course, there are general restrictions on this: it will likely be very 
difficult to think oneself responsible despite a variety of later interventions or if one’s 
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action played a tiny causal role.1 But there is an interesting case in which one might think 
someone is responsible for an outcome when no one else agrees: when I, and only I, 
judge myself to be responsible.2  
We have no special concern with most other people’s lives; but my own life, and my 
relationship with those I care about, is important to me in a way it might not be important 
to other people, morality, or the law. Thus my own actions (and perhaps the actions of 
those who are very close to me) will be more salient to me, and are more likely to stand 
out to me as interventions.3 Take the following case. In The Memoirs of Miss Sidney 
Bidulph, Sidney encourages her husband to go riding, he falls off his horse and dies, 
and she blames herself.4 We do not want Sidney to blame herself; yet we can see why 
she ascribes her husband’s death at least partly to her own agency. But those around her 
might not think she is responsible. Yet in thinking herself responsible, she makes no 
error. Her divergence from the judgment of outsiders is a sign not that she has erred but 
that she cares about particular things—namely, she has a particular interest in her role in 
the world, and the effect she has on those she loves. It should be no surprise if her own 
actions are more salient and stand out more vividly to her than to others.
5
 
This brings us on to a second point: what we care about affects whether we think our 
responsibility for an outcome is important and whether it conditions our interpersonal 
reactions and self-conceptions. Being masterful at the piano or knowing a lot about the 
Rochester Red Wings will matter to different people and will affect our self-conceptions 
or interpersonal reactions in different ways. We should not expect uniformity in how 
people react to an agent’s responsibility for an outcome. Just because you care about 
                                               
 
 
1
 Honoré’s own response is to note that there are “objective and interpersonal principles of attribution. 
These principles tell us, at least approximately, which outcomes are attributable to which acts.” Honoré, 
225. It strikes me that Honoré downplays the potential for conflict, and my account allows for greater 
divergence in attributions. 
2
 Likewise, I might be answerable not to anyone else, but only to myself, or God Duff, Answering for 
Crime, 2009, 26–27. 
3
 See Nagel, “Moral Luck,” 37–38. 
4
 Discussed at Macpherson, Harm’s Way, 158–59. Citing Sheridan, The Memoirs of Miss Sidney 
Bidulph, 283–87. 
5
 Relatedly: “the significance of someone's life and its relations to society may be such that someone needs 
to recognise and express his responsibility for actions when no one else would have the right to make a 
claim for damages or be in a position to” Williams, S&N, 74. "…to hold oneself responsible only when 
the public could rightfully hold one responsible is not a sign of maturity." Williams, “Voluntary Acts and 
Responsible Agents,” 32.  
 170 
 
something, it doesn’t mean that I will. Some feature might condition how you think 
about me whilst leaving me unmoved. So it might be that you care about a feature and 
it affects your self-conception, but nobody else cares and it does not affect how others 
interact with you, or vice versa. 
We also will often be responsible for an outcome without this mattering to anybody. 
Whenever we step on carpet we make a certain indent and are thus responsible for that 
indent, but it has no impact on anyone’s self-conception or interpersonal reactions. As 
I noted, albeit briefly, in chapter 6: we should not think that our responsibility for 
outcomes is always important or that each time we are responsible this has some impact 
on our identities. The claim is not that every instance of responsibility alters our 
identities; rather, it is that in order to properly understand our identities we need to 
appreciate that our responsibility for particular outcomes plays some role here. Our 
impact on the world matters to us, but it does not follow that every impact matters nor 
that each impact matters in the same way. 
So, what we care about matters to agent-regret in several respects. We saw at 5.5 that 
emotions presuppose care: to feel agent-regret over your responsibility for an outcome 
you must care about your responsibility for that outcome. But whether you judge that 
you are responsible will depend upon what you care about; and whether you care about 
your responsibility for that outcome—and thus whether it affects your self-conception—
will depend further upon what you care about. Recognising this and recognising that 
there can be divergence over what people care about, and thus recognising that there 
might be debate over whether someone should or should not, will or will not, feel agent-
regret, is an important step in capturing a sufficiently subtle understanding of agent-
regret. 
7.1.2 The external view 
Seeing that care and our identities connect also helps us to understand what it means to 
take an external view.6 We may be responsible for some outcome and recognise this 
                                               
 
 
6
 On Meir Dan-Cohen’s understanding, which we can see without accepting his picture of identity, we can 
hold certain of our features as closer to or further from “the self’s “core””. Dan-Cohen, “Responsibility 
and the Boundaries of the Self,” 972. See also 966-972, 990. Dan-Cohen’s position brings out a nuance 
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but, for some reason or other, fail to care about this responsibility. (This can apply third-
personally: others might recognise that I am responsible for an outcome yet not ascribe 
it any importance and not let it affect how they see me.) I suggested at 1.2.2 that when 
we take an external view on an action we either do not care about or do not identify with 
that outcome.7 The above discussion draws these together: the fact that my responsibility 
for an outcome leads me to think of myself in a different way shows that I care about 
this instance of responsibility. 
When I take an external view on my action I regard it as if it were someone else’s. I 
might feel regret, but I cannot feel agent-regret. We can understand this: I recognise I 
was responsible but I do not care that I was responsible and so do not let this 
responsibility affect my self-conception, so I can regard that action as if it were anyone 
else’s.8 To take an external view is to recognise that one did make an impact on the 
world, but it is to insulate oneself from at least some of the reactions attendant to this. 
Sometimes this can reveal an immaturity in the agent, such as if Maddie doesn’t care 
about smashing the vase because she has a tenuous grip on her own relationship with 
the world; other times this is perfectly fine, such as when Maddie just has much more 
important things on her plate. We can thus understand taking an external view in terms 
of both care and identity. We will return to the external view below when we discuss the 
expression of agent-regret in 7.4.  
7.2 Pure cases of agent-regret 
In chapter 3, I introduced pure cases of agent-regret. On my analysis of agent-regret, 
although in many cases of agent-regret one regrets one’s responsibility for an outcome 
because one regrets that outcome, one can also regret one’s responsibility without 
regretting the outcome. This is a novel analysis of agent-regret and I think it is the correct 
                                               
 
 
that has been implicit in our discussion: something can be more or less significant to who I am. It’s quite 
plausible that there is a spectrum between internal and external, and Dan-Cohen’s view would nicely 
capture that. 
7
 See also Wojtowicz, “Bernard Williams on Regarding One’s Own Action Purely Externally,” 58–65. 
8
 Regret can affect our interpersonal reactions. Yet it need not. I might regret the fact that someone did 
this, without caring about who did it, and thus without it affecting my interpersonal reactions with anybody. 
Thus I can take an external view without altering my self-conception (say, via my interpersonal-reaction-
to-someone-who-is-actually-me). 
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analysis, but it has taken a back seat in much of this thesis. What we have seen in chapter 
6 helps to shed light on pure cases, and this is worth exploring. 
I suggested that we can feel agent-regret without regretting an outcome itself. How can 
we regret our responsibility for an outcome if we don’t see that outcome as in itself bad? 
Williams, through his characters of Jim and George, shows us that sometimes it matters 
who does something; Amelie Rorty, through her character of the mother who completes 
the daughter's project, shows us that even with good outcomes it can be bad that the 
wrong person brought it about; Shylock and Inigo Montoya both show us that, in cases 
of revenge, it can matter who metes out vengeance.  
Thinking about the impact on our identities illuminates some pure cases. The effect of 
outcome responsibility on our identities can explain why we feel agent-regret even when 
we do not regret an outcome. Consider the boss from 3.2 who must fire the useless 
worker. She might think that in doing so, she demonstrates that she is ruthless: in doing 
so she might confirm that she has a certain trait (this would be akin to the Razian 
interpretation of why instances of responsibility matter). Or it might be that in firing him 
she becomes someone she was not before. She has now fired someone, which is a 
feature that many of us might find, to greater or lesser degrees, significant. The ex-
employee might, unless he is particularly generous, think of her as the woman who, if 
not ruined his life, at least made his life much more difficult. The boss’s firing someone 
is perhaps significant to her because her father lost his job when she was a child, and he 
always spoke with utter contempt of the person who fired him: so, she holds “firers” in 
contempt. Certainly, firing this employee won’t always be salient to her, but she may 
sometimes think of herself in these terms and this explains why she regrets firing him. 
The rifleman might regret his responsibility not because of the fact that a life has been 
taken from the world, but because he did it and because of what that does to him. His 
mother—horrified that her son has killed someone—tries to maintain the love and 
affection she has always shown him but hugs him just a little less tightly, and he notices 
this. What bothers him, what makes him wish he had never killed that man, is not that 
the convict was executed but how his responsibility for this death has conditioned how 
even his own mother sees him. We do not just need to think of this in terms of our 
interpersonal reactions; his self-conception might also be on the line. He sees himself 
now as a killer, and this comes with associated baggage. Likewise, the hateful driver will—
 173 
 
just like the ordinary lorry driver—see himself as a killer. And the press photos, the 
disgusted looks in the street, combined with the (as he now sees as) tasteless high-fives 
demonstrate just how much killing Margaret Thatcher or the warmonger will affect how 
others see him.  
Compare a real case, though not a pure one, that demonstrates this impact on our 
identities. Raimond Gaita discusses a Dutch woman who hates Hitler most of all for 
making “a murderess of her”: she was in a plot to assassinate Hitler and had to turn 
three Jews out of her protection to not risk the plot.9 They were killed. Although she 
clearly regrets the death of those she was protecting, one can also recognise a self-
focussed element. She does not merely regret their deaths, she also regrets the fact that 
she had a hand in it; she conceives of this in terms of the effect it has on who she is: she 
is now a murderess in her own eyes. Our responsibility for outcomes is part of our 
identities, and this identity can be lamentable. One reason we might feel agent-regret 
even when we do not feel regret about the outcome is that our responsibility for 
outcomes changes who we are.  
But the Dutch woman should help to ward us away from a worry about agent-regret that 
is particularly prominent if my pure analysis is right: that it is narcissistic and 
demonstrates that one cares only about oneself. The Dutch woman is concerned with 
herself and the fact she is made into a murderess, but this is not her only concern: she 
cares also about the victims. More often than not, one cares about one’s responsibility 
for an outcome because one cares about something other than one’s responsibility, such 
as for the outcome, or for the people involved in that outcome.10 Take the lorry driver. 
Of course, he won’t care about the child he kills in the same way that a parent cares 
about their child; but we often do have a general care for other human beings and do 
not want to make their lives worse.11 He cares about being responsible for the child’s 
death because he cares in this general way about the child. And this is why his 
responsibility for the child’s death affects his identity in a negative way. We have no 
reason to draw the unpalatable conclusion that agent-regret is totally self-regarding. It is 
                                               
 
 
9
 Gaita, Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, 43. 
10
 See Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni, In Defense of Shame, 179–84. 
11
 See the discussion of Wallace and how we have a general care for humanity, above at 4.4.2 
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self-regarding—what I have done is central to agent-regret—but very often we care about 
our responsibility for outcomes and that responsibility impacts our self-conceptions 
because we care about the outcomes or the people implicated in those outcomes.  
Yet it is true that sometimes we care about our responsibility for outcomes without caring 
about the people involved in those outcomes. Is this problematic? No. Not if we grant, 
as I think we should, that there is nothing wrong with not caring about certain people. 
The rifleman, although he might be saddened by the fact that the convict committed 
such crimes, can feel that the convict deserves to die and make no negative evaluation 
of his execution. There doesn’t seem to be anything wrong if he nonetheless cares about 
his own place in the world, and his own role in bringing about that outcome: Williams’s 
Jim gets us a long way towards seeing this. 
These pure cases, and our understanding of the role that responsibility plays in our 
identities, also help us understand the wish involved in agent-regret. Agent-regret 
involves the wish that something had been different, but this need not involve the wish 
that this outcome had never arisen.12 When we feel pure agent-regret, we might not regret 
the outcome, we regret that we have done such a thing. So, we might wish that we had 
never done such a thing without any associated wish about the outcome itself. Or 
perhaps we have an even more specific thought. The rifleman might wish that he didn’t 
care about his responsibility, that he didn’t think of himself as a killer or attach any 
negative connotations to that. Perhaps the lesson of pure cases is that even if agent-regret 
is not perniciously self-regarding, at its core it is about me. And to understand agent-
regret, we need to understand this. 
7.3 Moving on 
In this section, I explore what Williams meant when he said that we should try to move 
the lorry driver away from his feeling of agent-regret: 
“Doubtless, and rightly, people will try, in comforting him, to move the 
driver from this state of feeling, move him indeed from where he is to 
something more like the place of a spectator, but it is important that this 
is seen as something that should need to be done, and indeed some 
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 Williams discusses this in terms of foreseen outcomes at “Moral Luck,” 31. 
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doubt would be felt about a driver who too blandly or readily moved to 
that position. We feel sorry for the driver, but that sentiment co-exists 
with, indeed presupposes, that there is something special about his 
relation to this happening, something which cannot merely be eliminated 
by the consideration that it was not his fault.”13 
I do not read Williams as saying that the driver must move away from feeling agent-
regret, that agent-regret is a temporary feeling and that he should end up exactly like a 
spectator.14 Instead, he should feel agent-regret, but its urgency and strength should 
decline so that he is closer to the spectator. I will argue that we can better understand 
moving on by considering the role that responsibility plays in our identities. I will do this 
by exploring the reflections of Darin Strauss, who, as a sixteen-year-old, killed a fellow 
student in a road accident (through no fault of his own).15  
Strauss did not attempt to disavow the significance of his responsibility. It has massively 
impacted his life and affects how he sees himself. It had all the impacts on his identity 
that we might expect from chapter 6. But although Strauss always accepted responsibility 
and the significance of this, he tried to hide it from newer acquaintances:  
“College offered a sort of witness protection program. Everyone in my high 
school knew. No one at Tufts did. And while I was there, they never would.”  
“I didn't tell any friends. I thought it would taint how they saw me. I thought they 
wouldn't want to know. Who would want to know? Even I didn't want to.” 
Strauss knew that telling people about what he had done would change how they 
interacted with him. Not telling them made sense, and his behaviour seems perfectly 
acceptable.  
Being responsible for outcomes, especially particularly horrifying ones, can be 
“positively destructive of my sense of identity”.16 Our reflections on identity make sense 
of this. When others think about Strauss, knowing that he is a killer—and when Strauss 
regards himself as a killer, which is often enough and no doubt even worse when 
surrounded by others who see him as one—this blots everything else out. It is destructive 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 28. 
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 Pace Sussman, “Is Agent-Regret Rational?,” 801. See also Jacobson, “Regret, Agency, and Error,” 115–
16. 
15
 The quotes below come from the transcript of “Life After Death.” 
16
 Beever, “Corrective Justice and Personal Responsibility in Tort Law,” 490. 
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of his identity not insofar as it literally destroys other features of his ethical identity, but 
insofar as it looms over them all, being so significant that it sandblasts the subtlety out of 
any interactions with him. Had it become known to the other students at Tufts, it would 
have altered almost every one of his social interactions.17  
What does this mean for moving on? It should be unsurprising that, especially soon 
after we have done something or discovered our responsibility for an outcome, this can 
loom large over us; to move on is to stop this responsibility from looming too large.18 
MaryAnn Gray, another accidental killer, tells of how her own attitude to herself has 
softened. Whereas once she would hear the voice of the boy who she killed criticizing 
her, she now still hears the voice but it has softened to the voice of a friend.19 In discussing 
Oedipus, Williams considers the contrast between Oedipus’s “I have done it with my 
own hand” offered just after discovering that he killed his father and wed his mother, 
and his “I suffered those deeds more than I acted them” offered as he reflects back years 
later; Williams sees this as “Oedipus’s attempt to come to terms with what his erga, his 
deeds, have meant for his life.”20 Oedipus moved from a self-punitive excess (he plucked 
out his eyes), to a far more sanguine view of what he had done and its impact on him.  
But one does not get the impression that these figures entirely lose their agent-regret; 
quite the opposite, they are often clear that what they have done will always stay with 
them.21 Their regret mellows; the voices that harass them soften; the ways in which they 
see themselves take on a brighter mood. Why? Because their responsibility for that 
outcome starts to play a more nuanced, role in their view of themselves. These agents 
still recognise the significance of what they did, but they put it into perspective. We need 
not think of this as an abandonment of agent-regret, nor a move from agent-regret to a 
different emotion. Instead we can see this shift as akin to the shift in grief. The grief felt 
upon losing a loved one is a deeply intense emotion, but it inevitably fades into a softer 
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 See also: “I struggle daily with the riddle of how to go on living as the person I have become. To be The 
Man Who killed, or not be defined by that one event?” Izard, “‘I Had Become a Killer.’” 
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 The shift from an incredibly harsh and looming attitude to one in which the agent has a more nuanced 
and softer view of themselves, comes out in several real life accounts, see, for instance: Bartley, “Killing a 
Man...”; “Meeting the Man I Killed - BBC Radio 4”; Izard, “‘I Had Become a Killer.’” 
19
 “Meeting the Man I Killed - BBC Radio 4,” 33:25. 
20
 Williams, S&N, 68–69.  
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 “I will always carry it with me.” Bartley, “Killing a Man...” 
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form. Likewise, the impact on our identity changes, but it need not dissipate—and our 
regret will capture this. 
The role that others play in moving on is to help move us away from being defined by 
this one event. But it is important they recognise that agent-regret is appropriate. Take 
the following from “Patricia”, who hit a motorcyclist after being blinded by a sunbeam. 
Patricia is clearly upset by her friends reminding her that it was just an accident: 
“Yes, it was an accident, and in a certain sense we were both to blame, but, at 
the end of the day, I hit him, I took his life... No matter how much you want to 
dismiss it as an accident, I still feel responsible for it, and I am.” She cried, “I hit 
him! Why does nobody understand this?”22 
“It’s not your fault” can sound like it wasn’t your responsibility, and when an agent feels 
agent-regret they do recognise that they were responsible and are responding 
appropriately. Presumably, the proper route here is to remind the agent that, although 
it looms large over who they are—and it always will—their responsibility for killing a child 
is not all there is to who they are. We should respect they were responsible but remind 
them that our identities are made up of more than our deeds and that we have many 
deeds not just one. Sometimes they are important and should be prominent, but 
accidentally killing someone should not obliterate everything else in an innocent 
person’s life.  
7.4 The expression of agent-regret 
Now, we shouldn’t suppose that this shift in the force of our agent-regret just happens, 
sometimes the agent needs to take certain steps. One way of moving on is linked to the 
“expression” of agent-regret—the actions it urges us to perform—and pure cases help us 
to see some interesting ways that agent-regret might be expressed.23  
One who feels agent-regret will often feel the need to “act in some way which he hopes 
will constitute or at least symbolise some kind of recompense or restitution.”24 Williams 
points out that one can be willing to compensate despite taking an external view, and if 
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 Gregory, “The Sorrow and the Shame of the Accidental Killer.” 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 27. 
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 Williams, “Moral Luck,” 28. 
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one takes an external view one would be just as happy were an insurance company to 
pay out whereas this leaves one unsatisfied in a case of agent-regret.25 I have explored 
this in more depth elsewhere, but a simple way of explaining this expression and the 
difference with compensation is by focussing on why one makes such a pay-out. An 
agent might be willing to pay compensation because they think that, all things being 
equal, it is unfair to leave the costs of one’s actions on someone else. What matters here 
is the unfairness of the other person suffering the burden; were that to be eased by an 
insurance pay-out, the need to compensate would disappear, and our agent would be 
satisfied.26  
Williams’s suggestion is that an agent who feels agent-regret will be motivated by a 
different thought. He is not only motivated to pay out of considerations of fairness, 
although these may play a role. Instead, it seems that his own responsibility is what 
underpins much of his desire to make amends—it is his responsibility for the outcome 
that urges him to make amends.27 Why would the agent have to be the one to make 
amends? And why do I suggest that this expression might help us in moving on? 
One explanation is that, despite trying her best, the agent violated a reason and that 
reason persists, just in some other form.28 You had a reason not to harm me because 
this makes my life worse, and although you have harmed me—through your action that 
left you responsible, without being at fault, for my injury—you might still comply, in some 
other way, with your reason not to make my life (overall) worse. This is what John 
Gardner calls the continuity thesis. Although we can quibble about the details, it strikes 
me as a reasonable way of understanding why we must make amends. This helps us to 
make sense of how we can move on in feeling agent-regret. If you have reasons to make 
amends, then this exerts some pull over you and may well compound the strength of 
your emotions; once you conform to these reasons as best you can, then the weight of 
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 Williams, 28–29. 
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 Wojtowicz, “Bernard Williams on Regarding One’s Own Action Purely Externally,” 63. 
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 Williams, 29. 
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 See Gardner, “What Is Tort Law For? Part 1.”. For two interesting theories of compensation that have 
some affinity with Gardner’s work, see Karhu, “Non-Compensable Harms”; Slavny, “Negating and 
Counterbalancing.” 
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non-compliance lifts and it will be no surprise that your emotional reaction lightens as 
well.  
This strikes me as a reasonable way of understanding many expressions of agent-regret; 
but I will focus elsewhere, on how our picture of outcome responsibility and identity 
relates to the expression of agent-regret. As I noted above, we can soften our agent-regret 
by re-evaluating the importance that instance of responsibility plays in our identities. It 
should be clear that this won’t always succeed through merely thinking about things or 
talking to others. Quite often, we will have to do things, altering how we see ourselves 
and how others see us by doing other things. The following example illustrates how our 
actions can do this. John Profumo was involved in a sex scandal; he was Secretary of 
State for War and slept with the same woman a Russian naval attaché slept with. And 
he lied to parliament about it all. After being caught lying, he resigned in disgrace. Soon 
after this, he started helping out at a local charity, which he served for decades. His work 
has been described in terms of atonement and redemption.29 Profumo’s actions changed 
how people saw him. He was no longer seen just in light of his sex scandal—although he 
was still seen in such lights—but also in a new light, as a redeemed figure. His amends 
also amend his identity. 
No doubt Profumo’s actions were also an attempt at making amends for what he had 
done, if not the fact he had lied to parliament at least the fact he had let down those he 
served in parliament; it was a way of making this up to the people by helping people 
more directly. But those who feel pure agent-regret have no such concerns. It wouldn’t 
make sense to try to compensate for the harm wrought by their actions because they do 
not regret this harm. What option is left open to someone who does not want to make 
up for the outcome itself, but only is concerned with their own responsibility for it? The 
important factor is why they care about their responsibility. The rifleman might focus 
on altering how particular people (such as his mother) see him. The hateful driver might 
focus on why he thinks being a killer matters and on performing some constructive steps 
that get him to move past just seeing himself as a killer. What should be clear is that 
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 “Profumo’s Charity Work Remembered.” See also Runciman, “Take a Bullet for the Team.” 
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their actions will not be directed to those who they have harmed—they will be directed 
to, say, reforming their own identities. 
We find a vivid example of how someone can change how others see them (albeit, in 
this case, unintentionally) in Ian McEwan’s Atonement. Robbie, trying to help Cecilia, 
smashes her vase and a shard drops into a fountain; “Denying his help, any possibility 
of making amends, was his punishment”: she steps into the fountain herself to retrieve 
the shard.30 Robbie still wants to make amends, or at least apologise, and drafts a rather 
bland letter of apology. In another draft of the letter, which he means to discard, he 
writes “In my dreams I kiss your cunt […] In my thoughts I make love to you all day 
long.”31 He accidentally sends the explicit note. Cecilia receives it, their recent tension 
breaks, and they have sex in the library.  
This is not a point about amends, nor need we suppose that Robbie is actively trying to 
alter how Cecilia thinks of him—although clearly in drafting the bland letter he wanted 
to make amends or at least stop Cecilia from allowing the vase-breaking incident to loom 
too large. Rather, the point is simpler: after he sends the explicit letter, all thoughts of 
the vase are long gone. By accidentally sending the explicit letter, Robbie completely 
alters how Cecilia thinks of him. (The letter also affects how Cecilia’s sister (who reads 
it) thinks of Robbie—the perception others have of him is massively impacted by the 
letter, and this drives the novel.) 
The point for us is that the things we do can have a greater or lesser impact on how 
people see us. Sometimes, we can alter how people see us and lessen the importance of 
our responsibility for particular outcomes (at least insofar as it affects our interactions 
with that person) by establishing or highlighting other of our features for them to focus 
on that have nothing to do with the original incident. Cecilia now sees Robbie as a sexual 
being, and the vase is no longer important. Someone who feels agent-regret might learn 
from this; they might take their responsibility for that outcome and scrub it from their 
identity as much as possible—but to do this, they don’t always have to attend to the action 
that they regret.  
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Identity certainly does not carry all the weight when it comes to the expression of agent-
regret; but I hope to have shown that the expression of agent-regret can aim at affecting 
one’s own identity, and in pure cases this might be all that the expression needs to do. 
Agent-regret, in its purest form, shows no concern for the people or objects involved in 
the outcome. What matters is the fact that I was responsible, and sometimes this matters 
because it affects how others see me. Yet even when agent-regret is pure, to totally scrub 
away one’s responsibility for an outcome from one’s identity, either by denying 
responsibility or denying any importance to this, will often be inappropriate. We must 
respect our potency as agents. Working out what steps are appropriate will be a fraught 
task. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Robbie’s case reinforces something I mentioned at the end of 7.3: our ethical identities 
are conditioned by a wide variety of features. Outcome responsibility and agent-regret 
is embedded in the larger mess that is our lives. Love, sex, friendship, enmity, unrelated 
projects, or any manner of other parts of our lives, might affect how we judge our 
responsibility for outcomes and the presence or absence, strength or weakness, of agent-
regret. One thing I regret in this thesis is that I have not made this clearer throughout. 
Yet I hope to have made agent-regret clearer. My focus has been on defusing a variety 
of prominent challenges to both the nature and justifiability of agent-regret. I hope that 
by paying keen attention to the nature of agent-regret, and then bringing attention to the 
importance of our responsibility for outcomes, I have offered a defence of our 
propensity to feel agent-regret. Agent-regret takes as its object our responsibility for an 
outcome (including when that outcome was not intended) and agent-regret is 
appropriate (justified, rational, etc.) because such responsibility is important. Agent-
regret is appropriate, and to feel it is to respond properly to important aspects of 
ourselves as human agents in this world. 
But we will not come to a clear understanding of agent-regret unless we appreciate what 
I have called the purity of agent-regret: that we can regret our responsibility for an 
outcome without regretting the outcome itself. Any proper account of agent-regret must 
pay heed to this, and—although the purity of agent-regret has not been my focus—I hope 
to have at least made progress by exploring the impact that our responsibility for 
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outcomes has on us. I hope to have made it clear that to properly understand agent-
regret, we need to understand how Adam Smith was right when he wrote:  
“[T]he evil which is done without design should be regarded as a 
misfortune to the doer as well as to the sufferer.”32 
                                               
 
 
32
 Smith, TMS, II.iii.3.4. 
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